Charles Burkett v. Martha Burkett

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Charles BURKETT v. Martha BURKETT  CA05­957  __ S. W.3d ___  Court of Appeals of Arkansas  Opinion delivered May 31,2006  1.  TORTS – MALICIOUS PROSECUTION – LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE.– Where appellee alleged in  her complaint that appellant caused her “to be arrested on false criminal charges knowing the  charges were false . . . [,]” and if appellant knew the charges to be false, then he did not have  probable cause to seek appellee’s arrest; this was sufficient to plead the lack of probable cause  and the trial court was affirmed on this point.  2.  TORTS – MALICIOUS PROSECUTION – TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS WERE NOT CLEARLY AGAINST  THE  PREPONDERANCE  OF  THE  EVIDENCE.–  Where  the  trial  court  awarded  appellee  compensatoryand punitive damages for the torts of outrage, malicious prosecution, and abuse  of process, the appellate court affirmed because there was evidence from which the trial court  could have concluded that probable cause for appellee’s arrest was lacking; the trial court  could have considered all of the information available to appellant in deciding whether there  was  probable  cause  for  initiation  of  the  criminal  charges;  it  could  also  have  considered  appellant’s failure to seek clarification in the divorce court as evidence of lack of probable  cause in a fashion similar to a shopkeeper’s policy of automatically prosecuting suspected  shoplifters without regard to their explanations, and; it could have found that appellant failed  to make a full and fair disclosure of all the information concerning the divorce case and that ___________________________  ROBBINS, J. ­ 4  BURKETT v. BURKETT  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 2  this failure also  showed a lack of probable cause, which had it been disclosed, may have  caused the prosecutor not to authorize the issuance of the arrest warrant.  Appeal from Pulaski County Circuit Court; Barry Sims, Judge; affirmed.  Tripcony Law Firm, P.A., by:  James L. Tripcony, for appellant.  Floyd Healy, for appellee.  JOHN  B.  ROBBINS,  Judge.  This  tort  litigation  springs  from  a  post­divorce  dispute  between  appellant  Charles  Burkett  and  his  former  wife,  appellee  Martha  Burkett,  over  Martha’s right to be on the premises of the former marital residence. Charles brings this  appeal  from  a  judgment  of  the  Pulaski  County  Circuit  Court,  following  a  bench  trial,  awarding Martha compensatory damages of $21,600 and punitive damages of $10,000 for  1  the torts of outrage, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process.  Charles raises two points:  that the trial court should have dismissed Martha’s complaint pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P.  12(b)(6) because she failed to state facts upon which relief could be granted, and that the trial  court’s award of damages was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. We affirm.  The parties were divorced after more than thirty years of marriage by a decree entered  on February 20, 2002.  Among other things, the decree provided that Charles was to have  sole possession of the marital house until November 2002, at which time the house was to  be listed for sale.  On September 19, 2002, Charles signed an affidavit for a warrant for Martha’s arrest,  alleging that he had been informed by neighbors that Martha attempted to enter the residence  on September 18, 2002, without his permission. The affidavit also stated that Charles did not  currently reside in the home. Martha was charged with criminal trespass.  On October 3, 2002, the divorce court entered an order from a hearing held on August  29, 2002, providing that the parties were to list the former marital residence for sale as of  September 30, 2002, earlier than originally provided in the decree. The order also provided 1  The trial court offset a previous award of $500 to Charles, resulting in a net judgment of  $31,100. The basis for this setoff is not explained.  ___________________________  ROBBINS, J. ­ 4  BURKETT v. BURKETT  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 3  that Charles was to deliver certain personal property awarded to Martha, with the transfer  to take place at the residence on September 7, 2002.  On December 4, 2002, the criminal­trespass charges were dismissed in the District  Court of Jacksonville, Arkansas. The records concerning the charges were later expunged  and sealed. After the dismissal of the charges, Martha filed the present suit on July 17, 2003,  asserting causes of action for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and outrage or the  intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint asserted that Charles, in seeking  the arrest warrant, withheld material information from the police and the prosecutor in his  affidavit and that the criminal charges were designed to harass her in the divorce action, in  retaliation for the divorce court awarding her a part of Charles’s retirement and disability  benefits, and was done without probable cause. Charles answered, admitting that he signed  the  affidavit  leading  to  Martha’s  arrest  but  denying  the  remaining  allegations  of  the  complaint. He also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state facts upon  which relief could be granted. After a hearing on the motion in which Charles argued that  Martha failed to allege facts showing that she had the right to be on the premises, the trial  court denied the motion.  