Timothy Leron Hester v. State of Arkansas

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DIVISION IV  CACR 07­250  NOVEMBER 7, 2007  V. APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,  SEVENTH DIVISION  [NO. CR 06­2416]  STATE OF ARKANSAS  HONORABLE BARRY SIMS,  JUDGE  TIMOTHY LERON HESTER  APPELLANT  APPELLEE  REVERSED AND REMANDED  JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge  Appellant Timothy Leron Hester was convicted in a bench trial of first­degree battery,  and  was  sentenced  as  a  habitual  offender  to  thirty  years  in  prison.    Mr.  Hester’s  sole  argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his request to withdraw his waiver  of his right to be tried by a jury.  We agree, and we reverse and remand.  On June 21, 2006, the State charged Mr. Hester with first­degree battery committed  against  Keith  Cooley.  A  pretrial  hearing  was  held  on  September  11,  2006,  where  the  following exchange transpired:  THE COURT: It looks like we’re here for omnibus.  Any motions?  DEFENSE COUNSEL: No motions except waive a jury trial.  THE COURT: Raise your right hand, Mr. Hester.  THE COURT: Did you sign this jury waiver?  APPELLANT: Yes, sir.  THE  COURT:  You  understand  that  you  have  a  right  to  trial  by  jury  and  that  by  signing this document, you’re waiving that right and electing to have a bench trial?  APPELLANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: You understand that I will determine both the facts and the law of the  case and whether you’re guilty or not guilty.  And if I find you guilty, I will fix your  sentence.  APPELLANT: Yes, sir.  THE COURT: Are you under the influence of alcohol or drugs?  APPELLANT: Pardon me?  THE COURT: Are you under the influence of alcohol or drugs?  APPELLANT: No, no, sir.  THE COURT: Have you read everything in this document and are you voluntarily  waiving your right to a jury trial?  APPELLANT: Yes, sir.  THE COURT: Okay.  DEFENSE COUNSEL: I read that to him verbatim.  One thing I’d like to state on the  record is that I did advise him to keep his jury trial, but he wanted a judge trial.  THE COURT: Jury waived; bench trial date?  TRIAL ASSISTANT: October 13th.  THE COURT: At?  TRIAL ASSISTANT: Nine o’clock.  THE COURT: Okay, thank you.  DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, he’s now telling me he wants to leave it as a  jury trial.  THE COURT: I think at this point it’s discretionary with me after I read him all that  stuff and done all that.  So I’m not giving him a jury trial.  He waived it.  Thank you.  The  bench  trial  was  held  as  scheduled  on  October  13,  2006.    The  State  called  three  witnesses,  which  included  the  victim  and  two  investigating  officers.  The  victim,  Mr.  Cooley,  testified  that  he  was  friends  with  Mr.  Hester  but  that  on  May  18,  2006,  Mr. Hester got angry with him because Mr. Hester wanted a ride home and Mr. Cooley  refused to give him a ride.  According to Mr. Cooley, Mr. Hester stabbed him with a “kitchen  steak knife,” resulting in collapsed lungs and two days’ hospitalization.  The defense did not  call any witnesses. ­2­  Mr. Hester argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing  him to withdraw his waiver of jury trial.  A criminal defendant may waive his right to a jury  trial if there is compliance with Ark. R. Crim. P. 31.2, which provides:  Should a defendant desire to waive his right to trial by jury, he may do so either  (1) personally in writing or in open court, or (2) through counsel if the waiver is made  in  open  court  and  in  the  presence  of  the  defendant.    A  verbatim  record  of  any  proceedings  at  which  a  defendant  waives  his  right  to  a  trial  by  jury  in  person  or  through counsel shall be made and preserved.  Mr.  Hester  concedes  that  his  initial  waiver  of  his  right  to  be  tried  by  a  jury  was  valid.  However, he contends that he should have been permitted to withdraw the waiver pursuant  to Ark. R. Crim. P. 31.5, which provides:  A defendant may not withdraw his voluntary and knowing waiver of trial by jury  as a matter of right, but the court, in its discretion, may permit withdrawal of the  waiver prior to the commencement of trial.  Mr. Hester notes that he made his request to withdraw his jury­trial waiver a month before  the scheduled trial date, and only moments after the waiver was accepted by the trial court.  Under these circumstances, appellant submits that his request for withdrawal was not made  in bad faith or for purposes of delay, and that there was no showing that granting his request  would have delayed the start of the trial or inconvenienced the State’s witnesses.  A denial of a request to withdraw the waiver of a jury trial will be affirmed absent an  abuse of discretion.  Maxwell v. State, 73 Ark. App. 45, 41 S.W.3d 402 (2001).  An abuse  of  discretion  occurs  when  the  trial  court  makes  a  judgment  call  that  is  arbitrary  and  groundless.  Smith v. State, 90 Ark. App. 261, 205 S.W.3d 173 (2005).  In the present case ­3­  we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Hester’s motion to withdraw  his waiver.  