Valdez Trevino Woods v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  SARAH J. HEFFLEY, JUDGE  DIVISION I  CA CR 06­1212  VALDEZ TREVINO WOODS  APPELLANT  November 7, 2007  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  WASHINGTON  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­2004­269­1]  STATE OF ARKANSAS  HONORABLE WILLIAM A. STOREY,  JUDGE  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  A jury found appellant, Valdez T. Woods, guilty of possession of crack cocaine with  intent  to  deliver  and  possession  of  marijuana  with  intent  to  deliver.  Appellant  received  consecutive  sentences  of  thirty  years’  imprisonment  and  ten  years’  imprisonment,  respectively.  Appellant  raises  nine  issues  on  appeal,  including  (1)  the  evidence  was  insufficient to show intent to deliver; (2) the State violated his speedy trial rights; and (3) a  variety of arguments related to the admissibility of the evidence at trial. We find no error and  affirm.  On January 13, 2004, a “Be On The Lookout” alert was issued for appellant due to  suspected drug activity. The information given to officers included a description of both appellant and his vehicle. Two Fayetteville police officers recognized appellant walking to  his vehicle and conducted a traffic stop after confirming it was the correct license plate.  Appellant was placed under arrest, and in searching his pockets, the officers found three  baggies containing marijuana and three baggies containing cocaine. Appellant also had cash  in the amount of $641 on his person.  In a felony information filed February 12, 2004, appellant was charged with four  counts:  Count  1,  delivery  of  a  controlled  substance;  Count  2,  delivery  of  a  counterfeit  substance;  Count  3,  possession  of  a  controlled  substance  with  intent  to  deliver  (crack  1  cocaine); Count 4, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (marijuana).  After a series of continuances, a trial on the matter was set for November 17, 2004. On the  date of trial, however, appellant failed to appear and a warrant was issued for his arrest.  Appellant was arrested in Tennessee  on  September 15, 2005. He was returned to  Arkansas, and a trial date was set for December 7, 2005. The trial was continued, however,  and on January 24, 2006, appellant filed a motion for dismissal for want of a speedy trial.  A hearing  on  the  speedy  trial  issue  was  held  on  January  25,  2006,  at  which  appellant’s  motion for dismissal was denied.  The case proceeded to trial on June 27, 2006, and a jury found appellant guilty of  possession  of  cocaine  with  intent  to  deliver  and  possession  of  marijuana  with  intent  to  deliver. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment on the possession of cocaine Counts 1 and 2, which were eventually severed and tried separately after appellant’s trial  on Counts 3 and 4, are not at issue in the present appeal.  1  ­2­  CA CR 06­1212  charge  and  ten  years’  imprisonment  on  the  possession  of  marijuana  charge,  to  run  2  consecutively. This appeal followed.  Sufficiency of the Evidence  Although appellant’s argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence was listed  last in his brief, we address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction before  considering other trial errors to preserve appellant’s right to be free from double jeopardy.  Hickman v. State, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Aug. 29, 2007). We have repeatedly  held that, in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence  in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict.  Smith v. State, 367 Ark. 274, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006). We affirm a conviction if substantial  evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and  character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other,  without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id.  In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, appellant simply asserts  that while he admitted he had drugs in his possession at the time he was stopped by the  police,  the  State  did  not  prove  any  intent  to  sell  or  distribute  the  drugs.  However,  the  testimony at trial established that appellant was arrested with almost two­and­a­half ounces Appellant’s  notice  of  appeal  was  untimely,  as  the  judgment  and  commitment  order  memorializing appellant’s conviction was entered on June 30, 2006, and appellant’s notice  of appeal was not filed until August 30, 2006. However, our supreme court granted a motion  for rule on the clerk so that appellant could file a belated appeal, see Woods v. State, 368  Ark. 131, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006); therefore, appellant’s appeal is properly before this court.  