Eric M. Davis v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, JUDGE  DIVISION III  CACR06­1385  December 19, 2007  ERIC M. DAVIS  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  BRADLEY  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­2005­11­1]  V. HONORABLE  SAMUEL  B.  POPE,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Judge  Appellant, Eric M. Davis, was convicted of second­degree murder and sentenced to  twenty years’ imprisonment and fined $10,000.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence was  insufficient to support his conviction, that the circuit court erred in admitting testimony in  contravention  of  Rules  403  and  404(b)  of  the  Arkansas  Rules  of  Evidence,  and  that  the  circuit court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial for juror misconduct.  We affirm.  Preservation of appellant’s right against double jeopardy requires that we consider his  challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence first even though it was not listed as his first  point on appeal.  Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003).  Appellant argues  on appeal that the evidence  was insufficient to support his conviction for second­degree murder.  We note, however, that in his directed­verdict motions, he argued that the evidence  was insufficient to support first­degree murder, without addressing second­degree murder  either by name or by apprising the court of the elements of second­degree murder.  In order  to  preserve  a  challenge  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  supporting  a  conviction  for  a  lesser­included  offense,  a  defendant  must  in  his  directed­verdict  motions  address  the  lesser­included  offense  either  by  name  or  by  apprising  the  court  of  the  elements  of  the  lesser­included  offense.  Id.  Given  appellant’s  failure  to  do  so,  his  argument  was  not  preserved for appellate review.  Next, citing Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, appellant argues that the  court erred in permitting seven witnesses to testify, as their testimony had no bearing on  whether  he  committed  the  crime  and  was  admitted  solely  to  show  his  bad  character.  Appellant  also  cites  Rule  403  of  the  Arkansas  Rules  of  Evidence  and  argues  that  the  probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  Rule  404(b)  provides  that  “[e]vidence  of  other  crimes,  wrongs,  or  acts  is  not  admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity  therewith,” but it “may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,  opportunity,  intent,  preparation,  plan,  knowledge,  identity,  or  absence  of  mistake  or  accident.”  Rule  403  provides  that  “evidence  may  be  excluded  if  its  probative  value  is  substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....”  Circuit courts are afforded  wide  discretion  in  making  evidentiary  rulings,  and  we  will  not  reverse  a  ruling  on  the  admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of discretion.  Brunson v. State, 368 Ark. 313, ___ ­2­  CACR06­1385  S.W.3d ___ (2006).  Here, appellant was charged with first­degree murder, and the State alleged that with  the purpose of causing the death of the victim, Burgandy Duncan, he caused her death.  See  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  5­10­102(a)(2)  (Repl.  2006).    According  to  appellant,  Burgandy  was  sixteen and in the eleventh grade at the time of her death, and that, at the time of the trial, he  was twenty­two.  On February 17, 2005, he went to Burgandy’s residence.  He had a poultry  knife with him because he had “snatched” a dog by cutting its rope tether.  Burgandy went  through his pockets, found the knife, and playfully poked at him with it.  He grabbed her  hand, and she turned her back to him.  He noticed that she had blood on her hand, though it  was not a lot of blood, and he did not know that it was serious.  He testified that it was as  much her fault as his.  He admitted on cross­examination that he told police that he went  over to her house to pick up a Valentine’s Day gift he had sent to her.  Appellant challenges the admissibility of the testimony of seven witnesses: Frederica  Marshall, Akilah Swift, Shamonica Hampton, Chance Davis, Shaquonda York, Terrence  York, and Faneshia Duncan.  In allowing these witnesses to testify, the circuit court limited  their testimony to incidents occurring from 2004 to Burgandy’s death on February 17, 2005,  and informed appellant that he would be entitled to a limiting instruction.  The instruction  apprised the jury to consider the testimony only as evidence of appellant’s motive and intent.  Frederica Marshall testified that appellant and Burgandy Duncan would argue and  fight, and a few months before her death, appellant asked Marshall whether Burgandy spoke  to other males.  Even though Marshall told him that Burgandy had not, appellant stated that ­3­  CACR06­1385  he was going to kill Burgandy.  Akilah Swift testified that during the school year Burgandy would come to school  with cuts on her chest and burns on her arms.  According to Swift, appellant told her he had  caused those injuries.  Swift also testified that three to four weeks before Burgandy’s death,  appellant called Swift and asked what other guys Burgandy was speaking to, and he stated  that he would kill Burgandy.  Shamonica Hampton testified that appellant would call and speak to her about his  relationship with Burgandy.  