Corbin Cauldwell v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE
DIVISION III
CACR06-1431
June 20, 2007
CORBIN CAULDWELL
APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[CR2006-817-1]
V.
HON. WILLIAM A. STOREY, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
On August 30, 2006, a Washington County jury found Corbin Cauldwell guilty of
driving while intoxicated, and the court sentenced him to ninety days of community service
and a $1000 fine. He appeals from the conviction, arguing that the conviction was not
supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, he contends that the jury should not have
considered the results of a breathalyzer test in light of evidence that the arresting officer did
not observe him for twenty minutes before administering the test, as required by the
Department of Health. We hold that the police officer’s testimony was substantial evidence
that he complied with the twenty-minute observation period. Accordingly, we affirm.
The only testimony at trial was from Sergeant Brian Comstock of the Washington
County Sheriff’s Office. In the early morning hours of July 4, 2005, Comstock saw appellant
run a stop sign at the corner of Gregg and Prospect Streets in Fayetteville. Comstock
followed appellant and initiated a traffic stop. During the stop, Comstock smelled an odor
of intoxicants inside the vehicle. Comstock wanted to know whether appellant or his female
passenger was drinking; therefore, he asked appellant to step out of the car. Appellant told
Comstock that he had two drinks. Because of the odor and appellant’s admission, Comstock
administered field sobriety tests.
Comstock first performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. Appellant failed
the test, as he showed six of the six clues showing intoxication. Comstock testified that
seventy-seven percent of people who fail the HGN test are intoxicated.
Next, Comstock administered the walk-and-turn test. Appellant showed three of the
eight clues, which constituted failure of the exam. Comstock stated that eighty percent of the
people who fail both the HGN and walk-and-turn tests are intoxicated.
Finally, Comstock administered the one-leg-stand test. Appellant only showed one
clue during the test, which is a successful exam; however, Comstock testified that it was not
unusual for someone to pass one test and fail the others. Comstock arrested appellant after
administering the field sobriety tests.
The records show that Comstock made the arrest at 2:11 a.m. Comstock testified that
the Department of Health requires that a subject be observed for at least twenty minutes
before administering a breathalyzer test. Comstock administered the exam at 2:38 a.m., and
the test showed that appellant’s blood-alcohol level was 0.12, above the legal limit.
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On cross-examination, Comstock explained that the twenty-minute observation
period was in place to allow any residual alcohol in the subject’s mouth to evaporate. During
this period, he watches for the subject to burp or vomit. He stated that he watched appellant
part of the time by looking at him through the rear view mirror of his patrol car; however,
he acknowledged that he did not have constant observation. Comstock also counted as part
of his observation period the time that appellant sat in the intake area. He acknowledged that,
while he was in the adjacent room looking for a form, appellant could have burped or
regurgitated; however, he stated that he would have known if appellant had burped or
regurgitated, either by a mess on the floor or by the odor. Comstock testified that appellant
did not burp during the observation time.
At the conclusion of the State’s case, appellant moved for directed verdict. Appellant
argued that the trial court should not have allowed the jury to consider the results of the
breathalyzer test because of the ambiguity of the evidence regarding the twenty-minute
observation period. He further argued that once the test was excluded, the remaining
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The court denied appellant’s motion, and
appellant closed without presenting a case.
Over the State’s objection, the jury was instructed that it had to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Comstock substantially complied with the twenty-minute observation
period prior to administering the breathalyzer test and that absent substantial compliance, it
was not to consider the evidence that the test yielded. After deliberations, the jury found
appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated, and the court sentenced him to ninety days of
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community service and a $1000 fine.
For his sole point on appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction for driving while intoxicated. He argues that the jury’s verdict was not
supported by substantial evidence because Comstock did not substantially comply with the
twenty-minute observation period and that, without the results of the breathalyzer test, there
was not substantial evidence to support the conviction. We reject appellant’s argument and
affirm his conviction.
We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Gorman v. State, 366 Ark. 82, — S.W.3d — (2006). In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and
consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We affirm if substantial evidence
exists to support the conviction. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and
character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other,
without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id.
