Robert Washington v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CACR 07­244  OCTOBER 31, 2007  ROBERT WASHINGTON  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM THE SALINE  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­06­130­3]  V. HONORABLE GRISHAM A.  PHILLIPS, JR., JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Robert Washington was convicted by a jury in Saline County Circuit Court  of  aggravated  robbery.  Washington  was  accused  of  forcibly  taking  $412  cash  from  the  register of Bullock’s convenience store in Benton, Arkansas, at approximately 2:30 a.m. on  December 23, 2005. The robber threatened the store clerk, Patricia Serrato, with a knife, had  a  slight  scuffle  with  her,  and  demanded  that  she  open  the  register.  Serrato  positively  identified appellant as the perpetrator, even though the robber wore a stocking cap to hide  his identity.  She was certain of his identity because he had been in the store on previous  occasions, he had talked to her, and he had identifiable physical mannerisms.  Police were  summoned, and they arrested appellant nearby and mere minutes later.  After the jury found  him guilty, this appeal followed.  Appellant argues three points for reversal:  (1) that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his guilt; (2) that the trial court abused  its discretion by not granting a mistrial after a witness testified to inappropriate character  evidence; and (3) that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a mistrial on the  basis that the prosecutor made an improper comment.  We affirm.  We first address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.  Our courts  treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  See  Tubbs v. State, __  Ark. __ , __ S.W.3d __ (May 10, 2007).  In reviewing a challenge to the  sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial  evidence, direct or circumstantial.  See id.  Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough  to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture.  See id.  This  court  views  the  evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  verdict,  and  only  evidence  supporting the verdict will be considered.  See id.  A directed verdict motion in a criminal  case must state the specific ground of the motion.  See Dixon v. State, 327 Ark. 105, 937  S.W.2d 642 (1997).  Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1 provides “[a] motion for  directed verdict . . . based on insufficiency of the evidence must specify the respect in which  the evidence is deficient.”  A party cannot change the grounds for a motion on appeal and  is bound by the scope and nature of the arguments made at trial.  Abshure v. State, 79 Ark.  App. 317, 87 S.W.3d 822 (2002).  After the State rested, defense counsel moved for directed verdict “based on the lack  of sufficient evidence to convict my client based on each element.  I would question that they ­2­  have proved that it was actually my client who robbed Bullock’s.  That he had a knife, that  the skull cap belongs to him.”  Appellant expands this argument on appeal to challenge not  only whether it was appellant who committed this crime, but also whether the State set forth  sufficient proof of attempt to inflict injury or of  purpose  to  commit a theft.  We do not  address anything other than what was preserved at the trial court level.  Abshure v. State,  supra.  Appellant’s argument properly before us is limited to identifying appellant as the  person who robbed the store.  The evidence before the jury, in the light most favorable to the State, showed that  Serrato  worked  the  night  shift  at  Bullock’s  and  was  held  at  knife­point  on  the  night  in  question.  Serrato testified that she knew who the robber was because he had been in the  store the night before the robbery, hanging out for two or three hours, and he had also been  in the store that morning and later that evening, prior to the robbery.  He had talked to her.  She said she knew it was appellant because of his voice and the way he moved, plus she  could still see his face well enough despite the nylon cap.  The police responded to Serrato’s pushing of the panic button under the counter, and  officers were informed that they should look for a black male wearing blue pants and a white  or gray sweatshirt. Appellant was seen walking across a grassy field behind the convenience  store  and  toward  a  particular  residence  on  West  Sevier  Street.    Officers  drove  to  the  residence, exited their patrol car, and ordered the suspect to the ground.  The suspect did not  comply and had to be forcibly taken.  Appellant repeatedly told officers that, “I didn’t do ­3­  anything.”  A search of appellant’s clothing revealed exactly $412 in currency in his pants  pocket, the exact amount missing from Bullock’s cash register.  Appellant did not ask why  he was being arrested.  A search was conducted around the house in the light of day the next morning.  The  house belonged to a Mr. Crouch.  A kitchen knife was found inside Mr. Crouch’s toolbox  in  the  carport,  and  a  nylon  cap  was  found  on  the  ground  next  to  Mr.  Crouch’s  boat.  Mr. Crouch denied ownership of either item, and he recalled hearing the commotion outside  the night before.  Serrrato identified the knife and the cap as being used in the robbery.  The jury had before it sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt.  Appellant was  found near the crime scene just minutes after the crime occurred, and he would not respond  to officers’ commands to surrender.  He fled the scene trying to get away from the officers,  which is indicative of guilt.  Jones v. State, 314 Ark. 289, 862 S.W.2d 242 (1993).  More  importantly, the store clerk positively identified appellant as the man who robbed her that  night.  This alone is sufficient to support the jury’s determination that appellant was the  person who committed the crime that night.  See Garner v. State, 355 Ark. 82, 131 S.W.3d  734 (2003).  We affirm this point on appeal.  We next consider the two motions for mistrial, which were denied by the trial court.  Mistrial is  an  extreme remedy and is only necessary where it appears that, if the trial is  continued, the defendant cannot receive a fair trial.  