He would ask Hampton whether Burgandy was involved with  certain men.  She testified that, sometime in 2004, he stated that he wanted to stab Burgandy  and her family.  Also, she testified about a June 2004 altercation at a McDonald’s in which  appellant  pulled  Burgandy  from  a  car  Hampton  was  driving,  and  after  Hampton  and  Burgandy left the restaurant, he followed them to a residence where he demanded to speak  to Burgandy.  Chance  Davis  testified  that  he  observed  burns  on  Burgandy’s  arm  and  had  also  observed that she had a bloodshot eye.  He further testified that while at McDonald’s, he was  in a vehicle with Burgandy, Hampton, and another man and woman. Appellant tried to speak  to Burgandy, but she refused.  Appellant asked where they were going, and they gave him  incorrect information.  Appellant told them that he “should shoot holes in your car right  now,” but that he was not going to do so.  Shaquonda York testified that appellant followed her and Burgandy to a Pizza Hut.  According to York, appellant and Burgandy “got into it,” and appellant pulled Burgandy out ­4­  CACR06­1385  of the car by her arm.  When York tried to stop the argument, appellant pushed her.  Terrence  York  testified  that  around  the  time  Burgandy  was  killed,  he  observed  appellant walking down the street.  He testified that appellant was carrying a knife up his  sleeve, had a “mean look on his face,” and walked like he was “kind of upset.”  Faneshia Duncan, Burgandy’s mother, testified that when she learned that appellant  had a son by another woman, she told appellant that she did not want him involved with her  daughter.  Duncan testified that windows had been broken at her residence.  She described  how six or seven months before her death, Burgandy called after appellant had slapped her,  and when Duncan arrived, he cursed them and stated that he would get his gun.  She also  testified that on the day of Burgandy’s death, Burgandy called her and told her that appellant  had stabbed her in the chest.  When the purpose of evidence is to show motive, anything and everything that might  have influenced the commission of the act may, as a rule, be shown.  Brunson, supra.  Any  evidence that is relevant to explain the act, show a motive, or illustrate the accused’s state  of mind, may be independently relevant and admissible.  Id.  Further, a defendant’s previous  threats regarding a homicide victim are admissible to show intent.  Id.  Through the testimony of these witnesses, the State showed appellant’s aggressive  behavior against the victim leading up to the murder, describing his threats and the violent  and  controlling  nature  of  appellant’s  relationship  with  the  victim.    This  testimony  was  independently relevant and admissible to show appellant’s intent and motive in her death and  counter appellant’s assertion that her stabbing death was accidental.  Thus, we conclude that ­5­  CACR06­1385  the testimony was properly admitted.  Moreover, given the import of this testimony, we  cannot say that the circuit court erred weighing probative value of the testimony against its  prejudicial effect.  In  a  third  point,  appellant  notes  that,  following  a  recess,  appellant’s  counsel  approached the bench and stated that appellant and his father had observed one of the jurors  having a conversation with family members of the victim, including the deceased’s mother,  who later testified at trial.  In addressing the court alongside his attorney, appellant stated  that “[i]t was like when we went out,  they  was all gathered up, and then they just, they  scattered....”  He further stated that “[i]t occurred out there in the hallway when ­ ­ By the  time you said fifteen minute recess, we were all outside, and everybody was gathered up  together.  And when they seen me walk out the door, they scattered.”  Appellant’s counsel  stated that appellant would be open to an alternate juror or a mistrial, but would ask for an  alternate juror first.  Ultimately, however, appellant and his counsel concluded that they did  not want the court to speak to the juror and asked only for an admonition.  On appeal, appellant argues that even though appellant declined to have the court  question the juror, the court nevertheless should have declared a mistrial, sua sponte, or  alternatively  replaced  the  juror.  He  asserts  that  “[j]uror  contact  with  a  victim’s  family  members is presumptively prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant and a trial  court has a duty to intervene to correct a serious error like improper juror contact with a  witness.” Following an allegation of juror misconduct, the moving party bears the burden of ­6­  CACR06­1385  proving both the misconduct and that a reasonable possibility of prejudice resulted from it.  Holsombach  v.  State,  368  Ark.  415,  ___  S.W.3d  ___  (2007).    Here,  while  there  were  allegations  that  a  juror  spoke  to  the  victim’s  family  members,  there  was  no  testimony  submitted showing that any contact occurred.  Because appellant failed to go forward with  proof of misconduct, he did not meet his initial burden of proving misconduct stemming from  contact by a juror with the victim’s family.  His failure to do so waived any objection to the  alleged misconduct.  Affirmed.  GLADWIN and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree. ­7­  CACR06­1385 

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