This  case  is  unlike  Scates  and  Blaylock  v.  State,  244  Ark.  333,  424  S.W.2d  876  (1968), where our supreme court affirmed when the motion to withdraw the jury­trial waiver  was not made until the date on which the trial was set, and the trial court denied the motion  as being too late.  In a more recent case, Maxwell v. State, supra, this court stated that the  trial court should consider such matters as the timeliness of the motion to withdraw and  whether delay of the trial will impede justice or inconvenience witnesses.  In that case, we  held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Maxwell’s motion to withdraw her  waiver  in  part  because  her  motion  was  filed  more  than  one  month  prior  to  trial,  and  no  inconvenience to witnesses or to the administration of justice was demonstrated.  We  are  also  persuaded  by  cases  from  other  jurisdictions.    In  Thomas  v.  Commonwealth, 238 S.E.2d 834, 835 (Va. 1977), the Virginia Supreme Court wrote:  Whether one accused of crime who has regularly waived a jury trial will be permitted  to withdraw the waiver and have his case tried before a jury is ordinarily within the  discretion  of  the  trial  court.  The  rule,  as  expressed  in  some  cases,  is  that  if  an  accused’s application for withdrawal of waiver is made in due season so as not to  substantially delay or impede the cause of justice, the trial court should allow the  waiver to be withdrawn.  The authorities are uniformly to the effect that a motion for withdrawal of  waiver made after the commencement of the trial is not timely and should not be  allowed.  Whether a motion for the withdrawal of a waiver of trial by jury made prior  to the actual commencement of the trial of the case is timely depends primarily upon  the facts and circumstances of the individual case.  Where there is no showing that  granting the motion would unduly delay the trial or would otherwise impede justice,  the motion is usually held to be timely.  In some cases, however, it has been held that  a motion for withdrawal of a waiver of jury trial, although made prior to the trial, was  not timely and was properly denied by the trial court, the decisions in these cases ­4­  being based primarily upon the ground that granting the motion would have resulted  in an unreasonable delay of the trial.  In People v. Hamm, 298 N.W.2d 896 (Mich. App. 1980), the appeals court recognized that  a waiver should be strictly construed in favor of preservation of the sacred right to a jury  trial.  Relevant factors for the trial court include evidence of bad faith and the nature or  extent of prosecutorial objection.  See People v. Miller, 566 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.  1990).  And in State v. Cloud, 393 N.W.2d 123 (Wis. App. 1986), the appellate court stated  that the trial court’s discretion in deciding a withdrawal motion is not unbridled and should  be  exercised  liberally  in  favor  of  granting  the  defendant’s  right  to  a  jury  trial.    Upon  reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, that court wrote:  Generally, the cases hold that if a defendant’s motion to withdraw a jury waiver is  made  sufficiently  in  advance  of  trial  so  as  not  to  interfere  with  the  orderly  administration of court business or to result in unnecessary delay, inconvenience to  the witnesses, or prejudice to the state, the court should exercise  its discretion to  allow the defendant to have a jury trial.  Decisions upholding the trial court’s denial  of a withdrawal motion made prior to trial are primarily based on the ground that  granting withdrawal would have resulted in unreasonable delay or inconvenience.  Id. at 126 (citations omitted).  In the case at bar, Mr. Hester waived his right to a jury trial and then immediately  changed his mind and decided to take his counsel’s advice and request a trial by jury.  There  was no indication of any bad faith,  and  the prosecutor made no objection to appellant’s  request to withdraw the waiver.  Moreover, given the timeliness of the withdrawal request,  there was no indication that this would have caused any delay, inconvenience to witnesses,  or prejudice to the State. ­5­  The State argues in its brief that because appellant offered no argument or explanation  below in support of his request to withdraw the waiver, any supporting arguments raised on  appeal are outside the scope of appellate review.  We disagree.  A trial by jury is perhaps the  most basic of rights afforded an accused.  See Bartlett v. U.S., 354 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1966).  A criminal defendant is not required to explain his decision for attempting to exercise this  right, and under the circumstances presented before the trial court in this case its decision to  deny appellant’s withdrawal request was arbitrary and groundless, even in the absence of any  accompanying argument by appellant.  It appears that the trial court denied the request on  the sole basis that there had been a valid waiver, and this was an abuse of discretion.  Reversed and remanded.  VAUGHT and BAKER, JJ., agree. ­6­ 

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