2  ­3­  CA CR 06­1212  of marijuana and six grams of crack cocaine in his possession, which exceeds the amounts  necessary  under  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  5­64­401(d)  (Supp.  2007)  to  create  a  rebuttable  presumption of intent to deliver. Under the statute, possession of one ounce of marijuana or  one gram of cocaine creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to deliver. Ark. Code Ann.  § 5­64­401(d)(3)(A)(i) and (vii). Appellant offers no argument to rebut this presumption. In  addition, there was testimony that appellant had previously sold drugs to a police informant,  that the drugs were packaged as if to be sold, and that appellant had sent a letter to the trial  judge admitting that he used and sold  drugs.  We  find that substantial evidence exists to  support  appellant’s  convictions  for  possession  of  cocaine  and  marijuana  with  intent  to  deliver.  Speedy Trial  Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.1 (2007) requires the State to try a defendant  within twelve months, excluding any periods of delay authorized by Rule 28.3. Miles v.  State, 348 Ark. 544, 75 S.W.3d 677 (2002). The twelve­month period begins to run on the  date the information is filed or the date of arrest, whichever occurs first. Id. In this case,  appellant was arrested on January 13, 2004, and therefore should have been brought to trial  by January 13, 2005, if there were no excludable delays. Appellant’s trial did not occur until  June 27, 2006, 530 days over the allowed 12­month period. Once it is shown that a trial was  held after the speedy­trial period set out in Rule 28.1 has expired, the State has the burden  of showing that any delay was the result of the defendant’s conduct or was otherwise legally  justified. Id. ­4­  CA CR 06­1212  There are three time periods in dispute on appeal: (1) May 6, 2004 to July 12, 2004  (67 days); (2) July 12, 2004 to September 22, 2004 (72 days); (3) September 16, 2005 to  December 7, 2005 (82 days). Appellant does not dispute that the period from November 17,  2004 to September 16, 2005, the time from his failure to appear to his recapture in another  state, should be excluded for purposes of the speedy trial calculation. This excluded period,  a total of 304 days, reduces the time beyond the allowable twelve months to 226 days. Also,  appellant does  not challenge any exclusions for speedy trial purposes after December 7,  2005. Therefore the period of time from December 7, 2005 to June 27, 2006, a period of 202  days, is deemed properly excluded. This exclusion reduces the time beyond the allowable  twelve months to twenty­four days. The result being that, if any of the three disputed time  periods, the shortest of which was sixty­seven days, were properly excluded, appellant’s  right to a speedy trial was not violated. We hold that the eighty­two day period between  September 16, 2005 and December 7, 2005 was properly excluded. We decline to reach  appellant’s arguments concerning the other disputed periods.  After  his  failure  to  appear,  appellant  was  arrested  and  returned  to  Arkansas  on  September 16, 2005. At the speedy trial hearing, the parties agreed that appellant had been  arraigned on October 10, 2005, on the new charge of failure to appear, and all charges were  3  set for retrial on December 7, 2005.  At the speedy trial hearing, appellant argued that there  had been no finding that December 7 was the next available trial date, and the State had a We note that these actions are not memorialized on the docket or in the record. Appellant  ostensibly filed a motion for continuance on December 7, 2005, as well, but that motion and  the order granting the motion are not in the record.  3  ­5­  CA CR 06­1212  duty to make sure the trial date was set rather quickly, otherwise it violated the “spirit of the  speedy trial.” The court disagreed and stated that December 7 was the next available trial  date considering the number of cases already scheduled on the court’s docket. The court  stated that fifty­plus days was not an excessive period of time, and appellant’s case was set  as quickly and promptly as it could have been.  On appeal, appellant  again contends that the period from September 16, 2005, to  December 7, 2005, should not be excluded for purposes of the speedy trial calculation. The  State, on the other hand, argues that the period should be excluded as a delay for good cause  pursuant to Rule 28.3(h). In resolving this issue, we find the case of Osborn v. State, 340  Ark. 444, 11 S.W.3d 528 (2000), to be instructive. In Osborn, the defendant was arrested on  a charge of aggravated robbery, and after a series of continuances, his trial date was set for  October 17, 1997. The defendant failed to appear, however, and he was later arrested in  Colorado and returned to Arkansas on December 4, 1997. The defendant argued that the  State was required to bring him to trial within eighteen days after his return from Colorado  to comply with speedy trial requirements, but the supreme court did not agree:  Osborn’s trial was set for October 17, 1997, and he failed to appear. The duration of  a defendant’s unavailability is clearly an excludable period for speedy­trial purposes.  