The evidence shows that Comstock exercised a twenty-seven minute observation
period before administering the breathalyzer test. While appellant argues, without any
corroborating proof, that he could have burped without Comstock noticing, Comstock
testified unequivocally that appellant did not burp during the observation period. An officer
is not required to stare fixedly at the arrested person for the entire time in order to comply
with the twenty-minute regulation. Goode v. State, 303 Ark. 609, 798 S.W.3d 430 (1990);
Williford v. State, 284 Ark. 449, 683 S.W.2d 228 (1985). It was within the province of the
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jury to determine the weight and credibility of Comstock’s testimony. See State v. Johnson,
326 Ark. 189, 931 S.W.2d 760 (1996).
Here, it is apparent that the jury chose to believe Comstock’s testimony that he
observed the twenty-minute observation period and that appellant did nothing during that
period to affect the results of the breathalyzer test. Comstock’s testimony is substantial
evidence that he observed the twenty-minute observation period prior to administering the
breathalyzer test, and the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for directed
verdict. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
H ART and G LOVER, JJ., agree.
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DIVISION III
CA06-1223
June 20, 2007
LINDA PARSON
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION [F501700]
ARKANSAS METHODIST HOSPITAL
and ARKANSAS PROPERTY &
CASUALTY GUARANTY FUND
APPELLEES
REVERSED AND REMANDED
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JUDGE DAVID M. GLOVER
Appellant, Linda Parson, an LPN who worked for appellee Arkansas Methodist
Hospital (Methodist), fell and hit her head at work on October 29, 2001, suffering
bruising and black eyes.
Appellees accepted the injury as compensable and provided
medical treatment for Parson’s injuries. Parson requested permanent disability benefits,
which appellees controverted. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Parson had
suffered a compensable physical injury to her brain in addition to her other physical injuries
and that she was entitled to permanent-partial disability benefits of thirty-five percent as
well as fifteen percent wage loss, for a total of fifty percent permanent-partial impairment
to the body as a whole. The Commission reversed the grant of benefits, finding that
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-113, the statute regarding mental injury and illness,
was applicable and that Parson failed to meet her burden of proof. Parson now appeals,
arguing that the Commission erred (1) in determining the type of proof necessary to
establish the compensability of a closed-head injury in light of Wentz v. Service Master, 75
Ark. App. 296, 57 S.W.3d 753 (2001); (2) in finding that her claim was barred by the
language of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-113; and (3) in finding that she had
failed to present sufficient evidence to support her claim for benefits for a closed-head
injury. We reverse and remand to the Commission for further findings of fact.
Standard of Review
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JUDGE DAVID M. GLOVER
In workers’ compensation cases, this court views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings
and affirms the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Geo Specialty Chem. v.
Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Air
Compressor Equip. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000). The issue is not
whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have
supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s
conclusion, we must affirm its decision.
Geo Specialty, supra.
It is the Commission’s
province to determine witness credibility and the weight to be given to each witness’s
testimony. Johnson v. Riceland Foods, 47 Ark. App. 71, 884 S.W.2d 626 (1994).
In a workers’ compensation case, it is the claimant’s burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence both that his or her claim is compensable and that there is
a causal connection between the work-related accident and the later disabling injury.
Stephenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 265, 19 S.W.3d 36 (2000).
The
determination of whether the causal connection exists is a question of fact for the
Commission to determine. Id.
Hearing Testimony
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JUDGE DAVID M. GLOVER
At the hearing before the ALJ, Parson testified that she was fifty-five years old, had
completed the ninth grade, and had obtained her GED in 1968. She became a certified
nursing assistant in 1987, and she worked as a CNA while putting herself through nursing
school to obtain her LPN. She had been continuously employed in the field of nursing
since 1988, and had worked for Methodist since 2000.
Parson testified that on the night of her injury, to the best of her recollection, she
was walking back to the desk with a chart in her hand when both of her feet stuck to the
floor, causing her to fall forward and strike her head on the edge of the desk. She then fell
onto the floor on her hands and knees. She said that she felt “woozy and funny,” that her
head hurt, and that she was seen in the emergency room, but she did not remember how
she got there. She also did not remember if she continued to work after being seen in the
ER or if she went home.