The case was tried to the court without a jury. Martha testified that the divorce decree  did not prohibit her from going on the property, adding that Judge Gray told her that she  could inspect the home prior to sale. She admitted that, accompanied by a paralegal from her  divorce attorney’s office, she went to the property but did not attempt to enter the house and  did not damage anything. She said that she understood that the divorce decree provided that  Charles was to have sole possession of the house and  that  the October 22 order did not  change that but merely shortened the time of sole possession. She stated that, although she  never discussed the matter with Charles, he had consistently maintained that she had no right  to be on the property on September 18.  On cross­examination, Martha said that she did not know if Judge Gray’s statement  that she had the right to inspect the property was contained in any order. She also relied on  language from the October 2002 order providing that Charles would be responsible for any  damage to the house to support her theory that she had the right to be on the property, asking  how she would know if there was damage to the house unless she could inspect. Martha said  that, pursuant to the October 2002 order, she was allowed to go onto the property to retrieve  her personal property but stated that she did not go into the house. She also stated that there  was  no  other  language  in  any  order  authorizing  her  to  go  onto  the  property  after  the  September 7 date but said that she did not realize that she needed Charles’s permission.  Martha further testified that, on September 23, 2002, while at work, she was served ___________________________  ROBBINS, J. ­ 4  BURKETT v. BURKETT  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 4  with a warrant for her arrest and that she went home to gather her documents before going  to the police station. She stated that Charles knew where she lived but sent the police to her  work to embarrass her in front of her employer and coworkers and that she was, in fact,  embarrassed, scared, angry, and humiliated and had no idea why she was being arrested for  criminal trespass. Martha hired an attorney to represent her on the criminal charges at a cost  of  $400;  the  charges  were  ultimately  dismissed.  She  hired  another  attorney  to  have  the  charges expunged at a cost of $1,200.  Martha stated that Charles’s affidavit did not advise the prosecutor that the parties  were in the midst of divorce or that she had the right to go on the property to inspect it prior  to sale. She described Charles as being upset with Judge  Gray’s decisions regarding the  division  of  his  retirement  and  disability  benefits  in  the  divorce  case.  She  assumed  that  Charles swore out the warrant in order to embarrass her but added that Charles never told her  that he filed charges to harass her or to “get her” in connection with the divorce.  Martha said that, after the charges were filed, she started having problems with her  mental and physical conditions in that she was restless, nervous, scared, and had lost sleep  over the incident. She stated that she sought professional help with emotional problems and  with lack of sleep and was prescribed medication, which did not completely help. She was  also prescribed other medications that helped until she made the decision to stop taking them.  She said that she had been losing sleep since Charles filed the divorce action. She also said  that it was hard to separate the stress in general caused by her relationship with Charles from  that resulting from the criminal charges. Other than sleep problems, she said she suffered no  other  health problems stemming from her arrest. She also stated that she feared that her  nursing  license  was  in  jeopardy.  Martha  admitted  testifying  in  her  deposition  that  the emotional distress caused by her arrest was “very embarrassing but not extreme” but  disagreed with the accuracy of the statement.  Charles  was  called as a hostile witness by Martha and denied that there was any  animosity toward Judge Gray as a result of her rulings but said that he had appealed the  rulings. He said that he spoke with Martha only one time during the divorce, with other  communications going through the parties’ attorneys. Charles stated that he advised Martha’s  attorney to call so an appointment could be made if Martha wanted to inspect the property.  He also said that he had two or three conversations with neighbors concerning Martha’s  being on the property, with one neighbor indicating that she attempted to enter the house. He  stated that he was concerned because Martha might damage the house prior to sale and that  one  neighbor  said  Martha  was  destroying  property.  