Patrina Cobbs v. State of Arkansas

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DIVISIONS IV & I  CACR06­1381  NOVEMBER 14, 2007  PATRINA COBBS  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,  FIRST DIVISION,  [NO. CR2005­1619 & CR2001­938]  V. HON. MARION A. HUMPHREY,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Patrina Cobbs was convicted of first­degree forgery and identity fraud in a bench trial  in  Pulaski  County  Circuit  Court,  her  probation  was  revoked  in  a  revocation  hearing  conducted simultaneously with the trial, and her previously filed motion to suppress evidence  was denied.  Cobbs was sentenced to concurrent sentences of sixty months’ imprisonment  for the convictions and the revocation.  The charges against her resulted from events that  occurred at Best Buy in North Little Rock and from the search of her vehicle by an off­duty  city  police  officer  after  she  left  the  store.    The  forgery  charge  was  based  on  the  State’s  allegation  that  she  presented  a  fraudulent  driver’s  license  and  represented  herself  to  be  1  Veronica George.  The financial­identity charge alleged that Cobbs accessed the financial  resources of Raymond George by use of his checking account number. 1  Other forgery charges against Cobbs either were nol prossed or resulted in  acquittal.  Cobbs  raises  three  points  on  appeal.  She  contends  that  the  circuit  court  erred  in  denying her motion to suppress evidence as the result of an illegal search and seizure, in  refusing to grant her motion for directed verdict, and in refusing to grant her motion for a  new trial.  We affirm the convictions and the probation revocation.  Sufficiency of the Evidence  Although Cobbs presents this issue as her second point on appeal, double­jeopardy  considerations require us to examine the sufficiency of the evidence before addressing other  allegations of error.  Nelson v. State, 365 Ark. 314, 229 S.W.3d 35 (2006).  Cobbs moved  for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State’s case.  The motion was denied, and  Cobbs testified in her own defense.  The parties then made closing arguments, during which  Cobbs argued that she had no intent to commit a crime and that the State failed to produce  the check that she uttered.  Cobbs contends on appeal that the State failed to prove that she  forged any document or offered a forged instrument at Best Buy.  A  criminal  defendant  may  challenge  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  by  raising  a  motion to dismiss or a motion requesting a directed verdict, but a motion for dismissal or  directed verdict made during a closing argument instead of at the close of evidence does not  preserve a sufficiency argument for appellate review.  Maxwell v. State, 359 Ark. 335, 197  S.W.3d 442 (2004); McClina v. State, 354 Ark. 384, 123 S.W.3d 883 (2003); see Ark. R.  2  Crim. P. 33.1(b) and (c) (2006).  Here, because Cobbs failed to make her motion at the close 2  This court recently discussed the terminologies used in motions for directed  verdict and motions for dismissal:  ­2­  CACR06­1381  of all evidence and before closing arguments, she did not preserve her sufficiency challenge  for appellate review.  The Motion to Suppress  In suppression cases, the appellate court conducts a de novo review based on the  totality  of  the  circumstances,  reviewing  findings  of  historical  facts  for  clear  error  and  determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving  due weight to inferences drawn by the trial court.  Baird v. State, 357 Ark. 508, 182 S.W.3d  136 (2004); Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003).  The appellate court defers  to the superior position of the trial judge to evaluate the credibility of witnesses who testify  at the suppression hearing.  Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2005).  State’s witness Shanekia Parker testified that she was a cashier at Best Buy in January  2005 and became suspicious of a check that a woman wrote to pay for merchandise.  The  woman, whom Parker identified at trial as Cobbs, presented to Parker a driver’s  license  identifying herself as Veronica George and bearing a picture that looked like the presenter. The bench and bar often refer to a “directed verdict” during a non­jury case.  This is a misnomer. Because no jury is in the box, no verdict will be given.  The proper motion to challenge the sufficiency of an opponent’s evidence  in a non­jury case is a motion to dismiss. Ark. R. Civ. P. 50(a).  But there is truth in this common misnomer because the circuit court  must use the same legal standard in evaluating a motion to dismiss as it  would in evaluating a motion for a directed verdict. The court must decide  “whether, if it were a jury trial, the evidence would be sufficient to present  to the jury.”  Rymor Builders, Inc. v. Tanglewood Plumbing Co., Inc., ___ Ark. App. ___, ___, ___  S.W.3d ___, ___ (Oct. 10, 2007) (citation omitted).  ­3­  CACR06­1381  Parker immediately recognized the check as fake because of its size and paper and because  it was drawn on the Bank of Ouachita, which she had never heard of.  The lamination of the  driver’s license was not like that of a normal license, and the edges were square instead of  rounded.  Parker took the check and ID to her supervisor.  At  trial  Parker  identified  Veronica  George’s  “license”  as  the  one  that  Cobbs  had  handed her.  Parker said that State’s Exhibit No. 1 was a check similar but not identical to  the  check  that  Cobbs  had  written,  with  the  same  format  and  color,  the  name  Veronica  George, and “same everything” except for being on a different bank.  Parker acknowledged  that her statement to police reflected that she initially remembered only the name Veronica  with a last name starting with “G,” and that she (Parker) was able to testify to the last name  because checks had been shown to her just before trial.  Officer Tommy Norman of the North Little Rock Police Department testified that he  had seen Cobbs enter and leave Best Buy while he was working off­duty there on January  23,  2005.    After  helping  her  put  an  entertainment  center  into  her  SUV,  he  received  information from Best Buy employee Ebony Kelly, a customer service specialist, about a  3  possible incident that had taken place inside the store.  Because of this information, Norman  became concerned about “who  [Cobbs] was and what ID she had.”  He got into his patrol  car and caught up with the SUV a block away.  He turned on his blue lights, pulled the car 3  Kelly did not testify at trial.  ­4­  CACR06­1381  over, and asked Cobbs for her driver’s license.  She provided a license showing her name,  her picture, and an expired date in October 2004.  Although Norman referred in his testimony to a “traffic stop,” he also said that there  was no traffic violation and that his reason for stopping Cobbs was to question her about the  incident at Best Buy.  Norman said that he asked Cobbs to return to Best Buy because he  wanted to question her about the attempted transaction, that she drove back to the store’s  parking lot, and that he did not consider her under arrest when she exited the car with her  two passengers.  Norman testified that he and other officers searched the car because North  Little Rock Police policy at the time was to impound a vehicle if the driver’s license was  expired.  He also testified that his initial investigation was for a fraud committed inside the  store.  Although officers did not locate the check allegedly used in the incident, they found  under the passenger seat identification for Veronica George, blank Federal Credit Union  checks with the name Veronica George, and a Bank of America check with the name Brandi  Woods, made out to Best Buy.  Norman said that Cobbs informed him that she had a current license and that he was  “pretty sure” he “called in and verified that,” but he also testified that he was “not sure” what  response he had received.  Misty Jezierski, another witness for the State and an employee of  the Department of Finance and Administration, testified that records showed Patrina Cobbs  to have had a valid driver’s license on January 23, 2005.  Raymond George testified and identified Federal Credit Union checks presented by  the State as checks that had been stolen from him in late December 2004.  He said that he ­5­  CACR06­1381  did not know Patrina Cobbs and that she did not have authority to possess his checks or to  use his address.  Furthermore, although his address was shown on the driver’s license for  Veronica George, he testified that she did not live there and that he did not know her.  Cobbs made the following motion at the conclusion of the State’s evidence:  First, we’d ask the court to grant our motion suppressing the search that  was conducted of the vehicle driven by Ms. Cobbs on that date.  The basis  being that under Rule 3.1, an officer is permitted to stop a vehicle but only for  a  traffic  stop,  and  only  if  he  has  particular  information  pointing  toward  a  traffic violation.  The court denied the suppression motion, ruling that under the totality of the circumstances  the police had “specific particularized and articulable reasons” indicating that Cobbs was  involved in criminal activity.  Cobbs  asserted  to  the  circuit  court  that  its  ruling  was  wrong.  She  noted  Officer  Norman’s testimony that he made a traffic stop without witnessing a traffic violation, and  she argued that he had no sufficient basis to believe that she had committed a crime because  he did not know the weight or truth of the information that he received from the store.  The  State countered that the officer clarified through his testimony that he pulled Cobbs over to  investigate allegations of fraud and forgery.  