She said that her memory from the night of the accident
forward was affected; that she had memory loss; and that she also had attention-span
problems. Parson said that she had taken photographs of herself showing the injuries to
her face and eyes; those pictures were admitted into evidence.
Parson testified that prior to her October 29, 2001 injury, she had suffered other
medical problems, including two heart attacks, shoulder problems, herniated discs in her
lower back, and knee problems, but that she was able to perform her job in spite of those
problems. She said that after the incident, she was treated by Dr. Spanos and Dr. Johnson,
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and that appellee paid those medical bills through 2004. She was also seen by Dr. Shedd,
her original workers’ compensation doctor. She testified that Dr. Johnson administered
two eight-hour neuropsychological tests.
She said that she was having headaches and
near-syncope episodes but that she was told that there was nothing wrong with her.
Parson stated that she was eventually authorized to see her family physician, Dr. Sanders
McKee, who assumed that Parson had suffered a concussion and referred her to Dr.
Spanos.
Parson testified that in early November 2001, she was having what Dr. Shedd
called “near-syncope” episodes where she felt that she was going to fall or like there was
an aura. She said that she still had those episodes, that she had never had anything like that
prior to October 29, 2001, and that those episodes were now less frequent.
Parson said that she had several MRIs performed on her brain and neck. She also
said that she has headaches everyday, which she did not have prior to October 29, 2001,
and that they keep her from sleeping at times. She attributed her bad memory and lack of
attention span to the accident.
Parson stated that she continued to work for Methodist after the accident, but that
she had to begin making notes to herself to remember what she was doing. She did not
remember when she returned to work, but she worked until she suffered a non-work
related injury in April 2002, after which Methodist terminated her employment. Parson
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testified that she was currently totally disabled and receiving benefits from the Social
Security Administration.
The deposition of Dr. Demetrius Spanos was also entered into evidence. In that
deposition, Dr. Spanos, a neurologist, stated that he had completed a report from Parson’s
attorney and in it noted “AMA Guidelines 25 to 50 percent for moderately severe
cognitive decline.”
Dr. Spanos said that the cognitive decline was measured by two
neuropsychological examinations performed by Dr. Dan Johnson in 2002 and 2004. Dr.
Spanos stated that he did not understand exactly how the tests were done because he did
not perform them, but he further stated that there was a validity portion built into the test
to make sure that the patient was not malingering or trying to fake symptoms.
Dr. Spanos said that Dr. Johnson found mild to moderate cognitive decline in some
respects, pointing out that some of Parson’s factors improved slightly from 2002 to 2004,
but that others got worse.
Dr. Spanos testified that he did not have any
neuropsychological testing results for Parson prior to the October 2001 incident, but that
the test was also designed to gauge a patient’s ability before an injury occurred, although
he was not aware of how that was determined. Dr. Spanos said that he would assume that
the current level of function was more easily testable than the pre-injury state, but noted
that there were ways to determine the pre-injury state on the test.
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Dr. Spanos stated that the twenty-five to fifty percent came straight out of the
AMA Guidelines, Fourth Edition.
He said that, in his opinion, Parson was at
approximately thirty-five percent because some factors had improved and others had
worsened with time according to Dr. Johnson, so he erred on the lighter side of the
percentage and placed her at thirty-five percent. He testified that for head injuries and any
neurologic disease, the majority of improvement was made in the first year, and the
further out from the injury, the less likely improvement became. Dr. Spanos said that he
did not put in the headache issue because they had no number in the guidelines; however,
he gave Parson thirty-five percent for cognitive decline and thirty-five percent for
headaches, which he said was erring on the lower side of the scale. He also said that
Parson had chronic headache pain, and that he determined how severe the headaches were
by asking her, which he admitted was subjective.
On cross-examination, Dr. Spanos testified that he felt comfortable stating within a
reasonable degree of medical certainty the opinions he had outlined in the report. He
attributed his seventy-percent rating to the October 2001 work injury based upon the
history Parson gave and the fact that the headaches became worse following the head
Dr. Spanos stated that Dr. O’Sullivan 1 agreed that this was a post-traumatic
injury.
headache, and that it may be post-concussive.
