Victoria Farrelly v. State of Arkansas

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Not designated for publication. DIVISION I  CACR07­272  NOVEMBER 14, 2007  VICTORIA FARRELLY  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  FAULKNER  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­2002­1671]  HON. CHARLES E. CLAWSON,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  On  December  4,  2006,  the  Faulkner  County  Circuit  Court  filed  a  judgment  and  commitment order, which found appellant Victoria Farrelly guilty of failing to comply with  the terms and conditions of her probation.  On appeal from that order, appellant contends that  the evidence of violation is not sufficient to revoke her probation.  We affirm the trial court’s  decision to revoke appellant’s probation.  Appellant  pled  guilty  on  January  27,  2004,  in  Faulkner  County  Circuit  Court,  to  forgery in the second degree, and the trial court sentenced her to sixty months’ supervised  probation.  The  supervision  of  her  probation  was  transferred  to  Pulaski  County,  where  appellant was already serving a separate probationary sentence.  On August 13, 2005, while  under supervision in Pulaski County, appellant was charged with robbery.  She was tried  before a Pulaski County jury and found not guilty.  However, before her robbery trial, a  motion to revoke probation was filed on September 9, 2005, in Faulkner County, alleging  that appellant had violated the laws of Arkansas, had failed to pay fines and fees, and had  failed to report.  After the revocation hearing, the trial court found that appellant failed to  report and sentenced her to thirty­six months in the Arkansas Department of Correction.  This appeal follows.  Our law regarding revocation of probation or suspended sentence is well settled.  To  revoke probation or a suspended sentence, the burden is on the State to prove the violation  of a condition of the probation or suspended sentence by a preponderance of the evidence.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­4­309(d) (Supp. 2003).  See also Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 229, 91  S.W.3d 68 (2002); Bradley v. State, 347 Ark. 518, 65 S.W.3d 874 (2002).  On appellate  review,  the  trial  court’s  findings  will  be  upheld  unless  they  are  clearly  against  the  preponderance of the evidence.  Williams, 351 Ark. at 234, 91 S.W.3d at 70.  Because the  burdens are different, evidence that is insufficient for a criminal conviction may be sufficient  for revocation of probation or suspended sentence.  Id.  Thus, the burden on the State is not  as  great  in  a  revocation  hearing.  Id.  Furthermore,  because  the  determination  of  a  preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of credibility and weight to be given to the  testimony, we defer to the trial judge’s superior position.  Id.  1.  Sufficiency argument  Appellant admits that at the close of the State’s case and at the close of her own case  she  did  not  move  for  directed  verdict.    However,  she  maintains,  and  we  so  hold,  that  appellant  has  preserved  her  sufficiency­of­the­evidence  argument  as  a  matter  for  appeal ­2­  CACR07­272  under Whitener v. State, 96 Ark. App. 354, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  In Whitener, this court  held  that  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  of  the  State’s  proof  regarding  violation  of  a  condition of probation may be challenged on  appeal  of a revocation in the absence of a  directed­verdict  motion,  citing  Barbee  v.  State,  346  Ark.  185,  56  S.W.3d  370  (2001).  Appellant argues that the evidence of violation is not sufficient by the standard of proof in  revocation hearings.  2.  Failure to comply with probation conditions  Appellant  claims  that  the  trial  court  based  its  decision  to  revoke  on  one  specific  finding of failure to report, and not on allegations that appellant had violated the laws of  Arkansas  and  had  failed  to  pay  fines  and  fees.    No  evidence  was  submitted  regarding  appellant’s charge of robbery in Pulaski County.  Further, appellant claims that Earl Cranor,  a probation officer from Faulkner County, testified that appellant owed fines and supervision  fees that had lapsed, but specifically tied that lapse to a time in which he testified that she  had failed to report.  Therefore, she argues that this court should limit its review to the single  allegation that appellant failed to report.  We hold that within this limited review, the trial  court’s findings are not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Appellant argues that Earl Cranor testified that appellant’s case was transferred to  Pulaski  County  for  probation  supervision  in  March  2004.    