Robert Lee Coleman, Jr. v. State of Arkansas

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Not Designated For Publication DIVISION II  CACR07­228  ROBERT LEE COLEMAN, JR.  November 7, 2007  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  MISSISSIPPI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­2006­266]  STATE OF ARKANSAS  HON. CINDY GRACE THYER,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Robert Lee Coleman, Jr., was convicted in a Mississippi County bench trial of two  counts of second­degree forgery, and he was sentenced as an habitual offender to serve  two concurrent 120 month sentences in the Arkansas Department of Correction.  On  appeal Coleman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence concerning his identity as the  perpetrator of the offenses and also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion  for a severance of the two offenses with which he was charged.  We affirm.  Coleman was originally charged with five counts of forging checks belonging to  Teketa  Speed  and  cashing  them  at  convenience  stores  in  Mississippi  County  on  the  sixteenth and seventeenth of April 2006. Ultimately, three of the charges were dismissed,  but Coleman was convicted of cashing checks in the face amounts of $60 and $30 on  consecutive days at Mark’s Exxon in Blytheville.  Coleman first argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish the identity  of the perpetrator so as to enable the trier of fact to reach a conclusion, without having  to  resort  to  speculation  and  conjecture,  that  he  forged  and  cashed  the  checks.    He  acknowledges  that  there  was  testimony  that  he  confessed  to  writing  the  checks,  but  asserts that there was no written statement or taped conversation corroborating his alleged  confession.  Coleman also concedes that there were surveillance photos admitted into  evidence,  but  argues  that  they  were  “blurry”  and  in  one,  the  perpetrator’s  face  is  “obscured.”  He  also  urges  us  to  discount  the  testimony  of  Teketa  Speed  as  “so  incoherent as to be unreliable” and to find insubstantial the testimony of Crystal Watson,  the clerk at Mark’s Exxon who cashed the checks, because no attempt was made to have  her identify him as the check writer.  We disagree.  When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the proof  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  appellee,  and  will  only  consider  the  evidence  that  supports the verdict.  Graham v. State, 365 Ark. 274, 146 S.W.3d 392 (2006).  Here,  Coleman is essentially asking us to re­weigh the evidence, which does not comport with  our standard of review.  Accordingly, we give the testimony from Officer Scott Adams  that Coleman confessed that he wrote the checks in question, its highest probative value.  The fact that there was no signed or recorded statement merely goes to the weight that  the trier of fact gives to the testimony, which we will not consider in a challenge to the  sufficiency of the evidence.  Tiller v. State, 42 Ark. App. 64, 854 S.W.2d 730 (1993).  Likewise, we note that surveillance photos were admitted into evidence.  With ­2­  CA07­228  Coleman present in the courtroom, the trier of fact had the opportunity to compare the  photographs to the accused so that she could determine their value with regard to the  issue of whether or not he cashed the checks.  In our review, we do not substitute our  judgment for that of the finder of fact.  Id.  Finally, we disagree that Teketa Speed’s testimony was “so incoherent as to be  unreliable.”  On review, we defer to the credibility determinations made by the trier of  fact, and we consider only that portion of the testimony that supports the verdict.  Id.  Accordingly, Speed’s testimony provided proof that she did not write the checks, that  Coleman  had  access  to  the  checks  when  he  borrowed  her  car,  and  that  she  did  not  authorize him to sign the checks.  Thus, under our standard of review, Speed’s testimony  only added to the substantial evidence that Coleman committed the offenses in question.  See Brown v. State, 278 Ark. 604, 648 S.W.2d 67 (1983).  Coleman next argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to sever as  the checks were written on different dates and there was insufficient evidence to satisfy  the requirement that they were of a single scheme or plan.  He concedes that proximity  in time and place is a factor to be considered, but he asserts that the offenses did not  occur on the same day, which makes the instant case distinguishable from Brown v. State,  304 Ark. 98, 800 S.W.2d 424 (1990), where the supreme court affirmed the denial of a  severance where the crimes occurred only thirty minutes apart and it was necessary in  Brown to present evidence of one crime to prove the other crime.  We find this argument  unpersuasive. ­3­  CA07­228  As Coleman notes, Rule 22.2 (a) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure  provides that, when two or more offenses have been joined for trial solely on the basis  that they are of the same or similar character and they are not part of a single scheme or  plan,  a  criminal  defendant  has  a  right  to  have  the  offenses  severed.  We  review  the  decision to sever under an abuse of discretion standard.  Garner v. State, 355 Ark. 82,  131 S.W.3d 734 (2003).  We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to sever the counts because the  forgeries were part of a single scheme or plan.  The forgeries were perpetrated at the  same  convenience  store,  occurred  less  than  twenty­six  hours  apart,  involved  checks  purloined from the same source, and the instruments were signed with the same signature.  See Passley v. State, 323 Ark. 301, 915 S.W. 2d 248 (1996)(upholding a trial court’s  refusal  to  sever  where  residential  burglaries  occurred  on  different  days  but  involved  substantially similar methods).  Accordingly, we affirm on this point as well.  Affirmed.  MILLER  and GLOVER, JJ., agree. ­4­  CA07­228 

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