Kenneth Ray Pitts v. State of Arkansas

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION DIVISION II  CACR07­110  October 31, 2007  KENNETH RAY PITTS  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR 05­4343]  V. HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS FOX,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  A jury found appellant, Kenneth Ray Pitts, guilty of second­degree sexual assault and  of sexual indecency with a child.  On appeal, he contends that the circuit court erred in  admitting  evidence  of  appellant’s  prior  acts  of  sexual  misconduct  against  minors.  Specifically, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in allowing a former victim to testify  under the “pedophile exception” to Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.  Further,  he asserts that the circuit court erred in failing to weigh the probative value of this and other  evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice, in accordance with Rule 403 of the Arkansas  Rules  of  Evidence  and  as  provided  by  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  16­42­103  (Supp.  2007).    We  affirm.  At trial, the victim, C.M., who was seven years old at the time of trial, testified about  appellant, whom she called “Uncle Kenny,” and events that occurred in 2004.  She testified  that  appellant  would  visit  her  at  home  while  she  was  living  with  her  mother,  Stephanie  Moore, and her “grandfather,” Manuel (also referred to as Emanuel) Benton.  She described  how,  when  Moore  and  Benton  were  outside  of  the  residence,  appellant  took  her  into  a  bathroom and later to a bedroom and “touched me with his pee­pee” while both had their  pants off, and that he touched her on her “pee­pee.”  She further testified that appellant told  her not to tell anyone.  On cross­examination, she was asked if appellant “actually put it in  your pee­pee?”  C.M. replied, “Half, a little bit.”  C.M.’s mother, Stephanie Moore, testified regarding C.M.’s relationship to appellant  and to Benton.  Moore testified that she knew appellant as “Uncle Kenny,” and that Benton  was C.M.’s great­great grandfather.  She had recently learned, however, that appellant was  not Benton’s biological son.  She further testified that in 2004 she and C.M. had lived with  Benton, and appellant visited frequently.  Chevette Ewing, who was twenty­five years old at the time of trial, testified regarding  appellant’s conduct toward her when she was approximately nine years old.  According to  Ewing,  appellant  was  her  mother’s  boyfriend  and  lived  with  them.  Ewing  testified  that  appellant would play with his penis in front of her and touch her face and vaginal area with  it.  She stated that this would occur in her mother’s bedroom as well as other rooms and that  appellant told her he would hurt her mother or her brother if she told anyone what he was  doing. ­2­  CACR07­110  The  State  also  introduced  into  evidence  a  certified  copy  of  a  judgment  and  commitment order showing that appellant was convicted of first­degree sexual abuse in 1990,  which  stemmed  from  the  events  involving  Ewing.  Additionally,  the  State  introduced  a  certified copy of a judgment from 1984 showing that appellant pleaded guilty to first­degree  sexual abuse and the felony information from 1983 charging appellant with the crime and  alleging that appellant “engaged in sexual contact with [S.H.], who is less than fourteen (14)  years old.”  Beatrice Burns testified for appellant regarding her family relationship with appellant  and Benton.  She stated that she was appellant’s sister, and that Benton was her step­father.  She  further  testified  that  while  they  were  growing  up,  they  believed  that  Benton  was  appellant’s father and that he raised them, but when appellant was grown, he learned that  Benton was not his biological father.  As he argued to the circuit court, appellant contends that the circuit court erred in  allowing Ewing to testify under the “pedophile exception” to Rule 404(b).  He asserts that  the  events  testified  about  by  Ewing  were  not  sufficiently  similar  to  the  acts  committed  against C.M., in that no allegation of vaginal penetration was made by Ewing.  Further, he  asserts that appellant did not have an “intimate” relationship with C.M., as he did not live  in the same household as C.M., and C.M. was never under his care or authority. ­3­  CACR07­110  1  The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized a “pedophile exception” to Rule 404(b),  which  allows  evidence  of  similar  acts  with  the  same  or  other  children  when  it  shows  a  proclivity for a specific act with a person or class of persons with whom the defendant has  an intimate relationship.  Hamm v. State, 365 Ark. 647, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  The stated  reason for this exception is that such evidence proves the depraved instinct of the accused.  Id.  The basis of the “pedophile exception” was the court’s acceptance of the notion that  evidence  of  sexual  acts  with  children  may  be  shown,  as  that  evidence  demonstrates  a  particular proclivity or instinct.  Id.  For the pedophile exception to apply, the court requires  that there be a sufficient degree of similarity between the evidence to be introduced and the  sexual conduct of the defendant.  Id.  Further, the court requires that there be an “intimate  relationship”  between  the  perpetrator  and  the  victim  of  the  prior  act.  Id.  “Intimate  relationship”  has  been  defined  as  close  in  friendship  or  acquaintance,  familiar,  near,  or  confidential.  Parish v. State, 357 Ark. 260, 163 S.W.3d 843 (2004).  We  disagree  with  appellant’s  argument  that  the  conduct  was  dissimilar.    