Charles Smith v. Superior Industries and Crockett Adjustment
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE
DIVISION III
CA 06-542
DECEMBER 6, 2006
CHARLES SMITH
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
[NO. F408458]
SUPERIOR INDUSTRIES and
CROCKETT ADJUSTMENT
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
Appellant Charles Smith appeals the denial of additional benefits by the Workers’
Compensation Commission in his claim against appellee Superior Industries. Appellant was
treated briefly for a strain injury to his left wrist, but he contended that he also suffered from
a ligament tear in his left wrist and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome that should have also
been considered work-related and compensable. He sought related surgical and medical
intervention, related temporary total disability benefits, and attorney fees.
While the
administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded appellant all the benefits he sought, on appeal to the
Commission, it found that appellant had not carried his burden of proof on causation. He
appeals, arguing that the Commission’s decision lacks substantial evidence to support its
conclusion. We disagree, holding that there is a substantial basis upon which to deny
additional benefits. Therefore, we affirm.
This court reviews decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support it. Rice v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 72 Ark.
App. 149, 35 S.W.3d 328 (2000). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Wheeler Constr. Co. v.
Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d 822 (2001). We review the evidence and all
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s
findings, and we affirm if its findings are supported by substantial evidence. Geo Specialty
Chem. v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). The issue is not whether we
might have reached a different decision or whether the evidence would have supported a
contrary finding; instead, we affirm if reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion
rendered by the Commission. Sharp County Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Ozark Acres Improvement
Dist., 75 Ark. App. 250, 57 S.W.3d 764 (2001). It is the Commission’s province to weigh
the evidence and determine what is most credible. Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark.
94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).
With these parameters, we examine the evidence presented to the Commission.
Appellant worked for appellee, a wheel manufacturer, for approximately five years in several
different capacities. He worked eight-hour shifts five days per week. The duties were leak-
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testing, casting, inspecting, and packing. All of these jobs involved handling wheels in
preparation for shipping, but he was moved from duty-to-duty as the needs arose.
On the day he was hurt, July 22, 2003, he had been working shifts on the pack line for
two years. This job required that he take a wheel off a hanger, and then set it in front of
himself and inspect it. He said that during his shift that day, he felt his left wrist pop as he
took a wheel off the hanger. Appellant described this injury as causing immediate pain and
swelling, and rasing a knot or bubble on his wrist. He immediately reported this to
supervisory personnel, who sent him to a company medical professional. This was nurse
practitioner Max Beasley, who took an x-ray and gave appellant medication and a splint to
wear for this wrist strain. Beasley noted in a letter that appellant denied any tingling or
weakness in his left-hand fingers. A report of injury, for workers’ compensation purposes,
was filled out by the medical clinic on July 24, and on July 25 by the employer. Both forms
noted reports of pain in the left wrist. Appellant was seen again for this strain on July 31,
wherein appellant reported significant improvement and stated that he was ready to go back
to work without restrictions. The medical note listed no tenderness or swelling, and listed
full range of motion. Appellant was released. This injury was accepted as compensable up
to this date. Thereafter, appellant worked as ususal.
On September 26, 2003, appellant presented to his family doctor, Dr. Byrum, for the
stomach flu. Appellant told Dr. Byrum that he had experienced progressive and persistent
numbness and tingling in his hands. Dr. Byrum said he understood that appellant had worked
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for two and a half years with repetitive inspection of tires. Dr. Byrum took appellant off
work, gave him bilateral splints to wear, gave him medication, and referred him to
Dr. Cooper, an orthopedist, for evaluation of possible carpal tunnel syndrome.
Appellant reported to Dr. Cooper on October 13 that he had suffered a “pop” in his
left wrist at work a couple of months previously, and that he subsequently developed
numbness in both hands that came and went. Dr. Cooper thought that “it seems likely this
is work related” though he could not say for certain. Appellant underwent nerve conduction
studies on October 23 that showed moderate bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Appellant saw
another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Benafield, on November 3, and the clinic note stated that
appellant popped his wrist at work on September 18. Also on November 3, appellant
underwent an MRI, which revealed in the left wrist a focal tear of the triangular
fibrocartilage with moderate fluid within the distal joint. Appellant underwent surgery on
November 25 to correct these left-sided maladies, performed by Dr. Benafield. Appellant
underwent right-sided carpal tunnel release surgery on January 16, 2004. Dr. Benafield
opined in a clinic note dated May 11, 2004, that the tear and the carpal tunnel syndrome were
related to his work. Dr. Benafield reiterated that opinion in a letter dated May 16, 2004. A
comprehensive functional capacity evaluation was conducted in July 2004, and the results
were that appellant had provided consistent performance that showed he could return to
medium work, with some weight limitations.
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The Commission found that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that his torn tendon was causally related to his work injury in July 2003. It noted
that he had heard a “pop” in July 2003, was treated with medication, and went back to work
using a splint for a while, and that when he complained to his family doctor about numbness
and was ultimately given diagnostic tests that showed the presence of a tear, it was months
later, in November 2003. The Commission also found that appellant had failed in his burden
to show that his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was caused over time by his work. The
Commission determined that appellant’s history about numbness and tingling was
inconsistent. The Commission mentioned that appellant told one doctor that he suffered from
numbness and tingling for two and a half years, told another doctor he said he had numbness
beginning a month or two after his injury in July, told another doctor that his hands had been
going to sleep for over a year, and yet there was no mention of these symptoms in the two
July 2003 treatments provided by the nurse practitioner. The Commission concluded that
because appellant was contradictory in his reports to the various medical providers, “the
claimant is not a credible witness.” This was a two-to-one vote by the Commissioners.
