Kerry Deon Vincent v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, CHIEF JUDGE
DIVISION I
CACR06-777
September 3, 2008
KERRY DEON VINCENT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DREW COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT [NO. CR-05-141-3]
V.
HON. ROBERT BYNUM GIBSON,
JR., JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
The appellant in this criminal case was tried by a jury and convicted of commercial
burglary, attempted theft of property, and criminal mischief in the first degree. Appellant
argues that the evidence is insufficient to support all three convictions. He also argues that
the trial court erred in permitting an amendment to the information after the case was
submitted to the jury and in permitting the arresting officer to testify regarding statements
made by appellant before Miranda warnings were given. We find no error, and we affirm.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict.
Watson v. State, 358 Ark. 212, 188 S.W.3d 921 (2004). We will affirm a conviction if
substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient
force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the
other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id.
A person commits commercial burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
commercial occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in that
structure any offense punishable by imprisonment. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201(b)(1) (Repl.
2006). Appellant argues that the evidence of commercial burglary was insufficient because
there was no evidence he was inside the store that was burglarized. We do not agree. There
was evidence that police officers answered a burglar alarm call at The Outdoor Store at 5:30
a.m. and discovered that a block of concrete had been used to break a window on the south
side of the store. A nearby door was open. Shoeprints matching those worn by appellant
were found near the broken window and the open door. Merchandise inside the store was
found to be damaged and in disarray; notably, two all-terrain vehicles had their headlights on
and had been moved; numerous items of clothing were on the floor and had been run over
and damaged; a box of merchandise from Wildlife Specialties had been run over; and packets
of deer scent and other items were scattered over the floor. While one officer investigated
the scene, Officer Ted Williams, who had remained in the patrol car, observed appellant run
from behind the dumpster located near the southwest corner of the store. He gave chase, and
appellant was apprehended approximately 300 yards from the store. Appellant pleaded to be
let go as he was being handcuffed, and said “Ted, let me go. Ted, let me go. I broke the
glass out, I gotta have some money. Shorty’s gonna kill me.” We hold that this is sufficient
evidence to support the finding that appellant entered a commercial occupiable structure of
another with the intent to commit an offense punishable by imprisonment, and to support the
finding that appellant committed attempted theft of property. Likewise, we hold that the
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CACR06-777
store owner’s testimony that the value of the damaged items was more than $800 is sufficient
to support the finding that appellant committed criminal mischief in the first degree by
causing damage valued in excess of $500.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by improperly allowing an amendment
to the information after the case was submitted to the jury. Appellant was charged with
attempted theft of property valued in excess of $500. Because of a typographical error, the
jury was instructed that this was a Class C felony, when in reality it should have been a Class
D. The trial judge cured this error, with appellant’s assent, by amending the charge from
Class C to Class D. Even if this were error, it was invited by appellant and appellant clearly
suffered no prejudice from it. We will not reverse in the absence of demonstrated prejudice.
Perroni v. State, 358 Ark. 17, 186 S.W.3d 206 (2004).
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in permitting the arresting officer to
testify regarding appellant’s statement at the time of his arrest. We do not reach this issue
because appellant did not object when he became aware of these statements, but only objected
several minutes after the officer testified. Even constitutional errors in the admission of
evidence are waived in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. Crawford v. State, 362
Ark. 301, 208 S.W.3d 146 (2005). Furthermore, even were we to reach the merits of this
issue we would find no error because, from our examination of the record, it is clear that
appellant’s statement was spontaneous and not the result of any custodial interrogation.
Affirmed.
H ART and G LADWIN, JJ., agree.
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CACR06-777
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