See  Ark.  R.  Crim.  P.  28.3(e).  Moreover,  once  he  was  arrested  and  returned  to  Arkansas, he was not entitled to a trial within 18 days, as he now argues. That would  have had the effect of disrupting the trial court’s entire docket. What the trial court  did, upon Osborn’s arrest and return to this state, was to set the trial down for the next  available trial date. Osborn was entitled to nothing more under our rules. ­6­  CA CR 06­1212  Id. at 446­47, 11 S.W.3d at 530. Similarly, we find that upon appellant’s return to Arkansas,  the trial court reset his trial for the next available trial date, which was fifty­six working days  4  after appellant’s return and twenty­five days after the time for speedy trial expired,  and we  find no error in that decision. See also Yarbrough v. State, 370 Ark. 31, ___ S.W.3d ___  (2007) (holding that a defendant’s failure to appear constitutes “good cause” to exclude the  time attributable to the delay); Henson v. State, 38 Ark. App. 155, 832 S.W.2d 269 (1992)  (holding that defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated when, after defendant’s failure  to appear, trial date was rescheduled for five days after the time for speedy trial had expired).  Accordingly, we find no violation of appellant’s speedy trial rights and affirm.  Evidentiary Issues  The remainder of appellant’s arguments focuses on evidence that should or should not  have  been  admitted  at  trial.  The  circuit  court  has  wide  discretion  in  making  evidentiary  rulings, and we will not reverse its ruling on the admissibility of evidence absent an abuse  of discretion. Wright v. State, 368 Ark. 629, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007). Abuse of discretion is  a high threshold that does not simply require error in the trial court's decision, but requires  that the trial court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Butler v.  State, 367 Ark. 318, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  1.  DVD of Traffic Stop This number has been calculated on the assumption, for purposes of argument, that the two  other disputed time periods are not excluded for purposes of the speedy trial calculation.  4  ­7­  CA CR 06­1212  At trial, a DVD copy of the police videotape of appellant’s arrest was introduced into  evidence over appellant’s objection that there was a lack of proper foundation based on chain  of  custody  and  that  the  testifying  officer  had  not  made  the  DVD  himself.  Officer  Sean  Chandler, one of the arresting officers, testified that he had viewed the DVD and verified that  it  was  an  accurate  representation  of  the  traffic  stop  and  arrest.  He  also  testified  that  an  employee  at  the  prosecutor’s  office  had  actually  made  the  DVD  copy  from  the  police  videotape.  The  court  overruled  appellant’s  objection  and  found  that  there  was  proper  foundation for the DVD.  On appeal, appellant again argues that the chain of custody had been broken and that  Officer Chandler was not the proper person to lay a foundation for the introduction of the  evidence. However, Rule 901(b)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides that the  “testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be” is sufficient  for authentication purposes. In Owens v. State, 363 Ark. 413, 214 S.W.3d 849 (2005), our  supreme court held that it was not essential for purposes of laying a proper foundation to  have the person who actually took still photographs from a videotape be in court to testify.  Similarly, in this case, we do not believe there was a lack of proper foundation or a chain­of­  custody issue simply because Officer Chandler did not personally make the DVD copy. As  an arresting officer, he was present at the scene, and he testified that he had viewed the DVD  and that it was an accurate depiction of the arrest as seen on the police videotape. We find  no abuse of discretion in admitting the DVD copy of the traffic stop.  2.  Testimony of Charlene Hardy Elder ­8­  CA CR 06­1212  Charlene Elder was a drug addict and police informant who purchased drugs from the  appellant on two occasions prior to his arrest. At trial, appellant objected to her testimony,  arguing it was irrelevant, inadmissible character evidence under Rules 404(a) of the Arkansas  Rules of Evidence, and prejudicial under Rule 403. The State countered by arguing that the  prior drugs sales were relevant to show intent. The court overruled appellant’s objection and  gave the jury a cautionary instruction that the testimony was offered not to show that the  allegations actually took place but to show a course of conduct or lack of mistake and that  it should be considered only for that purpose.  On appeal, appellant renews his Rule 404 argument and asserts that the testimony of  the previous two drug transactions was introduced solely for the purpose of giving the jury  the impression that appellant was a drug dealer. Appellant also argues that the testimony was  highly prejudicial and should have been excluded under Rule 403.  