See Wilkins v. State, 324 Ark. 60, 918  S.W.2d 702 (1996).  The trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for ­4­  mistrial, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that  discretion.  Cook v. State, 316 Ark. 384, 872 S.W.2d 72 (1994).  We defer to the trial court,  as it is in a superior position to determine the effect of the allegedly prejudicial remark on  the jury.  Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000); Ward v. State, 338 Ark. 619,  1 S.W.3d 1 (1999).  A curative instruction or admonition is generally deemed sufficient to  eliminate prejudice generated by most trial error.  Wilkins v. State, supra.  It is the appellant's  obligation to ask for a curative  instruction, and the failure to do so will not inure to his  benefit on appeal.  Vick v. State, 314 Ark. 618, 863 S.W.2d 820 (1993).  There were two motions for mistrial.  The first came during the testimony offered by  Serrato.  Her  testimony  had  been  the  subject  of  a  motion  in  limine  to  prevent  her  from  discussing certain topics, including that she believed appellant to be intoxicated during a visit  to  the  store.    The  trial  court  ruled  that  this  would  not  be  allowed,  but  that  her  general  familiarity with him was permissible.  However, during her testimony, she said she recalled  appellant  telling her  that  he  liked  her  because  she  was  white  and  he  did  not  date  black  women.  This  drew  an  objection,  urging  that  this  was  improper  bad­character  evidence  impermissible under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) and that this had been ruled inadmissible.  The  State countered that this testimony established her familiarity with appellant and why she had  reason  to  remember  him among all  the  patrons  of  the  store.    The  trial  judge  denied  the  mistrial but told the prosecution to move on to something else.  Appellant argues that his is  reversible  error  because  introducing  this  “prior  bad  act”  was  highly  prejudicial, ­5­  inflammatory,  and  could  not  be  cured  by  an  instruction  to  the  jury  to  disregard  it.    We  disagree and hold that the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion.  Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:  Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of  a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however,  be  admissible  for  other  purposes,  such  as  proof  of  motive,  opportunity,  intent,  preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.  The admission or rejection of evidence under Rule 404(b) is left to the sound discretion of  the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.  Hernandez v.  State, 331 Ark. 301, 962 S.W.2d 756 (1998).  Testimony is admissible pursuant to Rule  404(b) if it is independently relevant to the main issue, relevant in the sense of tending to  prove some material point rather than merely to prove that the defendant is a criminal or a  bad person.  Mosley v. State, 325 Ark. 469, 929 S.W.2d 693 (1996).  Here, the prosecution made clear that it had to demonstrate why Serrato was certain  in her identity of appellant as the person who committed this crime, and this comment lent  credence to why Serrato would remember appellant.  Moreover, appellant did not ask for a  curative instruction, which cannot inure to his benefit on appeal.  For the foregoing reasons,  we affirm this point.  The  other  motion  for  a  mistrial  came  during  the  State’s  closing  argument.    The  prosecutor summed up the evidence presented to the jury and noted that when appellant was  apprehended by the police, he did not ask why he was being arrested.  Defense counsel ­6­  objected on the basis that this was an improper comment on the defendant’s right not to  testify.  The defense asked for a limiting instruction, which was not given.  Appellant argues  that this was reversible error because it was an improper comment that influenced the jury’s  verdict.  Some leeway is given to counsel in closing argument, and counsel are free to argue  every plausible inference that can be drawn from the testimony.  Newman v. State, 353 Ark.  258, 290, 106 S.W.3d 438, 459 (2003).  Therefore, a trial court is given broad discretion in  controlling the arguments of counsel, such that, absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial  court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal.  See, e.g., Cox v. State, 345 Ark. 391, 47  S.W.3d 244 (2001); Cook v. State, 283 Ark. 246, 675 S.W.2d 366 (1984).  An allegedly improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify usually occurs  during the prosecutor's closing argument, when the evidence is closed and the defendant's  opportunity to testify has passed.  Adams v. State, 263 Ark. 536, 566 S.W.2d 387 (1978).  Under those circumstances, a comment  that  draws attention to the defendant's failure to  testify is improper because it creates the risk that the jury will surmise that the defendant's  failure was an admission of guilt.  See id.  Consequently, the comment has the effect of  making the defendant testify against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  Howard  v. State, 348 Ark. 471, 79 S.W.3d  273 (2002).  Under the Fifth Amendment to the United  States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant  has the privilege of deciding whether to testify.  See id. ­7­  In this case, appellant chose not to testify, and his counsel moved for a mistrial and  asked for an admonition to the jury.  However, the comment did not refer to appellant’s  failure to testify.  Rather, it referred to what appellant did and did not say to the officers who  were trying to arrest him, not to the fact that he did not speak or testify before the jury.  Compare  Howard  v.  State,  supra  (holding  that  the  comment  did  not  refer  to  appellant  Howard’s failure to testify but, instead, to Howard never having expressed remorse to the  witnesses that testified).  Under those circumstances, there is no error committed.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery.  VAUGHT and BAKER, JJ., agree. ­8­ 

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