Lester Joe Hill v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  SARAH J. HEFFLEY, JUDGE  DIVISION I  CACR 06­1204  LESTER JOE HILL  October 31, 2007  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  SEBASTIAN  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­2005­1178]  STATE OF ARKANSAS  HONORABLE  J.  MICHAEL  FITZHUGH,  JUDGE  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant, Lester Joe Hill, was charged with one count of kidnapping and two counts  of rape. A jury found appellant guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to a term of ten years’  imprisonment for kidnapping and seventeen years’ imprisonment for each count of rape, all  to run consecutively. On appeal, appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to  suppress evidence found in his home pursuant to a search warrant, arguing that the warrant  was defective because the affiant omitted relevant information that would render a lack of  probable  cause.  We  find  that  this  argument  was  abandoned  by  appellant  below,  and  we  therefore affirm. Appellant  was  charged  with  kidnapping  and  two  counts  of  rape  in  violation  of  Arkansas  Code  Annotated  sections  5­11­102  and  5­14­103,  respectively.  Appellant  was  accused of kidnapping the victim at knifepoint from the Pic­N­Tote car wash in Fort Smith  and raping her on the night of September 23, 2005. Prior to the trial on the matter, appellant  filed a motion to suppress items seized by the Fort Smith Police Department, arguing that they  were illegally obtained.  A  suppression  hearing  was  held  on  March  16,  2006,  at  which  the  testimony  of  Detective Michael McCoy was presented by the State. McCoy testified that he participated  in the investigation by obtaining a statement from the victim at the police station, obtaining  a surveillance video from the car wash, and speaking with the car wash managers about a  possible  suspect  identification.  As  part  of  her  statement,  the  victim  told  McCoy  that  her  attacker had a brown­handled knife. McCoy testified that he showed the victim two different  photographic line­ups, from which she did not identify her attacker. After obtaining the name  of appellant, McCoy assembled a third photographic line­up, from which the victim identified  appellant as her attacker. McCoy and other officers then set up surveillance at appellant’s  home, conducted a traffic stop after he left his home in his truck, and searched the truck  incident  to  the  arrest.  McCoy  testified  that  the  truck  matched  the  truck  seen  on  the  surveillance video, and that it was maroon in color with decals that spelled “VIPER” along  the side. Pursuant to the search of the truck, the police found a knife with a black handle.  McCoy  explained  that  after  the  arrest,  appellant  was  read  his  rights  and  signed  a ­2­  CA CR 06­1204  Miranda  rights  form,  acknowledging  that  he  understood  his  rights.  Appellant  was  then  questioned by the police and admitted to sexual contact with the victim, which he claimed  was consensual. Appellant later asked for an attorney and the interview was concluded. The  next  day,  McCoy  obtained  a  search  warrant  for  appellant’s  home  and  provided  the  information in the supporting affidavit. During the subsequent search, officers found a brown­  handled knife in appellant’s closet.  On cross­examination, McCoy did not recall whether the discrepancy between the  color of the knife found in appellant’s truck and the color of the knife identified by the victim  was mentioned in the affidavit for the search warrant. Appellant’s counsel then argued to the  court that the discrepancy should have been brought to the attention of the court to assist in  its determination of whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrant. The court  responded by noting that the affidavit did not mention the knives at all, so not addressing the  color of the knives was not a discrepancy, as the court only looked to the four corners of the  affidavit  in  making  its  determination.  The  court  concluded  by  noting  that  it  “is  a  novel  argument but I don’t think it has got much merit.” Appellant’s counsel then concluded his  cross­examination of McCoy.  After the State had presented its closing argument, the following colloquy took place:  BY [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]:  Well, Your Honor, as much as I hate to admit it,  [the State] is citing the correct law to the Court.  You mentioned about looking at the four corners  of the affidavit before issuing the search warrant.  My  concern  was  about  the  discrepancy  on  the  colors of the knife and things like that. ­3­  CA CR 06­1204  I believe that was probably done correctly  and I  probably don’t have grounds at this point to try and  challenge any further than what I have done.  BY THE COURT:  All right. Well, then, your motion to suppress the  evidence on the basis of the testimony of Detective  McCoy, your arguments, and the law which both  of you are familiar with, and I appreciate the candor  of  Mr.  Dunagin  on  what  the  law  is  and  his  knowledge of it  and agreement with it. So, your  motion to suppress is going to be denied.  (Emphasis added.) A jury trial was held on July 12, 2006, and appellant was found guilty as  charged and received a total of forty­four years in the Arkansas Department of Correction.  This appeal followed.  On appeal, appellant again argues that the motion to suppress should have been granted  because the affiant, Officer McCoy, had direct knowledge of the discrepancies regarding the  knives and intentionally and knowingly omitted that information. Appellant contends that if  the discrepancy was added to the affidavit, it would render a lack of probable cause for the  search warrant. We do not reach the merits of appellant’s argument, however, because this  argument was abandoned. At the suppression hearing, appellant’s counsel conceded that the  State was correct in its recitation of the law and the warrant was obtained correctly. The court,  citing the applicable law and noting appellant’s agreement with it, then denied the motion to  suppress.  We  hold  that  appellant’s  agreement  with  the  ruling  below  constituted  an  abandonment of his motion to suppress and cannot now be revived on appeal. See Eastin v.  State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (May 10, 2007) (holding that motion to suppress was  abandoned when defense counsel told the court he could not proceed without knowing the ­4­  CA CR 06­1204  identity of a confidential informant). Moreover, an appellant cannot agree with a trial court’s  ruling and then attack it on appeal. Banks v. State, 354 Ark. 404, 125 S.W.3d 147 (2003);  Roberts v. State, 352 Ark. 489, 102 S.W.3d 482 (2003). Accordingly, we affirm.  Affirmed.  GLADWIN  and BIRD, JJ., agree. ­5­  CA CR 06­1204 

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