We do not agree with appellant’s assertion that the testimony regarding the previous  drug transactions was introduced solely as character evidence. Our case law has established  that in cases involving possession with intent to deliver, as here, evidence of prior drug sales  is admissible to show  intent as long as the earlier sales are not too remote in time to be  relevant. Owens v. State, 325 Ark. 110, 926 S.W.2d 650 (1996). In this case, the prior drug  sales testified to by Elder occurred on December 5, 2003, and January 6, 2004, thirty­eight  days and seven days before appellant’s arrest. These drugs sales are certainly not too remote  in  time  to  render  their  significance  irrelevant.  As  to  appellant’s  Rule  403  argument,  he  contends that the testimony was highly prejudicial and had no probative effect because the ­9­  CA CR 06­1212  prior drug sales “had no temporal relation or similarity to the simple possession of drugs on  January 13, 2004.”  First, we note that appellant has mischaracterized the charges against him; he was  charged with possession with intent to deliver, not simple possession as he asserts in his  argument. Second, the balancing of probative value against prejudice under Rule 403 is a  matter left to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and we will not reverse the lower  court's decision on such a matter absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Davis v. State, 368  Ark. 401, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007). Considering the testimony’s relevance with regard to the  element of intent, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to admit Elder’s  testimony with regard to the prior drug sales.  Also with regard to Elder’s testimony, appellant argues that the trial court improperly  restricted  his  cross­examination  of  Elder.  At  trial,  appellant’s  counsel  questioned  Elder  regarding her financial situation, including her sources of income and amount of rent, but the  State objected to a question regarding Elder’s car payment as beyond the scope of direct  examination, which was sustained. Appellant also was not allowed to inquire into Elder’s  financial needs that exceeded the amount of her disability check; the court ruled that the  question had been asked and answered. On appeal, appellant contends he was entitled to  determine whether Elder had a bias or reason to lie, and he was prejudiced because he was  not allowed to expose Elder’s lack of credibility to the jury.  In considering an argument that appellant's right of cross­examination was unduly  restricted, it must be kept in mind that the trial judge is vested with some discretion in the ­10­  CA CR 06­1212  limitation of the scope and extent of cross­examination. Dillard v. State, 260 Ark. 743, 543  S.W.2d 925 (1976). In this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling, as  the questioning concerning Elder’s sources of income and monthly expenses was clearly  outside the scope of direct examination. In addition, appellant is unable to demonstrate any  prejudice from the trial court’s ruling. Elder was called again as a witness during appellant’s  case in chief, thus giving him an opportunity to cure any restriction placed upon his cross­  examination,  and  we  do  not  reverse  a  decision  by  the  trial  court  absent  a  showing  of  prejudice. Miller v. State, 97 Ark. App. 285, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007).  3.  Testimony of Craig McKee  Craig McKee, a former officer with the Fayetteville Police Department, testified that  he had been an officer for almost ten years and had worked on the drug task force for five  years. He explained that he had attended drug­investigation training and had participated in  hundreds of drug investigations. McKee also testified that he had interviewed hundreds of  drug suspects and had learned the methods that they use. The State then moved to  have  McKee declared an expert witness in the field of narcotics investigations, and after a brief  voir  dire  by  appellant,  McKee  was  declared  an  expert  in  the  field  of  drug  investigation  without objection by appellant.  Appellant did lodge an objection, however, when the State asked McKee how drugs  are sold. Appellant argued that McKee was not an expert in drug sales, and although he had  been qualified as an expert, the court did not specify his field of expertise. The trial court  disagreed  and  noted  that  McKee  had  been  recognized  as  an  expert  in  the  field  of  drug ­11­  CA CR 06­1212  investigation with appellant’s consent. Over appellant’s objection that “this testimony is  subject to the expert’s testimony level of the Dow Pharmaceuticals case which has not been  met in this case,” the trial court overruled appellant’s objection.  On appeal, appellant again argues that McKee’s testimony regarding drug sales should  not have been allowed. Appellant contends that McKee did not possess any expertise in the  area  of  drug  sales,  therefore  his  testimony  should  have  been  excluded.  