David Lance Ellis v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  PUBLISHED  JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, CHIEF JUDGE DIVISION IV  CACR07­187  December 19, 2007  DAVID LANCE ELLIS  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM THE WHITE COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT [NO. CR­2004­346]  V. HON.  WILLIAM P. MILLS,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  AFFIRMED  APPELLEE  Appellant in this criminal case was convicted of four counts of rape of his minor  stepdaughter, committed when she was between the ages of eleven and fourteen.  The victim  testified that the abuse occurred continuously over a period of several years, usually on the  living room couch, when her mother was present.  Appellant moved in limine to prevent any  testimony that appellant’s wife, the victim’s mother, pled guilty to abusing her minor son.  This was denied.  On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony  by  the  victim that  her  brother  knew  about  the  abuse  because  he  was  involved  in  it,  and  testimony of a police officer that appellant’s wife was in the county jail.  We affirm.  Appellant’s  arguments  hinge  on  his  assertion  that  his  wife’s  sexual  abuse  of  the  children was not relevant to his crime, or that any relevance is outweighed by the potential  for unfair prejudice.  He is wrong.  Evidence of the depravity of appellant’s wife was highly  relevant, especially in light of the victim’s testimony that the rapes continued for years in the  open where her mother was present.  Appellant’s wife had a legal duty to protect her daughter from sexual abuse if she  knew or should have known it was occurring.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­303(36)(A) (Supp.  2005).  More importantly, Arkansas courts, in recognition of basic human nature, have long  engaged the presumption that parents will care for their children, bring them up properly, and  treat them with kindness and affection.  See, e.g., Manuel v. McCorkle, 24 Ark. App. 92, 749  S.W.2d 341 (1988).  The  State needed to explain how these crimes could possibly have  occurred in the presence of the victim’s mother; therefore, the mother’s depraved sexual  abuse of her own children was highly relevant.  Abuse of another child in the same home has been held to be relevant and admissible  even  when  perpetrated  by  the  defendant.  See,  e.g.,  Limber  v.  State,  264  Ark.  479,  572  S.W.2d 402 (1978).  [T]he general rule is that evidence of other crimes by the accused, not charged  in the indictment or information and not a part of the same transaction, is not  admissible at the trial of the accused; however, evidence of other crimes is  admissible under the res gestae exception to the general rule to establish the  facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of the offense.  Haynes v. State, 309 Ark. 583, 832 S.W.2d 479 (1992); Young v. State, 269  Ark. 12, 598 S.W.2d 74 (1980).  Under the res gestae exception, the State is  entitled to introduce evidence showing all circumstances which explain the  charged act, show a motive for acting, or illustrate the accused's state of mind  if  other  criminal  offenses  are  brought  to  light.  Haynes  v.  State,  supra.  Specifically, all of the circumstances connected with a particular crime may  be shown to put the jury in possession of the entire transaction.  Haynes v.  State,  supra.  Where  separate  incidents  comprise  one  continuing  criminal  episode or an overall criminal transaction, or are intermingled with the crime  actually charged, the evidence is admissible.  See Ruiz & Van Denton v. State, ­2­  CACR07­187  265 Ark. 875, 582 S.W.2d 915 (1989); Thomas v. State, 273 Ark. 50, 615  S.W.2d 361(1981); Henderson v. State, 284 Ark. 493, 684 S.W.2d 231 (1985).  Res gestae testimony and evidence is presumptively admissible.  Henderson,  supra; Lair v. State, 283 Ark. 237, 675 S.W.2d 361 (1984); Love v. State, 281  Ark. 379, 664 S.W.2d 457 (1984); Hobbs v. State, 277 Ark. 271, 641 S.W.2d  9 (1982).  Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 110, 8 S.W.3d 547, 554 (2000).  Here, the  testimony was  essential  to  explain  the  charged  act,  it  was  therefore  of  great  relevance,  and,  because  it  involved the crime of a third party rather than of the appellant himself, there was far less  danger of unfair prejudice than would normally be the case.  Affirmed.  ROBBINS and BIRD, JJ., agree. ­3­  CACR07­187 

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