Appellant pursued the present appeal from the Commission’s decision.
On appeal to us, appellant argues that as to the tendon tear, the Commission’s decision
is at odds with the great weight of the evidence, particularly where the x-ray in July 2003 was
not sensitive enough to pick up the tendon tear. It was only revealed by MRI, performed in
November 2003. He contends that he was hurt on July 23, 2003, in the specific incident
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when he heard his wrist pop, and that this was the only reasonable explanation for why his
tendon was damaged. With regard to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, appellant argues that
the Commission arbitrarily disregarded his testimony and decided that he was not credible.
Appellant notes that he did hand-intensive work for appellee for years, that he had a good
work record, that there was no other explanation for why he developed carpal tunnel
syndrome, that he should not be penalized for not having the medical knowledge to
understand that his work caused his condition, and that his doctors all believed that this
gradual-onset syndrome was causally related to his work. Appellant adds that carpal tunnel
syndrome symptoms are not constant, but rather wax and wane.
Appellant implies that the majority of the Commissioners erroneously substituted their
determination regarding credibility for that of the ALJ. We disagree in that we do not review
the decision of the ALJ but rather we determine whether the Commission’s decision upon
de novo review is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Jones v. Scheduled Skyways,
Inc., 1 Ark. App. 44, 612 S.W.2d 333 (1981). The ALJ's findings, when they are not
affirmed and adopted by the Commission, are irrelevant for purposes of appeal to our court.
See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enters., 306 Ark. 641, 816 S.W.2d 876 (1991); Graham
v. Turnage Empl. Group, 60 Ark. App. 150, 960 S.W.2d 453 (1998); Crawford v. Pace
Indus., 55 Ark. App. 60, 929 S.W.2d 727 (1996). In workers' compensation cases, the
Commission functions as the trier of fact. Blevins v. Safeway Stores, 25 Ark. App. 297, 757
S.W.2d 569 (1988). The credibility of witnesses and any conflict and inconsistency in the
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evidence is for the Commission to resolve. Warwick Elecs., Inc. v. Devazier, 253 Ark. 1100,
490 S.W.2d 792 (1973). A majority of the Commission is required to reach a decision. See
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-204(b)(1) (Repl.1996); see also S & S Constr., Inc. v. Coplin, 65 Ark.
App. 251, 986 S.W.2d 132 (1999). Two-to-one decisions are frequently issued by the
Commission, and those are majority decisions. S & S Constr., Inc. v. Coplin, supra.
Appellant’s claim for the torn tendon failed because it was not diagnosed until months
after the specific incident in July that appellant contends was the cause of the tear. Indeed,
appellant was treated by a nurse practitioner over the course of two weeks, and at the end of
that time, he reported vast improvement and readiness to return to work without any
difficulty. While he complained of general numbness and tingling later to other medical
providers and he was taken off work in late September, and there was a tear found in
November, he failed to carry his burden of proving that the July work incident was the cause
of the tear. Because of this failure, and because the Commission is the sole determiner of
credibility and the weight to be given any evidence before it, we hold that the Commission’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence on this point.
Appellant’s other primary contention on appeal is that the Commission’s decision, that
he did not prove a causal connection between his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and his
work, is not supported by substantial evidence. Carpal tunnel syndrome is a gradual-onset
injury; it is not necessary that appellant prove that his injury was caused by rapid repetitive
motion. See Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 333 Ark. 335, 969 S.W.2d 190 (1998). A
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claimant seeking workers' compensation benefits for a gradual-onset injury must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the injury arose out of and in the course of his or
her employment; (2) the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body that
required medical services or resulted in disability or death; and (3) the injury was a major
cause of the disability or need for treatment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii) & (E)(ii)
(Supp. 1999). It is causation that the Commission found lacking in this case.
It is well settled that a decision by the Workers' Compensation Commission should
not be reversed unless it is clear that fair-minded persons could not have reached the same
conclusion if presented with the same facts. Foxx v. American Transp., 54 Ark. App. 115,
924 S.W.2d 814 (1996).
Appellant provided evidence that, if believed, would have
supported his claim. His doctors believed that his work caused the carpal tunnel syndrome.
His work involved hand-dominant activity. However, there were discrepancies in his
testimony about the onset and duration of symptoms. Furthermore, appellant agreed that his
job duties varied from day to day and shift to shift. His more pronounced symptoms did not
come to the fore until after he was taken off work. It was for the Commission to decide what
was believable. The mere fact that appellant reported a carpal-tunnel injury to appellee did
not require the Commission, absent other evidence supporting a causal connection, to find
that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his carpal-tunnel symptoms were
work-related. But see Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760
(2001). We affirm this point.
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Because of the disposition of these two points on appeal, this renders moot
any discussion about related temporary total disability benefits or attorney fees. After
consideration of this appeal under the proper standard of review, we affirm.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN, C.J., and G LADWIN, J., agree.
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