Ralph Miller v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, CHIEF JUDGE
DIVISION IV
CACR05-774
September 27, 2006
RALPH MILLER
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE CLAY COUNTY
C IR C U IT C O U R T, W E ST ER N
DISTRICT [NO. CR-04-27]
HON. JOHN N. FOGLEMAN,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
The appellant in this criminal case entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we conduct a de novo
review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for
clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the trial court. Russell v. State, 85 Ark. App.
468, 157 S.W.3d 561 (2004). Our de novo review of the record shows that a police officer
observed appellant committing a traffic violation. After an interval, the police officer stopped
appellant’s vehicle to issue a citation, whereupon the officer noticed a large dagger in plain
view near the driver’s seat. The officer ordered appellant to get out of his vehicle. After
another knife was observed sheathed on appellant’s belt, appellant was directed to sit in the
front seat of the squad car. After running a driver’s license and warrant check that disclosed
appellant did not have the mandatory insurance on his vehicle, the officer asked appellant if
he had any other weapons in the car. Appellant stated that there was a pistol under the
driver’s seat.
This was located and appellant was arrested for weapon possession.
A
subsequent search of the vehicle resulted in the discovery of the methamphetamine.
For reversal, appellant argues that the trial court clearly erred in denying his motion
to suppress the methamphetamine and his statement that there was a pistol under the driver’s
seat. Appellant first argues that the evidence should have been suppressed because the traffic
stop was pre-textual. This argument lacks merit. The constitutionality of a traffic stop does
not depend on the actual, subjective motivations of the individual police officers involved
under either the Federal or the Arkansas Constitution. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996); State v. Harmon, 353 Ark. 568, 113 S.W.3d 75 (2003). The question, instead, was
whether there was a valid reason for the traffic stop, and this appellant does not dispute. After
observing a large knife in plain view near the driver’s seat, it was reasonable for the officer to
conduct a pat-down and direct appellant to sit in the patrol car while he checked his
identification.
Appellant’s statement to the police officer that there was a pistol under
the driver’s seat and the subsequent discovery of that pistol justified his custodial arrest on
weapons charges, which in turn permitted the search of the vehicle resulting in the discovery
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of the methamphetamine. Based on a review of the totality of the circumstances, we cannot
say that the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was clear error.
Appellant also argues that the evidence should be suppressed because it was discovered
as a result of non-consensual custodial interrogation. However, brief detention during a
routine traffic stop does not implicate Miranda. In Lopez v. State, 29 Ark. App. 145, 778
S.W.2d 641 (1989), a case involving similar circumstances, we said that
We also do not agree with the appellant's contention that
the appellant was unreasonably detained, or that the detection of
the odor of marijuana resulted from an interrogation and
information received without Miranda warnings having been
given. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that persons temporarily detained pursuant
to a routine traffic stop are not “in custody” for the purposes of
Miranda. See also, Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S.Ct.
205 (1988). The Court reasoned that Miranda was not
implicated in these situations as the stop is presumptively
temporary and brief, it is in public, and that the atmosphere
surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less “police
dominated” than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at
issue in Miranda. It was held that a motorist detained pursuant
to a traffic stop is entitled to a recitation of his rights only when
he is “subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for
practical purposes.” 468 U.S. at 440. The Court also said that
the officer may ask the detained a moderate number of questions
to determine his identity and to try to obtain information
confirming or disspelling the officer's suspicions.
Lopez, 29 Ark. App. at 151–52, 778 S.W.2d at 644. On this record, we do not think
appellant was “in custody” for practical purposes prior to the officer’s question regarding other
weapons, and we affirm.
Affirmed.
G LADWIN and G LOVER, JJ., agree.
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