1
The record contains no medical evidence from Dr. O’Sullivan.
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Dr. Spanos testified that the November 12, 2001 MRI did not appear to show an
objective sign of traumatic injury, and that an EEG taken one and one-half years after the
accident also did not show any abnormalities. However, he stated that just because there
was no abnormal result on the MRI did not mean that there was not injury to the brain or
nervous system because closed-head injuries often showed normal results on MRIs and
EEGs. He said that he regarded the neuropsychological tests performed by Dr. Johnson as
objective even though he acknowledged that it was a question and answer session. He
also said that he did not see evidence of trauma to Parson’s head, but that he did not see
her until February 2002. He stated that he believed that the story he was given by Parson
was accurate. He testified that for the better part of the first year Parson responded well to
medication for headaches, but that for many patients, medication may not work over time.
Medical Evidence
The November 12, 2001 MRI was essentially normal, showing only “a focal area
of small vessel ischemia in the occipital lobe on the left, deep white matter tract probably
secondary to hypertension.” There was no finding of brain trauma in the MRI report.
In the June 2002 neuropsychological exam, Dr. Dan Johnson noted that Parson’s
past medical history included high blood pressure, elevated cholesterol, occasional
headaches, and prior depression.
Parson told him that she had near-syncope episodes
anywhere from two to three times per day to two to three times per month, and she also
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said that she had been both near and far sighted since she had fallen. Dr. Johnson found
that Parson’s affect was primarily depressed.
He found that Parson’s overall cognitive
functioning was generally commensurate with premorbid levels, and that her composite
memory measures ranged from average to superior.
He found that Parson was
experiencing deficits in some areas of neurocognitive and neurobehavioral functioning
while being well within expectations in others, and that her overall cognitive functioning
was generally commensurate with premorbid levels. He stated that the most noticeable
areas of cognitive deficiency were in attentional abilities, and that those abilities were
lower than expected and most likely represented somewhat of a decline compared to
premorbid
functioning.
He
also
stated
that
Parson
demonstrated
significant
emotional/behavioral distress, highlighted by significant depressive symptomatology and
considerable anxiousness and worrying. He said that Parson most likely experienced a
clinically significant level of depressive/dysthymic that appeared to have been exacerbated
significantly by her current general medical condition and loss of work, which was
complicating/slowing her recovery toward baseline cognitively. Dr. Johnson stated that it
appeared from a neurological standpoint that Parson could benefit from an anti-depressant.
The second neuropsychological evaluation was performed on June 14, 2004.
Dr.
Johnson stated that Parson’s current overall cognitive functioning was generally
commensurate with premorbid levels. He said that although her overall ability to navigate
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verbally mediated tasks worsened from 2002, performance on non-verbally mediated tasks
improved significantly.
Parson’s performance on composite-memory measures fell
consistently within the average range, although her current performances were less
proficient in every measure than they were two years before. Her short-term memory
declined from 2002; however, Dr. Johnson stated that that type of failure to return to
baseline after mild concussion with psychologic overlay, while not being the norm, was
not completely atypical, and was often times grouped into the diagnostic category of postconcussive syndrome with poor adjustment.
He again noted that Parson likely
experienced a clinically significant level of depressive/dysthymic and to a lesser extent
anxious symptoms prior to her fall, but those symptoms appeared to be exacerbated by her
current medical condition as well as psychosocial stressors which were likely complicating
recovery.
Dr. Johnson found that given Parson’s job responsibilities as an LPN, her
attentional difficulties and current emotional/behavioral status might potentially pose
significant difficulties in the workplace, and those difficulties had shown little to no
remission over the past two years, which was indicative of future prognosis.