From  that  date  until  he  was  notified of her robbery charge at the end of August 2005, Cranor stated that he was never  notified of any infractions of appellant’s conditions of probation. Appellant testified that her  troubles  regarding  probation  began  only  after  receiving  the  robbery  charge  and  in ­3­  CACR07­272  determining whether to report to probation during the pendency of the new charge.  She  claimed that her public defender told her that if the judge did not order her to do it, she did  not have to report.  She also claimed that her probation officer in Pulaski County, Orriville  Thomas, also told her she did not have to report.  Appellant  asserts  that  the  Pulaski  County  docket  pages  that  were  introduced  into  evidence reflect that she had been in court six times during the pendency of the robbery  charge.  She was never arrested during that time.  She contends that Cranor explained why  probation officers from Pulaski County would not detain appellant, given the warrant, stating  “That’s Little Rock,” meaning that Little Rock has a tendency to get things “messed up.”  She maintains that another explanation for Little Rock’s lack of action in response to the  warrant  is  that  it  also  supposed  appellant  was  not  to  report  during  the  pendency  of  the  robbery case.  Further, she claims that Thomas told her that she did not have to report during  the pendency of the robbery case.  She contends that Thomas never discussed with her that  she was to report to Faulkner County.  Appellant’s sister also testified that it was clear to her  that Thomas told appellant that she did not have to report to Faulkner County, based upon  Thomas’s statement, “I’m your only probation officer.”  Appellant argues that the State must show that her failure to report was inexcusable  or not justified.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­4­309(d).  She argues that under Thompson v. State, 248  Ark. 625, 453 S.W.2d 41 (1970), she has demonstrated that any failure to report is excusable.  In Thompson, supra, the Arkansas  Supreme Court held that there was no abuse of judicial  discretion in finding that Thompson had offered no justifiable excuse for his failure to report ­4­  CACR07­272  when the probation officer had received no communication, and Thompson had moved from  his previous address; did not go to probation; and claimed not to know his probation officer’s  telephone number.  Appellant herein argues that she did meet with her probation officer,  talked  with  him  on  the  telephone,  and  met  with  him  in  court.    The  docket  sheet  and  chronological log show that she attended court.  She argues, therefore, that the trial court  erred in finding that the State met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence.  However, the evidence presented by the State was that Cranor testified that he had  multiple conversations with appellant in which he instructed her to report after she incurred  the  robbery  charge.    Joint  exhibit  number  one,  which  is  a  detailed  chronological  log  of  appellant’s probation, indicates that appellant was instructed to report by Cranor on April 11,  2006, and on August 29, 2006.  Appellant failed to do so, maintaining that this failure was  excusable because her Pulaski County probation officer indicated to her that she did not have  to report in the Faulkner County case.  However, the circuit judge, sitting as the trier of fact,  was not required to believe appellant’s version of events because she was the person most  interested in the outcome of the proceeding. E.g., Scott v. State, 27 Ark. App. 1, 764 S.W.2d  625 (1989).  The State notes that appellant also failed to report to Thomas while he supervised her  Faulkner  County  probation.    A  July  13,  2005  entry  by  Thomas  indicates  that  appellant  reported for her scheduled office visit that day.  That entry also indicates that her next office  visit was scheduled for August 9, 2005, at 3:30 p.m.  Appellant failed to report to her August  9, 2005 visit, but she reported on August 23, 2005, instead.  Thus, regardless of whether ­5­  CACR07­272  appellant reported to Cranor, she failed to report as instructed by Thomas, and, by doing so,  violated the terms of her Faulkner County probation.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial  court was not clearly erroneous in finding that appellant failed to report, and thus violated  a condition of her probation.  Affirmed.  BIRD  and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree. ­6­  CACR07­272 

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