The court observed that, although Norman at  one point characterized the stop as a traffic stop, it was clear to the court that the basis of the  stop was not a traffic violation.  Cobbs also argued that Norman had ascertained that Cobbs in fact had a valid driver’s  license and that he conducted an illegal search to look for evidence of a crime.  The State  responded that Cobbs did not have a valid license on her person, that it was unclear whether ­6­  CACR06­1381  Norman had found out if she had one at all, and that the inventory search was pursuant to the  North Little Rock Police Department’s then­current policy to impound a vehicle at that point.  The court again denied Cobbs’s suppression motion, observing that she had no valid driver’s  license at the time of the stop, that Norman proceeded with the impoundment and inventory,  and  that  the  search  would  not  have  been  conducted  had  she  had  a  valid  license  on  her  4  person.  Cobbs contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress  evidence that was discovered as the result of an illegal search and seizure of her vehicle.  She  presents three arguments in support of this point: that the initial seizure was unjustified and  unlawful because the purported traffic stop was not pursuant to reasonable suspicion of a  traffic violation, that the “informant tip” upon which Officer Norman relied did not justify  the seizure and search, and that the mandatory impoundment order upon which the officer  acted was an improper basis for the search.  Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1 (2006) provides:  A  law  enforcement  officer  lawfully  present  in  any  place  may,  in  the  performance  of  his  duties,  stop  and  detain  any  person  who  he  reasonably  suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or  (2)  a  misdemeanor  involving  danger  of  forcible  injury  to  persons  or  of  appropriation of or damage to property, if such action is reasonably necessary 4  The State points out that some items found in the SUV pertained to charges of  which Cobbs was not convicted.  The State also notes that Shanekia Parker’s testimony,  wholly apart from Officer Norman’s testimony that a “Veronica George” license was  found in his inventory search, supports the forgery conviction.   Thus, we agree with the  State that the only possible prejudice resulting from the search concerns the crime of  financial­identity fraud.  ­7­  CACR06­1381  either to obtain or verify the identification of the person or to determine the  lawfulness of his conduct. An officer acting under this rule may require the  person to remain in or near such place in the officer’s presence for a period of  not more than fifteen (15) minutes or for such time as is reasonable under the  circumstances. At the end of such period the person detained shall be released  without further restraint, or arrested and charged with an offense.  The trial court ruled that the basis of the stop was not a traffic violation and that, under the  totality of the circumstances, the police had “specific particularized and articulable reasons”  indicating that Cobbs was involved in criminal activity.  When this court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, it makes an  independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, but will reverse only  if the trial court’s decision was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Blockman  v. State, 69 Ark. App. 192, 11 S.W.3d 562 (2000).  Rule 3.1 does not require that an officer  personally  witness  criminal  activity  before  stopping  or  detaining  a  person  suspected  of  engaging in such activity.  E.g., Dowty v. State, 363 Ark. 1, 13, 210 S.W.3d 850, 857 (2005).  Any conflicts in testimony as to the reason for the stop are for the circuit court to resolve.  E.g., Dickerson v. State, supra.  Cobbs argues that the “informant tip upon which the officer relied” was unreliable,  uncorroborated, and insufficient to justify the seizure and search of her SUV. We agree with  the State that Cobbs confuses the law pertaining to information provided by ordinary citizens  and that provided by confidential informants.  Officer Norman stopped Cobbs and asked her  to return to Best Buy so that he could question her about the incident reported to him by an  employee of the store, not by a confidential informant.  Moreover, no rule or statute prevents ­8­  CACR06­1381  officers from “following through and investigating any information received by them whether  by confidential informant or otherwise,” and they can even act on information received from  anonymous sources.  Fouse v. State, 73 Ark. App. 134, 143, 43 S.W.3d 158, 164 (2001)  (quoting Toland v. State, 285 Ark. 415, 417, 688 S.W.2d 718, 720 (1985)); Hammons v.  State 327 Ark. 520, 527, 940 S.W.2d 424, 428 (1997).  Cf. Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.1(b) (stating  that when an affidavit for a search warrant or testimony is based in whole or in part on  hearsay, “the affiant or witness shall set forth particular facts bearing on the informant’s  reliability and shall disclose, as far as practicable, the means by which the information was  obtained”).  Forgery of a written instrument that is issued by a government constitutes first­degree  forgery under Ark. Code Ann. § 5­37­201 (Repl. 2006).  Here, Officer Norman was working  as Best Buy’s security officer when he received information from an employee that called  into  question  Cobbs’s  identity,  the  identification  that  she  had  presented,  and  a  check  allegedly presented.  Norman was not required to ascertain the reliability of the employee  before investigating the information that Cobbs had committed a felony by presenting the  fake driver’s license, a forged government instrument.  The reviewing court makes an independent determination of a trial court’s suppression  ruling based on the totality of the circumstances, reversing only if the trial court's ruling was  clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  McKenzie v. State, 69 Ark. App. 186, 12  S.W.3d 250 (2000).  We will affirm the trial court if it reaches the right result, but gives a  different reason for  doing  so.  Id.  We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying ­9­  CACR06­1381  Cobbs’s motion to suppress because Officer Norman had probable cause to arrest her at the  time he searched her car.  Under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.1(a)(i), a law enforcement officer may  arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person  has committed a felony.  Reasonable cause to arrest without a warrant does not require the  degree of proof sufficient to sustain a conviction.  Id.  Reasonable, or probable, cause for a  warrantless arrest exists when there is reasonably trustworthy information within an officer’s  knowledge sufficient to permit a person of reasonable caution to believe that a felony offense  has  been  committed  by  the  person  to  be  arrested.  Id.;  State  v.  Bell,  329  Ark.  422,  948  S.W.2d 557 (1997).  A search incident to a lawful arrest is valid even if conducted before the  arrest,  provided  that  the  arrest  and  search  are  substantially  contemporaneous  and  that  probable cause to arrest existed prior to the search.  McKenzie, supra.  Although Officer Norman testified that he did not consider Cobbs under arrest before  he searched her car, the issue of probable cause to arrest or detain is a matter of law to be  determined by the appellate court.  Addison v. State, 298 Ark. 1, 10, 765 S.W.2d 566, 570  (1989). In making the determination of probable cause, we are liberal rather than strict. See  id.  Here, Officer Norman had probable cause to arrest Cobbs after receiving information  from a Best Buy employee that Cobbs had committed a felony in the store.  Because there  was probable cause to arrest her, the officer also had authority to conduct a search incident  to that arrest.  See Ark. R. Crim. P. 12.1.  The evidence discovered in Cobbs’s vehicle thus  was not the result of an illegal search and seizure. ­10­  CACR06­1381  Cobbs also argues that the mandatory impoundment policy of the North Little Rock  Police Department was an “improper basis” for the search of her vehicle.  Because we hold  that  the  search  and  seizure  of  Cobbs’s  vehicle  were  not  illegal,  we  need  not  decide  the  propriety of the inventory search pursuant to the department’s policy of impoundment and  Cobbs’s showing Officer Norman only an expired driver’s license.  Thus,  we affirm the trial  court’s denial of the motion to suppress the evidence that was found in the search of Cobbs’s  car.  Motion for a New Trial  Cobbs asserted in a motion for a new trial that Officer Norman had violated the policy  of the North Little Rock Police Department for the impoundment of vehicles.  Attached to  her motion were the department’s “Mandatory Vehicle Impoundment” policy and documents  indicating that, in March 2005, the district court rescinded impoundment orders subject to  that policy while the city researched the  relevant  law.  Cobbs asserts on appeal that the  policy, “even though illegal,” most clearly did not mandate impoundment of her vehicle “for  lack of having a driver’s license on one’s person.”  She asserts that Officer Norman lacked  a good, fair reliance upon a failed and unconstitutional policy.  As discussed in the previous point, our decision turns on the legality of the search of  Cobbs’s car pursuant to her arrest on suspicion of having committed a felony, not on the  propriety of the inventory search pursuant to the police department’s impoundment policy.  Therefore, we need not address the merits of these arguments as presented in the motion for  new trial. ­11­  CACR06­1381  Affirmed.  PITTMAN, C.J., and HART, MARSHALL, HEFFLEY, and MILLER, JJ., agree. ­12­  CACR06­1381 

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