Karon D. Trotter, Jr. v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID M. GLOVER, JUDGE
DIVISION I
CACR06-863
May 9, 2007
KARON D. TROTTER, JR.
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE DREW
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[CR-2005-0065-1A]
HONORABLE SAMUEL B. POPE,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Karon Trotter, Jr., was tried by a jury and found guilty of the offenses of
possession of drug paraphernalia, manufacturing cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent
to deliver, and delivery of cocaine.
He was sentenced to three years on the drug-
paraphernalia conviction and twenty years on each of the remaining convictions. The
sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
For his sole point of appeal, appellant
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
There is no real factual dispute in this case, and the pertinent facts can be
summarized as follows. Monticello police officers made arrangements with a confidential
informant, Buddy Frost, to make a controlled cocaine buy from appellant within the city
limits of Monticello on March 11, 2005. Appellant was staying at the Economy Inn in
Monticello. Frost initially tried to contact appellant by using a pay phone located at a
store in Monticello. Appellant did not answer the call from that location. According to
Frost, appellant would only answer calls from two numbers, one of which was Frost’s
home telephone. Consequently, the initial plan had to be changed to allow Frost to make
the call from his home phone, which was located north of Monticello—outside the city
limits.
Appellant was subsequently observed driving toward Frost’s house, and Frost then
later called Tommy Free, the Monticello Chief of Police, to report that appellant had been
there and that the controlled buy had been completed. Chief Free positioned his vehicle
along a public road to watch for appellant’s return from Frost’s house but was not able to
see the car. Frost delivered the purchased cocaine to Chief Free and then returned home,
soon thereafter reporting to Chief Free that appellant had returned to Frost’s home with
more cocaine for another sale.
Chief Free alerted other Monticello officers to look out for appellant’s vehicle
along the road from Frost’s house. An officer named Deaton notified Chief Free that he
had observed appellant’s car on its way from Frost’s house. Deaton followed appellant’s
vehicle, and Chief Free fell in behind Deaton’s vehicle when appellant and Deaton passed
him. Chief Free explained that the officers had planned to follow appellant into
Monticello; however, appellant’s vehicle pulled over to the side of the road before
reaching Monticello city limits. The officers surmised that appellant had realized he was
being followed, and they thought that he might try to dispose of the evidence. Deaton’s
vehicle went around appellant’s car, but Chief Free turned on his lights and pulled in front
of appellant’s car. As the officers approached the vehicle, it accelerated toward one of the
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officers and then ran into a ditch. Cocaine, the buy money, a motel-room key, and drug
paraphernalia were retrieved by the officers. In addition, bank records and motel-room
receipts were retrieved from appellant’s briefcase.
Mark Gober testified that he was the sheriff of Drew County, Arkansas.
He
explained that he issued commissions to various members of the Monticello Police
Department for purposes of working in the county.
The cards evidencing the
commissions provided in pertinent part that the sheriff had appointed the named officers
“as a Deputy Sheriff” and that the sheriff “hereby authorize[s] the said Deputy to perform
all the duties prescribed by law to my said office.” In addition, Sheriff Gober produced an
accompanying letter of January 27, 2005, listing the officers to whom he had issued
commission cards, which letter also provided in pertinent part:
As formally stipulated the usage of these cards will be closely monitored.
Utilization of the cards is to be one of the following:
1.
The Sheriff or Chief Deputy request assistance.
2.
At any time the Monticello Police Department has need to be outside
the city limits, the Sheriff shall be notified and in his absence the chief
deputy shall be notified. At which time the appropriate personnel
will be dispatched to assist. Any misuse of the card will be quickly
handled and the appropriate action taken.
In the future as I get to know other Police Department personnel additional cards
may be issued. Both of our Departments believe in a good working relationship
towards improving the lives of our citizens by providing good law enforcement for
our county.
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Sheriff Gober explained that he was not advised of the investigation prior to
appellant’s arrest; that he first learned city officers had made a stop in the county from one
of his own deputies; that he found out about the entire matter after March 11; that he
“absolutely” would have approved the operation if he had known; and that the operation
was scheduled to take place in the city, but appellant’s own actions made it necessary to go
into the county and to make the arrest in the county. He stated that he believed the
Monticello officers were acting under the authority that he had provided them; that their
actions began in the city limits and he would expect them “to stay on it” until finished;
and that he believed it was a necessity for the city officers to go into the county. He
concluded that he did not believe that the city officers had violated the agreement nor
misused their commission cards.
Standard of Review
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court conducts a de
novo review based upon the totality of the circumstances, reversing only if the circuit
court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress is clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence. Sheridan v. State, ____ Ark. ____, ____ S.W.3d ____ (Jan. 18, 2007).
Jurisdictional Authority to Arrest
Appellant contends that all of the evidence obtained in his case was the result of an
illegal stop/search of his vehicle and that the trial court therefore erred in denying his
motion to suppress. The only basis asserted by appellant in this appeal for his claim that
the search was illegal is that the Monticello police officers were operating outside of the
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city limits, and “beyond the limits of their appointments as deputy sheriffs of Drew
County when they made the warrantless stop of his vehicle.” Appellant acknowledges
that the officers carried commission cards, which purportedly appointed them to act as
deputy sheriffs in Drew County. He contends, however, that Sheriff Gober’s letter of
January 27, 2005, placed limits on the appointments and that the officers involved in the
stop and search of his vehicle were not acting within those designated limitations on their
authority. He argues, therefore, that all evidence and everything else resulting from the
stop should have been suppressed under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. We
disagree.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-15-503 (Repl. 1998), provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Every deputy sheriff appointed as provided by law shall possess all the powers of
his principal and may perform any of the duties required by law to be performed by
the sheriff.
(Emphasis added.) Appellant does not challenge the appointments themselves. Moreover,
the statute clearly grants full powers to appointed deputy sheriffs. The officers involved in
the stop were all listed as recipients of commission cards in Sheriff Gober’s letter of January
27, 2005.
The trial court concluded that the evidence established that the arresting
Monticello police officers were all commissioned deputies in Drew County, that appellant
had cited him no law pertaining to the placement of conditions on commissions, and that
Sheriff Gober was satisfied that the officers had acted within their authority as deputies.
The trial court, therefore, denied the motion to suppress.
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In addition, upon examining the contents of Gober’s January 27 letter, it can be
fairly said to provide that use of the cards was to take place in two basic situations: 1)
when the sheriff or chief deputy requested assistance, and 2) any time the Monticello
Police Department needed to be outside the city limits. In the latter situation, the letter
also provides that the Sheriff or Chief Deputy shall be notified, at which time appropriate
personnel will be dispatched to assist. Even though the letter uses the term “shall” it does
not specify that notification must precede any action. Sheriff Gober testified that he had
no problem with the series of events leading to appellant’s arrest, and that he “absolutely”
would have approved the operation. The trial court determined that the officers acted
within their authority as appointed deputy sheriffs.
Appellant’s argument does not
convince us otherwise. Our de novo review of this record reveals no clear error in the trial
court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
B AKER and M ILLER, JJ., agree.
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