Robert Lieblong v. State of Arkansas
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
D.P. MARSHALL JR., Judge
DIVISION IV
CACR06-1463
3 October 2007
ROBERT LIEBLONG,
APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[CR2005-2655]
v.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE
THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER
CHARLES PIAZZA, CIRCUIT JUDGE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Robert Lieblong entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. He reserved the right to appeal the denial
of his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his car. On the
authority of Sims v. State, 356 Ark. 507, 157 S.W.3d 530 (2004), and Lilley v. State,
362 Ark. 436, 208 S.W.3d 785 (2005), we reverse Lieblong’s conviction and remand
the case.
I.
We recite the facts in detail because we must consider the totality of the
circumstances in our de novo review of the suppression issue. Lilley, 362 Ark. at 439,
208 S.W.3d at 788. The facts were essentially undisputed.
Corporal Dale Donovan of the State Police stopped Lieblong for speeding on
Interstate 30 in Little Rock. Lieblong was driving a rented Pontiac Bonneville.
When Donovan approached the car, Lieblong appeared nervous. Donovan performed
a background check, which revealed that Lieblong had a criminal history involving
drugs. Donovan gave Lieblong a warning for speeding and told him that by “giving
him a break, it would help him to understand he needs to straighten things up in his
life . . . following what he’s supposed to do as far as the law is concerned.” Donovan
testified that Lieblong responded by saying that “he had a lot of problems, and he was
still trying to straighten things out . . ..” Donovan perceived that Lieblong became
more nervous at this point. Donovan asked for permission to search the car and if
Lieblong had any drugs or weapons in the car. Lieblong said that he had no drugs or
weapons, but responded ambiguously to the search request, saying that he was on his
way to his parents’ house and was running late.
Donovan then asked Lieblong to step out of the car and asked again for
permission to search it. Lieblong got out of the car as requested but would not
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consent to the search. Donovan then gave Lieblong an option: he could wait twenty
or thirty minutes for a K-9 unit to arrive and do a dog-sniff, or he could allow
Donovan to search the car, which would take only five minutes. Lieblong consented
and let Donovan search the car. Donovan found 75.9 grams of methamphetamine.
II.
The holdings in Sims and Lilley control this case. Unless Corporal Donovan
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Lieblong was involved in criminal
activity, then his continued detention of Lieblong after he issued the warning violated
the Fourth Amendment. Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 155–56, 60 S.W.3d 464,
473–74 (2001).
In Sims, for example, an officer wrote Sims a ticket for having a defective
brake light, at which point the purpose of the traffic stop was completed. 356 Ark.
at 510, 157 S.W.3d at 532. Although Sims continued to appear nervous, was
sweating, had prior drug arrests, and made a “strange” statement about having just
come from Wal-Mart, the officer had no objective basis for a reasonable suspicion
that Sims was involved in criminal activity. Our supreme court therefore suppressed
the fruits of the officer’s post-ticket search. 356 Ark. at 514–16, 157 S.W.3d at
535–36. In Lilley, the officer likewise did not have reasonable suspicion to detain
Lilley after the purpose of the traffic stop ended even though Lilley appeared nervous,
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the rental car he was driving smelled like air freshener, it was rented in another
person’s name, and it was a one-way rental. Again, the court rejected the officer’s
search. 362 Ark. at 445–46, 208 S.W.3d at 792.
III.
At trial, Corporal Donovan acknowledged that the purpose of the traffic stop
was completed when he gave Lieblong the warning. At that point, Lieblong was free
to go. But Donovan testified that he never told Lieblong that he could leave if he
wanted to do so. The State argues that Donovan had reasonable suspicion to detain
Lieblong after the traffic stop because Lieblong was nervous, had a criminal history
involving drugs, and made a suspicious statement that he was still trying to straighten
his life out. We disagree.
Lieblong’s nervousness cannot create a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Sims, 356 Ark. at 514–15, 157 S.W.3d at 535. Likewise, his prior drug
arrests cannot create reasonable suspicion. 356 Ark. at 510, 514–16, 157 S.W.3d at
532, 535–36. Lieblong’s statement—that he was trying to straighten his life
out—was ambiguous and “could have been merely a nervous attempt at
conversation.” Ibid.
Our precedents are clear, moreover, that all of these
circumstances combined do not create adequate grounds for reasonable suspicion.
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Lilley, 362 Ark. at 445–46, 208 S.W.3d at 792; Sims, 356 Ark. at 514–15, 157 S.W.3d
at 535–36.
We recognize that Corporal Donovan may have relied “on his experience to
make ‘inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.’”
Dominguez v. State, 290 Ark. 428, 439, 720 S.W.2d 703, 708 (1986), quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). But the officer’s perceptions must still
be supported by objective facts. Dominguez, 290 Ark. at 439, 720 S.W.2d 708–09.
Though the combination of factors may have, as Corporal Donovan said, “[thrown]
up a red flag” for him, the objective facts did not support that perception. We hold
that the officer did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Lieblong
after issuing the warning. Therefore, the evidence that Corporal Donovan found
during his post-warning search should have been suppressed.
Judgment reversed; case remanded.
BAKER and MILLER, JJ., agree.
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