To  support  his  argument, appellant cites Smith v. State, 330 Ark. 50, 953 S.W.2d 870 (1997), in which a  recreational hunter with no formal training or expertise was not qualified to testify as an  expert in ballistics. Similarly, appellant argues, McKee did not have any formal education  in  the  area  of  drug sales  and  should  not  have  been  allowed  to  provide  expert  testimony  regarding drug sales.  We find Smith to be inapposite, however, because the proffered expert in Smith was  a layman with no formal training, whereas McKee was an experienced police officer with  special training in narcotics investigations. McKee testified that he had interviewed hundreds  of  drug  suspects  and  learned  their  methods  of  use  and  sale,  and  he  also  participated  in  multiple controlled drug buys through his work in the drug task force. We find no abuse of  discretion in McKee being allowed to testify as an expert regarding drug sales.  4.  Testimony of Alex Pickering and the Letter to Judge Gunn  Alex Pickering, an employee of the Washington County Sheriff’s Office, testified that  he  was  familiar  with  appellant  and  appellant’s  handwriting  through  request  forms  and  outgoing  mail  that  appellant  had  given  to  him  while  at  the  detention  center.  Pickering ­12­  CA CR 06­1212  testified that appellant had a unique way of writing the letter “e.” The State asked Pickering  to identify a letter, and he identified it as a letter that was written to Judge Mary Ann Gunn  in  the  same  handwriting  as  appellant’s.  Appellant  objected  to  the  introduction  of  this  evidence,  however,  on  the  ground  that  the  letter  contained  inadmissible  references  to  appellant’s  previous  conviction.  The  letter  was  then  admitted  into  evidence  with  the  objectionable portion redacted.  Pickering proceeded to read to the jury a portion of the letter, which stated, “My name  is Valdez T. Woods, I’m writing you to ask for drug court,” and “I’ve wasted many years  selling  and  ultimately  using  drugs.”  At  that  point,  appellant  raised  an  objection  to  the  introduction of the letter to the jury, arguing that Pickering was not a handwriting expert and  the State had not laid a proper foundation. The court overruled appellant’s objection, noting  that the letter had already been admitted into evidence, subject to the sustained objection  from appellant, and the issue was now over.  On appeal, appellant argues that the letter (1) was prejudicial, (2) should only have  been used for impeachment, and (3) was inadmissible hearsay. Appellant also contends that  because  Pickering’s  testimony  was  only  offered  to  identify  appellant’s  handwriting  and  introduce the letter, Pickering’s testimony should have been excluded. We cannot reach the  merits  of  appellant’s  argument,  however,  because  he  failed  to  make  a  contemporaneous  objection to the letter on these grounds at the time it was introduced. An appellant’s failure  to make a contemporaneous objection prevents him from asserting any error on the part of  the trial court for admitting the evidence. McClain v. State, 361 Ark. 133, 205 S.W.3d 123 ­13­  CA CR 06­1212  (2005). In this case, the only contemporaneous objection to the letter raised by appellant  concerned inadmissible portions of the letter, which were redacted prior  to the evidence  being  admitted.  Appellant’s  later  arguments  concerning  Pickering’s  qualifications  as  an  expert and lack of proper foundation came too late. See Dixon v. State, 310 Ark. 460, 839  S.W.2d 173 (1992) (holding that objection to an exhibit should have been made at the time  it  was  admitted,  and  failure  to  do  so  rendered  the  argument  not  preserved  for  appellate  review). We also note that the arguments made by appellant on appeal were not raised to the  trial court at all, and issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered because  the trial court never had an opportunity to rule on them. Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 231  S.W.3d 638 (2006).  5.  The Money  During his description of appellant’s arrest, Officer Chandler testified that he and the  other arresting officer found three baggies of marijuana, three baggies of cocaine, and $641  in cash on appellant’s person. Chandler testified that once they had arrived at the jail, he  filled out a tally sheet documenting the total amount of cash found on appellant and the  quantity  of  each  bill  denomination.  