Commission Opinion
The ALJ found that Parson had suffered a compensable physical injury to her brain
in addition to her physical injuries to her forehead and both knees; that she reached the
end of her healing period on June 14, 2004; that she suffered permanent physical
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impairment in the amount of thirty-five percent to the body as a whole as a result of her
compensable October 2001 brain injury; and that in addition, she had suffered a loss of
earning capacity in the amount of fifteen percent over and above her anatomical
impairment. In reaching these conclusions, the ALJ relied upon Wentz v. Service Master,
75 Ark. App. 296, 57 S.W.3d 753 (2001).
The Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision, finding that Parson had failed to
meet her burden of proof.
The Commission found that Parson had received all the
medical treatment for which she was entitled. It further found, without stating any reason,
that the requirements of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-113 were applicable to
this case, and that the ALJ had failed to apply the requirements of this statute.
The
Commission also found that the doctor had failed to use the proper criteria to establish
Parson’s mental injury, using the AMA Guidelines instead of the required Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
The Commission noted that Dr. Spanos had
addressed that there could be objective signs of a closed-head injury but only identified the
EEG as a way to determine that and there were no abnormalities to be seen on Parson’s
EEG. The Commission noted that Dr. Spanos admitted that the tests on which he based
his conclusions were convoluted, but that he accepted them as objective, and that in order
to reach his conclusions, he had to take Parson at face value with her subjective
assessments of her condition. The Commission noted that Parson’s subjective complaints
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were under her voluntary control, and it rejected Dr. Spanos’s assessment of anatomical
impairment because it was not based upon objective findings.
The Commission also
noted that Dr. Johnson attributed Parson’s more severe symptoms and slower recovery to
a clinically significant level of depressive/dysthymic and, to a lesser extent, symptoms of
anxiety that she experienced prior to her fall.
The Commission further noted Dr.
Johnson’s assessment that while such symptoms were exacerbated significantly, they were
not exacerbated by the physical injury, but rather her general medical condition, loss of
work, and other factors that had occurred since the fall. The Commission stated that Dr.
Spanos’s testimony appeared to be inconsistent with his October 2003 opinion, which
stated that Parson had done very well, had no further headaches, and that her headaches
appeared to be resolved.
Compensability
The ALJ, relying on Wentz, supra, found that Parson had suffered a physical brain
injury and awarded permanent-partial disability benefits as well as wage-loss benefits. The
Commission, in reversing that decision, and without stating any reason, found that
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-113 was applicable in this case, and did not address
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the physical brain-injury analysis presented in Wentz. Section 11-9-113, entitled “Mental
Injury or Illness,” provides:
(a)(1) A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury unless it is caused by
physical injury to the employee’s body, and shall not be compensable unless it is
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence; provided, however, that this
physical injury limitation shall not apply to any victim of a crime of violence.
(2) No mental injury or illness under this section shall be compensable unless it is
also diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and unless the diagnoses of
the condition meets the criteria established in the most current issue of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
It is true, as the Commission points out, that Dr. Johnson, a clinical
neuropsychologist, did not use the DSM to diagnose Parson’s condition. However, in
Parson’s pre-hearing questionnaire, she claims that she suffered an injury to her head as a
result of a specific incident. Parson is not claiming that she has a mental injury or illness;
rather, as the ALJ found, she is claiming that she suffered a compensable physical injury to
her brain as the result of the specific incident of October 29, 2001.
As such, she is
required to meet the definition of a compensable injury as found in Arkansas Code
Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i), which provides, “An accidental injury causing
internal or external physical harm to the body . . . arising out of and in the course of
employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or death.
An
injury is ‘accidental’ only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and
place of occurrence.”
A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence
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supported by objective findings, which are findings that cannot come under the voluntary
control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (4)(D) and (16). Permanent benefits
shall be awarded only upon a determination that the compensable injury was the major
cause of the disability or impairment. Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-102(4)(F)(ii)(a).
The Commission has failed to address Parson’s contention that she suffered a
specific-incident closed-head injury. Instead, it has changed Parson’s argument to one of
mental injury or illness. Parson has contended that she suffered a specific-incident closedhead injury. Therefore, this case needs to be analyzed under Wentz, supra, and Watson v.
Tayco, Inc., 79 Ark. App. 250, 86 S.W.3d 18 (2002).
Reversed and remanded.
G RIFFEN, J., agrees.
H ART, J., concurs.
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