In  both  instances,  appellant  engaged  in  sexual  contact  with  female  victims  who  were  less  than  fourteen years old.  Furthermore, contrary to appellant’s assertions, there was an “intimate 1  Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not  admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity  therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,  opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or  accident.”  ­4­  CACR07­110  relationship” between appellant and his victims.  In Ewing’s case, he was her mother’s live­  in boyfriend. In C.M.’s case, he was a frequent visitor to the household who was left alone  with the child while her mother was outside.  Further, he was known to C.M. as her “uncle,”  and despite, as suggested by Moore and Burns, the lack of a biological relationship to C.M.,  appellant’s connection to C.M. and her family is apparent.  Thus, we conclude that Ewing’s  testimony was properly admitted.  For his second and third points, appellant asserts that the circuit court erred in failing  to weigh the probative value of Ewing’s testimony and evidence of appellant’s two prior  convictions for first­degree sexual abuse against the danger of unfair prejudice, in accordance  2  3  with Rule 403,  and as provided by Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­103(a).  We observe, however,  that though appellant argues that the circuit court failed to conduct a Rule 403 analysis, it is  apparent from the record that the court did rule on appellant’s Rule 403 objection to Ewing’s  testimony and the two convictions.  But to the extent that appellant also argues that the circuit court erred in failing to 2  Rule 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its  probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion  of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,  or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  3  The statute provides that “[i]n a criminal case where the defendant is accused of  a sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual assault is  admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant,  subject to the circuit court’s consideration of the admissibility of any such evidence under  Rule 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.”  Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­103(a).  ­5­  CACR07­110  exclude Ewing’s testimony under Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially  outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, we note that the standard of review is whether  the circuit court abused its discretion.  Flanery v. State, 362 Ark. 311, 208 S.W.3d 187  (2005).    In  view  of  the  similarities  discussed  above,  Ewing’s  testimony  and  appellant’s  conviction stemming from those events were highly probative on the issue of the appellant’s  sexual  proclivities.  Considering  the  broad  discretion  of  the  circuit  court  in  admitting  evidence, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in concluding that the probative  nature of the challenged evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair  prejudice.  We are mindful of appellant’s assertion that the probative value of Ewing’s testimony  is diminished because those events occurred fifteen years prior to the incidents involving  C.M.  But given the similarities involved, and in light of prior case law finding such evidence  admissible under Rule 404(b) even when a significant time gap exists, see Flanery, supra,  we still conclude that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger  of unfair prejudice.  Further, he asserts that the State failed to provide appellant with forty­  five days’ notice that the State would introduce Ewing’s testimony, as required by Ark. Code  4  Ann.  §  16­42­103(b),  and  that  this  failure  heightened  the  risk  of  potential  prejudice. 4  Subsection (b) of the statute provides that “[i]n a case where the prosecuting  attorney intends to offer evidence under this section, the prosecuting attorney shall  disclose the evidence to the defendant or the defendant's attorney if an attorney is  representing the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the  substance of any testimony at least forty­five (45) days before the scheduled date of trial  ­6­  CACR07­110  Appellant, however, failed to object to the admission of Ewing’s testimony based on the  failure to receive notice, so that argument was not preserved for appellate review.  See, e.g.,  Flanery,  supra  (holding  that  we  will  not  address  arguments  raised  for  the  first  time  on  appeal).  Further, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the probative value  against the danger of unfair prejudice of the certified copy of a judgment from 1984 showing  that appellant pleaded guilty to first­degree sexual abuse and the felony information from  1983 charging appellant with the crime and which alleged that appellant “engaged in sexual  contact with [S.H.], who is less than fourteen (14) years old.”  Despite appellant’s contention  that  the  court  could  not  ascertain  and  hence  could  not  weigh  the  probative  value  of  the  evidence,  we  conclude  that  the  judgment  and  information  together  showed  appellant’s  proclivity  to  engage  in  sexual  contact  with  females  less  than  fourteen  years  old.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in finding that the probative value of the evidence  was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Affirmed.  GLOVER and MILLER, JJ., agree. or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause.”  Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­  103(b).  ­7­  CACR07­110 

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