The  State  moved  to  introduce  the  tally  sheet  into  evidence, at which point appellant objected on grounds that it was irrelevant and unduly  prejudicial. The court disagreed and stated that it was indeed relevant, and the court also  noted that the witness had already made a statement with regard to how much money was  found on appellant. ­14­  CA CR 06­1212  On appeal, appellant argues that “the money” should have been excluded on the basis  that it had little probative effect but was highly prejudicial. Appellant appears to be mistaken  in his argument, however, because there was no money introduced at trial. Furthermore,  testimony had already been given as to the amount of money found on appellant’s person  without objection from appellant, and without a contemporaneous objection made at the first  opportunity, the proverbial bell had been rung. McClain, supra. Finally, there was no abuse  of discretion in the trial court’s decision to admit the tally sheet into evidence. Our case law  has established that possession of a large sum of money is relevant to the question of delivery  of a controlled substance, Jackson v. State, 52 Ark. App. 7, 914 S.W.2d 317 (1996), and  appellant can show no prejudice from the admission of the tally sheet, as he did not object  to Chandler’s earlier testimony telling the jury the amount of money found on appellant’s  person.  6.  The Receipt  During appellant’s case­in­chief, he offered the testimony of Ayala Rahm, a friend  and associate of appellant’s. Rahm testified that appellant’s car was not driveable for the first  two weeks of January 2004, and the car was in Rahm’s driveway during that period of time.  Appellant then testified on his own behalf and denied selling drugs to Charlene Hardy Elder  in December 2003 or January 2004. He reiterated that his car was broken down, “sitting on  its rims,” at Rahm’s house until January 13, 2004. Appellant testified that on January 13, he  removed the rims from his vehicle and had new tires put on the rims. Appellant attempted ­15­  CA CR 06­1212  to introduce a receipt into evidence showing his purchase of new tires on January 13. The  State objected based on relevancy, and the court agreed and sustained the objection.  Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact  that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than  it would be without the evidence.” Ark. R. Evid. 401. On appeal, appellant argues that the  trial court erred in excluding the receipt as irrelevant, because it directly contradicted Elder’s  previous testimony in which she had identified appellant’s car as the vehicle he was driving  at the time of the alleged drug sales on December 5, 2003 and January 6, 2004. Appellant  contends that the receipt was relevant to prove that Elder lied as to her previous drug dealing  with appellant and also corroborated the previous testimony of Rahm and appellant.  We concede that the receipt had some relevance, in that it could cast some doubt on  Elder’s testimony regarding the prior drug sales and provided corroboration for appellant’s  and Rahm’s testimony. But the receipt itself only proved a purchase of new tires on January  13 and did not prove that appellant’s car had been undriveable for the previous two weeks.  Because  the  receipt  was  only  marginally  relevant,  we  hold  that  appellant  has  failed  to  demonstrate prejudice by its exclusion, and the trial court’s exclusion of such evidence did  not amount to an abuse of discretion. See Harris v. State, 366 Ark. 190, ___ S.W.3d ___  (2006)  (holding that  an  appellate  court  will  not  reverse  a  trial  court’s  evidentiary  ruling  absent a showing of prejudice).  7.  Testimony of Warren Lloyd ­16­  CA CR 06­1212  Appellant attempted to call Warren Lloyd, a friend of appellant’s, to the stand during  his case­in­chief, and the State objected on the ground that it did not receive notice of the  witness until that morning. Appellant argued that the witness had just come to his attention  that morning, and he notified the State as soon as possible. Appellant explained that Lloyd  would testify that appellant’s car was sitting in Rahm’s driveway at the time of the second  alleged drug transaction. The court ruled that the State was entitled to reasonable notice,  which they did not receive, and that the testimony was cumulative, so the objection was  sustained.  On appeal, appellant argues he was prejudiced by the exclusion of Lloyd’s testimony  because it would have cast doubt on the State’s case. We find no abuse of discretion in the  trial court’s ruling, however, considering (1) the State had no opportunity to speak with the  witness before he testified, and (2) the testimony was merely cumulative, as it was repeating  the same information given by both Rahm and appellant. See McEwing v. State, 366 Ark.  456, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding  defendant's alibi witness from testifying on basis that it would be unfair to allow witness to  testify, as defendant failed to disclose witness until day of trial, and prosecutor did not have  opportunity to speak with the witness in hours before trial). Moreover, appellant has failed  to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s ruling as the proffered testimony  was  merely  cumulative,  and  we  will  not  reverse  absent  a  showing  of  prejudice.  Harris,  supra.  Affirmed. ­17­  CA CR 06­1212  GLADWIN  and BIRD, JJ., agree. ­18­  CA CR 06­1212 

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