Superior Industries and Crocket Adjustment v. Frank Dehner
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE
DIVISION II
CA 06-302
October 25, 2006
SUPERIOR INDUSTRIES
CROCKET ADJUSTMENT
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
[F411607]
V.
FRANK DEHNER
AFFIRMED
APPELLEE
By order filed December 29, 2005, the Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying benefits to appellee.
The
Commission found that appellee had met his burden of proving with objective medical
findings that his carpal-tunnel syndrome arose out of and in the course of his employment
and that his work-related injury is the major cause of his disability or need for medical
treatment. Accordingly, the Commission awarded benefits to appellee.
Appellant asserts on appeal that the Commission’s finding that appellee’s carpal
tunnel syndrome constitutes a compensable injury is not supported by substantial evidence.
We affirm.
In reviewing decisions from the Workers’ Compensation Commission, we view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to
the Commission’s findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence.
Carman v. Haworth, Inc., 74 Ark. App. 55, 45 S.W.3d 408 (2001). Substantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We
will not reverse the Commission’s decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded
persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at
by the Commission. Searcy Indus. Laundry v. Ferren, 82 Ark. App. 69, 110 S.W.3d 306
(2003). It is the function of the Commission to determine the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given their testimony. Id. Once the Commission has made its decision on
issues of credibility, the appellate court is bound by that decision. Cottage Café, Inc. v.
Collette, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Feb. 1, 2006).
A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by
objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2002). To seek workers’
compensation benefits for a gradual-onset injury a claimant must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that (1) the injury arose out of and in the course of his or her employment;
(2) the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body that required medical
services or resulted in disability or death; and (3) the injury was a major cause of the
disability or need for treatment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii) and (E)(ii) (Repl.
2002). Because carpal-tunnel syndrome is by definition a gradual-onset injury, it is not
necessary that the claimant prove that this injury was caused by rapid repetitive motion.
Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 333 Ark. 335, 969 S.W.2d 190 (1998).
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Appellee worked for Superior Industries for ten years, with eight-and-one-half years
of that time being spent in the polishing department. He testified that during his time in the
polishing department he was working ten to twelve hours a day, six days a week. His work
as a polisher required that he use a facing gun and a grinder, both of which required constant
use of his hands. As part of appellee’s work in the polishing department he also worked in
copper buff, which entailed orbiting and lathing. He testified that he used his hands “pretty
much the entire time.” After working for eight-and-one-half years as a polisher, appellee
moved to the laboratory to work as a wheel cutter. He was also required to use his hands
in that role.
Appellee testified that he woke up on Labor Day 2004 with a twinge in his wrist, and
at first thought maybe he had “slept wrong.” At work the next day he noticed it was worse,
but he “didn’t think anything was wrong.” Appellee testified that on Wednesday or
Thursday of that week his entire arm and wrist had swollen, and he could barely move his
thumb. At that point he reported the injury to his supervisor. Appellee further testified that
he had experienced twinges during the last two years he was in the polishing department,
but he had never before experienced the swelling. He said he would usually just “straighten
out my fingers and shake it off, and just try to go back to work.”
Appellee was referred to Dr. Thorn, who diagnosed him with right wrist tendonitis
and right carpal-tunnel syndrome. Appellee was referred by Dr. Thorn to Dr. Moon for an
NCV test on September 27, 2004. The test revealed that appellee had right carpal-tunnel
syndrome of moderate severity. Appellee saw Dr. Thorn again on October 14, 2004, and
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Dr. Thorn prescribed Celebrex and a wrist splint. Dr. Thorn also recommended that
appellee see an orthopaedist.
The Commission found that “there is no question that the claimant’s carpal tunnel
syndrome is established by objective medical findings.” In finding that appellee’s injury
was compensable, the Commission focused on appellee’s credible testimony about his use
of vibrating tools for eight-and-one-half years and his testimony that, although he had not
complained to his employer, he had experienced similar symptoms previously in his tenure
with his employer. The Commission reasoned that it “is well known that the use of
vibrating tools can be a significant factor in the development of carpal tunnel syndrome.”
The Commission noted that during the time previous to the manifestation of carpal-tunnel
syndrome, appellee was still frequently using vibrating tools. The record supports these
findings, and we cannot say that the Commission erred in finding that the appellee’s carpaltunnel syndrome is compensable.
Affirmed.
H ART and G LOVER, JJ., agree.
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CA 06-302
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