Charles  said  that  he  did  not  file  a  contempt motion in the divorce court because he did not see the need to do so. He described ___________________________  ROBBINS, J. ­ 4  BURKETT v. BURKETT  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 5  Martha’s presence at the marital residence as a form of harassment toward him, adding that  he had her arrested because she should not have been there. Charles conceded that there was  no order from Judge Gray indicating that Martha could not be on the property other than the  decree’s provision that he had sole possession of the house. On cross­examination, he denied  that Judge Gray gave Martha the right to inspect the property prior to the sale.  Although  he  could  not  recall  an  exact  date,  Charles  said  that  he  had  personal  knowledge that Martha had entered the house because she would not have otherwise known  about the replacement of the stove and refrigerator. He said that this was true even though  Martha testified that she was told about the appliances. He also gave contradictory testimony  concerning whether he had given permission for Martha and a realtor to inspect the house,  stating that he had given such permission before stating that he did not give permission. He  testified that he instructed the realtor not to let Martha in the house without his permission.  Charles denied feeling anger or hostility towards Martha, expressing concern that she  was going to break into the house because she had had Charles’s son do it before. He also  stated his belief that she was guilty of criminal activity by trespassing onto the property. He  denied that there was any other way to keep Martha from entering the property, adding that,  even though he discussed Martha’s entry on the property with his attorney, the thought of  a motion for clarification in the divorce court never crossed his mind.  According to Charles, he did not know where Martha resided in September 2002. He  said that he told the prosecutor or sheriff’s office that his only method of contacting Martha  was through her place of employment. In support of his statement in his affidavit that he  informed Martha that she was not to be at the residence, Charles said that he told Martha and  her attorney in the courthouse hallway that Martha should not be at the house without his  permission.  He  also  denied  testifying falsely  at  the  criminal  trial.  Charles  stated  that  he  believed that the divorce decree gave him sole possession of the residence and that this meant  Martha had no right to enter the property. He showed the prosecutor the divorce decree,  which led to the issuance of the arrest warrant. According to Charles, there was not an order  from the divorce court providing for joint possession of the property after its listing. He said  that he did not mention the August 2002 hearing that resulted in modification of the divorce  decree to the prosecutor because he did not see the need to do so.  Charles said that he did not want Martha on the property because he had it ready for  sale and did not want her to interfere with the steps he had taken. He took other steps to  protect the property, such as changing the locks, installing deadbolts, and using an alarm  system. He said that he did not have his son arrested when he broke into the house to assist  Martha. ___________________________  ROBBINS, J. ­ 4  BURKETT v. BURKETT  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 6  C.J. Jacobs, a paralegal for Martha’s divorce attorney, said that she  accompanied  Martha to the marital residence in September 2002. She stated that she was not aware of  anything that would have prevented Martha from going on the property for an inspection but  denied attempting to enter the home. Jacobs was present when Martha met with her attorney  to  discuss  the  criminal  charges  and  described  Martha’s  mental  condition  as  being  “completely distraught,” adding that Martha was shaking so severely that she could hardly  speak. She stated that she spoke with Martha daily and that each conversation involved how  traumatized she was by this incident. She also said that Martha’s mood did not appear to  change.  At the close of Martha’s case, Charles made a motion to dismiss for failure to present  a prima facie case and for insufficient evidence to support a verdict in Martha’s favor. After  arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the motion.  The trial court ruled from the bench, finding that there was nothing in the divorce  court’s orders prohibiting Martha from going onto the property. The trial court noted that the  proper course of action would have been for Charles to file a motion in the divorce court.  The court found that Charles acted to harass, embarrass, and humiliate Martha and that she  suffered emotional distress in that she was scared, angry, and humiliated. The court noted  the failure of the neighbors, upon whom Charles based his affidavit, to testify. The trial court  then  awarded  Martha  $1,600  for  her  attorney’s  fees  in  the  criminal  case,  $20,000  in  compensatory damages for emotional distress, and $10,000 in punitive damages. Judgment  was entered accordingly, and this appeal timely followed.  