Frederick A. Norris v. State of Arkansas

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Not designated for publication. DIVISION I  CACR07­246  NOVEMBER 7, 2007  FREDERICK A. NORRIS  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  SEBASTIAN  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­2006­273]  HON.  JAMES  MARSCHEWSKI,  JUDGE  V. R O B E R T  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Frederick Norris appeals his conviction from the Sebastian County Circuit  Court  on  two  charges  of  aggravated  robbery,  for  which  he  was  sentenced  as  a  habitual  offender to thirty years’ incarceration in the Arkansas Department of Correction on each  conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently, and ten additional years of suspended  imposition of sentences on each conviction.  On appeal, appellant argues that the circuit  court erred in admitting the in­court identification of Sheila Smith and in denying the motion  to suppress his confession, and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to  the conviction related to the first bank teller he encountered.  We affirm.  On or about March 9, 2006, appellant entered a Chambers Bank branch location in  Fort Smith, Arkansas, and committed aggravated robbery using a twelve­inch knife against  two separate bank tellers, Monta Wakefield and Jamie Payne.  As he ran into the bank, loan  assistant Sheila Smith noticed appellant from where she was sitting at her desk and observed  the  robbery take place in the approximately twenty seconds that followed.  Although he  initially held a towel around his head and over his face, Ms. Smith identified appellant from  a  photographic  line­up  conducted  by  Detective  David  Joplin  the  day  after  the  incident.  Additionally, bank surveillance equipment captured images of the robbery on videotape.  Appellant was arrested the following day at a Little Rock motel by Fort Smith police  officers,  Detective  Greg  Smithson  and  Detective  Ronald  Scamardo,  Jr.  The  officers  attempted to interview appellant and advised him of his rights, at which time he asked to  speak to an attorney.  The officers ceased questioning appellant and the three men left to  return to Fort Smith.  Near the beginning of  the return trip, Detective Scamardo made a  comment to the effect that he could not understand why someone that owes $40,000 in back  child support, which he had not made payments on, with a family in Van Buren struggling  to  survive,  robs  a  bank  to  compound  the  problems  he  already  has  and  then  makes  his  problems worse by possibly buying crack with the money or going to a motel to pay for  prostitution.  When they stopped to eat in Conway, appellant asked to speak privately with  Detective  Scamardo.  At  that  time,  appellant  admitted  his  involvement  in  the  robbery;  however,  he also explained that he did not rob the bank to obtain money for drugs or a  prostitute, but rather to support his family.  Detective Scamardo did not question appellant  further at that point in time, and the three completed their trip without further incident.  Three days later on March 13, 2006, Detectives Smithson and Scamardo received  word that appellant wanted to speak to them.  They went to see him, advised him of his rights ­2­  CACR07­246  again, reminded him that he had previously asked for an attorney, and then asked why he had  sent for them.  Appellant signed a second rights form and then proceeded to give the officers  a full statement, which was taped and subsequently typed into an approximately forty­page  statement that was admitted at trial.  Appellant implicated himself and even took the officers  back to an area on Interstate 40 where he stated he had discarded a knife, shirt, and glove  used in the robbery, although none of the items were located or recovered from under the  bridge.  Appellant then took the officers back to Little Rock and revealed to them where he  had buried the $1610 that was stolen in the robbery.  A  hearing  was  held  on  August  3,  2006,  and  continued  on  August  7,  2006,  on  appellant’s motion to suppress the in­court identification of Ms. Smith, the loan assistant, as  well as appellant’s motion to suppress the statements he made to officers on March 10, 2006,  and March 13, 2006, as well as the ones he made in the car when he subsequently took the  officers back to Little Rock regarding the evidence related to the robbery.  The prosecutor  assured the circuit court that he had no intention of utilizing the initial comment appellant  made  to  Detective  Scamardo  in  the  car.  Both  motions  were  denied,  and  the  jury  trial  proceeded on August 7, 2006.  At the close of the State’s evidence, appellant moved for a directed verdict on the  aggravated robbery count involving the first bank teller, Ms. Payne, on the basis that the  entire incident lasted less than one minute and consisted of the same conduct under the law.  Appellant’s  attorney  argued  that  he  felt  as  though  it  would  subject  appellant  to  double  jeopardy to be tried twice in one count for the same conduct and cited Ark. Code Ann. § 5­1­ ­3­  CACR07­246  110 in support of his argument.  Additionally, he mentioned that Ms. Payne turned around  and ran before appellant reached her station and did not recognize that he had a knife until  after she ran away.  Accordingly, he argued that appellant could not have made the required  representation at that point of possessing a deadly weapon.  The prosecutor responded that  appellant entered the bank yelling for the tellers to put money in a bag and then chased Ms.  Payne as she fled, brandishing a knife in front of him and telling her not to run from him.  The motion was denied, and appellant presented no witnesses on his behalf.  His attorney  rested without renewing his previous motion.  The jury found appellant guilty of the above­  described charges.  The judgment and commitment order was filed on August 8, 2006, and  appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 11, 2006.  I.  Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Conviction Related to Ms. Payne  Although  appellant  raises  this  issue  as  his  third  point  on  appeal,  this  court  must  consider  his  sufficiency  argument  before  addressing  any  asserted  evidentiary  errors  to  preserve appellant’s freedom from being placed in double jeopardy.  