Willie M. Pugh v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  SARAH J. HEFFLEY, JUDGE  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION I  CACR 06­1095  November 14, 2007  WILLIE M. PUGH  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF  MISSISSIPPI COUNTY  [NO. CR­2004­54]  V. HONORABLE VICTOR LAMONT HILL,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  By felony information, appellant Willie M. Pugh was charged with possession of cocaine with  intent to deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, tampering with physical evidence,  aggravated assault, and fleeing as a Class D felony.  After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty only  of felony fleeing and possession of marijuana, and he was sentenced as an habitual offender to a total  of twelve years in prison.  On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support  his conviction for fleeing.  We affirm.  On December 31, 2003, Scott Creecy, a probation officer, and Officers Jennifer Elphin and  Michael Russell of the Osceola Police Department  responded  to  a call concerning appellant and  directing them to the home of Annie Watkins, who was also known as “Big Sissy.”  Because his shift  had just  ended, Creecy rode in his personal vehicle, and Officers Elphin and Russell followed in Elphin’s unmarked police car.  When the officers arrived, they observed appellant parked near the  residence in his green Cadillac.  Creecy pulled in behind appellant’s vehicle, while Officer Elphin  positioned hers at an angle in front of appellant’s vehicle.  Officer Russell, who testified that he and  appellant were well known to one another, exited Elphin’s vehicle and started to approach appellant.  According to the officers, appellant spun out and almost struck Officer Russell as he sped away.  Creecy gave chase, as did Officer Elphin once Officer Russell reentered her vehicle.  Elphin’s  vehicle  was  equipped  with  lights  and  a  siren,  which  were  activated  during  the  pursuit.  Before  appellant stopped at the home of a relative, the chase exceeded speeds of sixty miles an hour through  the residential neighborhood where children and others were milling about, taking advantage of the  holiday and the unusually warm weather for that time of year.  There was testimony that appellant  ran stop signs and that he was swerving in and out of parked vehicles and bystanders.  One man leapt  off his bicycle to avoid being struck head­on by appellant’s vehicle.  Creecy discharged his firearm  at appellant’s vehicle during the pursuit.  The jury found appellant guilty of fleeing, which is committed when a person flees by means  of a vehicle, knowing that his immediate arrest or detention is being attempted by a duly authorized  law enforcement officer.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­54­125(a) (Repl. 2005).  The jury also determined that  appellant’s act of fleeing was a class D felony, finding that under circumstances manifesting extreme  indifference to the value of human life, appellant purposely operated his vehicle in such a manner that  created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person.  Ark. Code Ann.  § 5­54­125(d)(2).  Appellant argues on appeal that the jury’s verdict is not supported by substantial evidence  because there was insufficient proof that he knew his arrest or detention by a duly authorized law ­2­  CACR 06­1095  enforcement officer was eminent.  This issue has not been preserved for appeal.  A  motion  for  a  directed  verdict  is  the  means  by  which  a  defendant  must  challenge  the  sufficiency of the evidence.  Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1.  Rule 33.1(a) provides that in a jury trial a motion  for a directed verdict must be made at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution and again  at the close of all evidence.  The rule further provides that the failure of a defendant to challenge the  sufficiency of the evidence at the times and in the manner required will constitute a waiver of any  question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c).  In this case, although appellant moved for a directed verdict on the other offenses he was charged  with, he made no motion for a directed verdict with regard to the charge of fleeing.  In fact, the  record shows that appellant expressly declined to move for a directed verdict with respect to fleeing,  as shown by the following exchange:  APPELLANT’S  COUNSEL:  I  think  that  would  conclude  my  motions.  THE COURT: All right.  PROSECUTING  ATTORNEY:  So  you’re  not  going  to  challenge  fleeing?  APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: I could challenge it, but –  PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Okay.  APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: I don’t need to make one at this point.  Judge, I think I ought to do my proffer at this time.  Because appellant made no motion for a directed verdict concerning the charge of fleeing, he is by  rule  precluded  from  challenging  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  with  regard  to  that  conviction.  Consequently, we affirm. ­3­  CACR 06­1095  Affirmed.  GLADWIN and BIRD, JJ., agree. ­4­  CACR 06­1095 

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