Sylvester Jackson v. State of Arkansas
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JUDGE KAREN R. BAKER
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION IV
CACR061421
SYLVESTER JACKSON
NOVEMBER 14, 2007
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR05268]
APPELLEE
H O N O R A B L E L A N C E L A M A R
HANSHAW, CIRCUIT JUDGE
v.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
AFFIRMED
On May 18, 2006, a Lonoke County jury convicted appellant Sylvester Jackson for the rape
of his nineyearold granddaughter and sentenced him to ten (10) years' imprisonment in the
Arkansas Department of Correction. He asserts two points of error on appeal: (1) The evidence was
insufficient to support appellant's conviction for the offense of rape; (2) The trial court erred in
allowing the introduction into evidence of prior bad acts of appellant. We find no error and affirm.
Appellant's first challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not preserved for appeal
because the motion was not specific as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1 (b). A general motion that
merely asserts that the State failed to prove its case is inadequate to preserve the issue for appeal.
Wright v. State, 92 Ark. App. 369, 37172, 214 S.W.3d 280, 281 (2005) (citing Beavers v. State, 345
Ark. 291, 46 S.W.3d 532 (2001)). At the close of the State's case, appellant stated he moved for a
directed verdict based on the fact that the prosecution had not made a prima facie case. When the
trial court denied the motion, appellant stated that he would rest his case without offering any
testimony and renewed his motion for a directed verdict. These general assertions that the
prosecution failed to prove the case against appellant are inadequate to preserve a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Accordingly, we find no merit to appellant's first point of
error and affirm.
Neither do we find merit with appellant's second assertion that the trial court erred in
allowing the introduction into evidence of prior bad acts of appellant. Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing his recorded confession regarding the
sexual contact between appellant and the victim that occurred in Jefferson County, because appellant
had never been charged with or convicted of any crime related to that incident. Appellant urges us
to find the evidence inadmissible and that the State used the inadmissible evidence to improperly
bolster its contention that that appellant had similar improper contact with his granddaughter in
Lonoke County. He further claims that even if the evidence was admissible for a purpose other than
to establish conduct in conformity with his character, it nonetheless should have been excluded
because any probative value it had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Appellant contends that this testimony was particulary damaging because the victim denied at trial
that the incident occurred in contradiction to appellant's recorded confession detailing the events.
We acknowledge that the victim's testimony did not corroborate appellant's more detailed
account of his penetration of his granddaughter; however, the child also stated at trial that she loved
her grandfather and did not want anything bad to happen to him. In addition, the events in Jefferson
County took place when the child was eight years old, according to appellant's account,
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approximately a year before the acts leading to these charges. The variances in appellant's
confession and the witness's testimony raise credibility issues. The task of assessing the credibility
of witnesses is one that is left to the trieroffact. MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676
(2006). We are also aware of the rather unique situation of this case where the accused provides a
detailed account of the rape of the victim in one county from the year before, but denies the events
for which he stands accused in the county of trial. Nevertheless, appellant does not challenge the
propriety of his confession, and his motivation for confessing a crime against the same victim in
another county is not our focus. The question before us is whether the trial court erred in admitting
the evidence.
We find our discussion in Anderson v. State, 93 Ark. App. 454, 220 S.W.3d 225 (2005) to
be applicable and helpful to our analysis:
When the alleged crime is child abuse or incest, we have approved allowing evidence of
similar acts with the same or other children in the household when it is helpful in showing
a proclivity for a specific act with a person or class of persons with whom the defendant has
an intimate relationship. Berger v. State, 343 Ark. 413, 36 S.W.3d 286 (2001). This is known
as the "pedophile exception" to Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Parish v.
State, 357 Ark. 260, 163 S.W.3d 843 (2004). Further, it is admissible to show the familiarity
of the parties and antecedent conduct toward one another and to corroborate the testimony
of the victim. Id. The rationale for recognizing this exception is that such evidence helps to
prove the depraved sexual instinct of the accused. Flanery v. State, 362 Ark. 311, 208
S.W.3d 187 (2005).
Anderson v. State, 93 Ark. App. at 45859, 220 S.W.3d at 22930 (2005) (affirming trial court's
admission of other acts and convictions against same child victim occurring in a different county).
We find this reasoning dispositive of this case. The evidence of appellant's similar acts with
the same child the previous year was helpful in establishing to the fact finder appellant's proclivity
for sexual contact with his granddaughter. Although appellant attempts to classify the evidence as
impermissible bolstering of the victim's testimony, the pedophile exception is specifically admissible
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to corroborate the testimony of the victim. Anderson, 93 Ark. App. at 58, 220 S.W.3d at 29.
Appellant's argument that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial and thus inadmissible under
Ark. R. Evid. 403 is equally unavailing. Rule 403 provides that, although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding
evidentiary issues, and their decisions are not reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing
Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003)). Here, the evidence indicated that appellant
confessed to acts constituting rape in Jefferson County while denying the commission of any acts
as described by the victim that occurred in Lonoke County. The evidence of the prior occurrences
thus tended to corroborate the testimony of the childvictim and demonstrate appellant's proclivity
for engaging in similar conduct with his granddaughter. We are not able to say that the trial court
abused its considerable discretion in concluding that the probative value of the evidence exceeded
the danger of unfair prejudice.
Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.
ROBBINS and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
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