See Eastin v. State, 370  Ark. 10, __ S.W.3d __ (2007).  We first consider whether this issue is preserved for appeal.  Rule 33.1(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[i]n a jury trial, if  a motion for directed verdict is to be made, it shall be made at the close of the evidence  offered by the prosecution and at the close of all of the evidence.”  Subsection (c) states in  relevant part that “[t]he failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence  at the times and in the manner required . . . constitute waiver of any question pertaining to  the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or judgment.”  Appellant moved for a ­4­  CACR07­246  directed verdict on this particular count of aggravated robbery at the close of the State’s case­  in­chief, did not present evidence on his behalf, and rested without renewing his motion.  While a renewal of his motion for a directed verdict is generally required by Rule 33.1(a) of  the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is not required where, as here, a defendant rests  without presenting a case.  Diggs v. State, 93 Ark. App. 332, 219 S.W.3d 654 (2005) (citing  Robinson v. State, 317 Ark. 17, 875 S.W.2d 837 (1994); Chrobak v. State, 75 Ark. App. 281,  58 S.W.3d 387 (2001)).  Accordingly, we hold that appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency  of the evidence with respect to that particular aggravated robbery conviction is preserved for  our review.  Although appellant argues that he should not have been convicted of two counts of  aggravated robbery because it was a continuing course of conduct, our case law has held  otherwise.  See Rhodes v. State, 293 Ark. 211, 736 S.W. 2d 284 (1987) (aggravated robbery  is not a continuing offense). Furthermore, we hold that there is sufficient evidence to support  the conviction on the separate count of aggravated robbery involving Ms. Payne.  Arkansas  Code Annotated section 5­12­103 sets forth the elements of aggravated robbery, as follows:  (a) A person commits aggravated robbery if he or she commits robbery as defined in  § 5­12­102, and the person:  (1) Is armed with a deadly weapon;  (2) Represents by word or conduct that he or she is armed with a deadly weapon; or  (3) Inflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical injury upon another person.  (b) Aggravated robbery is a Class Y felony.  As appellant entered the bank and approached her area, he repeatedly shouted at the tellers  to put the money in the bag.    The  bank surveillance video shows appellant running and ­5­  CACR07­246  brandishing a  knife  in  front  of  him.  While  Ms.  Payne  did  turn  to  run  from  her  station,  appellant  ran  after  her  yelling  for  her  not  to  run  from  him  and  to  “get  back  here.”  He  approached her, demanded money, and threatened her while armed with a twelve­inch knife.  Ms. Payne testified that she saw appellant with “an object in his hand” and that she did not  know “if it was a gun or a knife” until she went down the stairs and saw that it was a “knife  and not a gun.”  The evidence supports that she saw that appellant was armed and perceived  that it was some type of deadly weapon, either a knife or a gun.  The test for determining the  sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct  or circumstantial.  White v. State, __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (June 21, 2007).  Substantial  evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel the fact­finder to make a conclusion one way  or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture.  Id.  When determining the sufficiency of the  evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and we will only  consider the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. Additionally, the credibility of witnesses  is an issue for the jury and not this court.  See id.  We affirm on this point.  II.  In­Court Identification by Sheila Smith  We  will  not  reverse  a  trial  court’s  ruling  on  the  admissibility  of  an in­court  identification unless the ruling is clearly erroneous under the totality of the circumstances.  Mezquita v. State, 354 Ark. 433, 125 S.W.3d 161 (2003). In determining whether an in­court  identification  is  admissible,  the  court  looks  first  at  whether  the  pretrial  identification  procedure was unnecessarily suggestive or otherwise constitutionally suspect; and it is the ­6­  CACR07­246  appellant’s burden to show that the pretrial identification is suspect.  Id.  Reliability is the  linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.  Id.  In  determining  reliability,  the  following  factors  are  considered:    (1)  the  prior  opportunity of the witness to observe the alleged act; (2) the accuracy of the prior description  of the accused; (3) any identification of another person prior to the pretrial identification  procedure; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation; (5) the failure of the  witness to identify the defendant on a prior occasion;  (6) the lapse of time between the  alleged act and the pretrial identification procedure. Mezquita, supra. Our supreme court has  held that, even when the identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive, the trial court  may determine that under the totality of the circumstances the identification was sufficiently  reliable for the matter to be submitted to the factfinder, and then it is for the factfinder to  decide the weight the identification testimony should be given.  Id.  Ms. Smith testified that she noticed appellant run into the bank from where she was  sitting at her desk and observed the robbery take place in the approximately twenty seconds  that followed.  Appellant initially held a towel around his head and over his face, and Ms.  Smith testified that she did not see his face when he first entered the bank and approached  the tellers.  She testified that, after the first teller ran, and appellant moved to another teller,  she was able to see parts of his face.  She asserted that she caught more than a glimpse of his  face and that he partially faced her office as he was leaving the bank.  Additionally, she  identified  appellant  from  a  photographic  line­up  conducted  by  Detective  David  Joplin  subsequent to the incident, and she stated that no one indicated to her whom she should ­7­  CACR07­246  choose.  Finally, she also positively identified appellant in the courtroom as the person she  witnessed robbing the bank.  Appellant’s sole argument is that Ms. Smith simply did not have enough time to make  an adequate identification.  At trial,  he  urged  the circuit court to examine her degree of  attention  and  her  opportunity  to  observe  what  happened.    Because  she  had  a  limited  opportunity  to  view  the  robber,  including  only  partial  views  of  his  face,  appellant  now  contends that the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress was clearly erroneous.  Based upon the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, Ms. Smith had ample  opportunity to observe the aggravated robbery.  She was not provided a prior description of  appellant, nor did she identify any other individual prior to the pretrial identification.  She  positively identified appellant, and she was certain of her choice of photograph in the lineup.  Additionally, there was no significant time lapse between the aggravated robbery and her  pre­trial identification. We hold that, under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court  was not clearly erroneous in admitting Ms. Smith’s identification and affirm on this point as  well.  III.  Denial of Motion to Suppress Statements  At  the  hearing  on  appellant’s  motions  to  suppress  various  statements  made  to  Detectives Smithson and Scamardo, the prosecutor informed the circuit court that the State  had no intention of using the initial statement made in Conway by appellant to Detective  Scamardo  during  the  trial.  As  for  the  subsequent  statements,  appellant  independently  initiated  the  contact,  the  officers  advised  him  of  his  rights,  reminded  him  that  he  had ­8­  CACR07­246  previously asked for an attorney, and then asked why he had sent for them.  Appellant signed  a second rights form and then proceeded to give the officers a full statement.  At trial, appellant argued that the initial comment by Detective Scamardo was the  functional equivalent to questioning, even though appellant had already asked to speak to an  attorney.  A “functional  equivalent to questioning” occurs when the words or actions of  police are such that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating  response  from  a  suspect.  See  State  v.  Pittman,  360  Ark.  273,  200  S.W.3d  893  (2005).  Appellant  maintained  that  once  the  original  exchange  between  Detective  Scamardo  and  appellant occurred, the “cat had been let out of the bag” and that it was still weighing on  appellant’s mind when he made the lengthy statement to officers some three days later.  His  attorney also asserted that all statements made thereafter were fruits of the original violation  and  should  have  been  suppressed.  While  the  circuit  court  indicated  that  even  the  State  seemed to be conceding that the comment in the car was improper, the circuit court did not  go so far as to find that all of the other subsequent statements should be suppressed.  Appellant now argues that not enough time elapsed between the statements to break  the chain and no sufficient act of intervening free will occurred.  He maintains that Detective  Scamardo deliberately elicited an admission of guilt after he had invoked his Miranda rights,  and  that  accordingly,  all  the  fruits  of  that  constitutional  violation  should  have  been  suppressed.  Detective Smithson testified that the comment by Detective Scamardo “was just a  comment . . . [i]t wasn’t a question.  It was just a comment he made.”  Detective Scamardo ­9­  CACR07­246  also  testified  that  he  was  simply  making  a  comment  and  was  not  attempting  to  elicit  a  response  from appellant.  Detective  Scamardo  stated  that  he  did  so  after  learning  that  a  known prostitute had been seen leaving appellant’s motel room and that appellant had been  to the child­support office in Little Rock without making any payments against his back­child  support  obligation.  Subsequently,  when  appellant  spoke  to  him  about  the  comment  in  Conway, Detective Scamardo explained that he only listened and did not attempt to question  appellant on the issue.  The State maintains that even if this court were to determine that the initial comment  was  violative  of  appellant’s  rights,  the  fact  remains  that  neither  Detective  Scamardo’s  comment nor appellant’s response in Conway were ever admitted at trial. The State contends  that the three­day gap between those comments and appellant’s transcribed statement serves  to avoid the effects of a Miranda violation.  See Davis v. State, 330 Ark. 76, 953 S.W.2d 559  (1997).  Additionally,  if  an  accused  initiates  further  communication  or  conversation  with  police officers, after initially requesting an attorney before speaking, any resulting statements  may be admissible.  See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).  It is clear that on March  13, 2006, appellant independently initiated the contact when he asked to speak with the two  officers.  Detective Smithson advised appellant of his rights, which he waived.  Appellant  then signed the rights form and gave his lengthy statement admitting the aggravated robbery.  It appears that, at that time, appellant not only initiated the contact but also provided the  information without significant questioning by the officers. ­10­  CACR07­246  The State argues, and we agree, that at each point of interrogation, appellant was  advised of his rights and his request to speak to an attorney was respected.  Simply because  he initially invoked that right does not preclude him from subsequently initiating contact with  the police, and upon doing so, his admissions were properly admitted into evidence by the  circuit court.  We affirm on this point as well.  Affirmed.  BIRD  and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree. ­11­  CACR07­246 

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