For  reversal,  Charles  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  not  dismissing  Martha’s  complaint  for  failing  to  state  facts  upon  which  relief  could  be  granted  and  that  the  trial  court’s decision to award damages is against the preponderance of the evidence. Charles did  not make a motion for additional findings of fact. He also does not challenge the trial court’s  findings as to the amount of damages. Therefore, because we hold that Martha’s cause of  action for malicious prosecution is affirmable, we will only address that action inasmuch as  an affirmance of any one of the causes of action involved in this proceeding will result in an  affirmance of the entire judgment. See Costner v. Adams, 82 Ark. App. 148, 121 S.W.3d 164  (2003).  In his first point, Charles argues that the trial court erred in not dismissing Martha’s  complaint pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing the trial court’s decision on a  motion to dismiss under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we treat the facts alleged in the complaint  as  true  and  view  them  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  party  who  filed  the  complaint.  Arkansas Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Brighton Corp., 352 Ark. 396, 102 S.W.3d 458 (2003); ___________________________  ROBBINS, J. ­ 4  BURKETT v. BURKETT  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 7  Clayborn v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 348 Ark. 557, 75 S.W.3d 174 (2002); Martin v.  Equitable  Life  Assurance  Soc’y,  344  Ark.  177,  40  S.W.3d  733  (2001).  In  testing  the  sufficiency  of  the  complaint  on  a  motion  to  dismiss,  all  reasonable  inferences  must  be  resolved in favor of the complaint, and the pleadings are to be liberally construed. Clayborn,  supra.  Our  rules  require  fact  pleading,  and  a  complaint  must  state  facts,  not  mere  conclusions, in order to entitle the pleader to relief. Id.; Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a). We look to the  underlying facts supporting an alleged cause of action to determine whether the matter has  been sufficiently pled. Arkansas Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Brighton Corp., supra. In the  present case, Charles argues that Martha failed to plead facts as to at least one element of  each cause of action.  Charles argues that Martha failed to set forth facts showing that he lacked probable  cause to institute the criminal charges. In her complaint, Martha alleged that Charles caused  her  “to  be  arrested  on  false  criminal  charges  knowing  the  charges  were  false....”  In  the  context of malicious prosecution, probable cause means such a state of facts or credible  information which would induce an ordinarily cautious person to believe that the accused is  guilty of the crime for which he is charged. Harold McLaughlin Reliable Truck Brokers, Inc.  v. Cox, 324 Ark. 361, 922 S.W.2d 327 (1996); Cordes v. Outdoor Living Ctr., Inc., 301 Ark.  26, 781 S.W.2d 31 (1989). If Charles knew the charges to be false, then he did not have  probable cause to seek Martha’s arrest. This is sufficient to plead the lack of probable cause.  Foster v. Pitts, 63 Ark. 387, 38 S.W. 1114 (1897); Delgado v. Rivera, 57 P.2d 1141 (N.M.  1936). We affirm on Charles’s first point.  For his second point, Charles argues that the trial court’s decision to award Martha  judgment is against the preponderance of the evidence. The standard that we apply when  reviewing a judgment entered by a circuit court after a bench trial is well established. We do  not reverse unless we determine that the circuit court erred as a matter of law or we decide  that its findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Vereen v. Hargrove,  80 Ark. App. 385, 96 S.W.3d 762 (2003); Riffle v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 64 Ark. App.  185,  984  S.W.2d  47  (1998).  Disputed  facts  and  the  determination  of  the  credibility  of  witnesses are within the province of the circuit court, sitting as the trier of fact.  Id. Charles  argues that Martha failed to prove at least one element of each of her three causes of action.  In order to establish a claim  for  malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove the  following five elements: (1) a proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the  plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) absence of probable  cause for the proceeding; (4) malice on the part of the defendant; and (5) damages. South  Ark. Petrol. Co. v. Schiesser, 343 Ark. 492, 36 S.W.3d 317 (2001); McLaughlin v. Cox, 324 ___________________________  ROBBINS, J. ­ 4  BURKETT v. BURKETT  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 8  Ark. 361, 922 S.W.2d 327 (1996). Here,  Charles challenges only Martha’s proof on the  probable­cause element, arguing that she offered speculation only as to why he signed the  affidavit. The trial court could consider all of the information available to Charles in deciding  whether there was probable cause for initiation of the criminal charges. First Commercial  Bank v. Kremer, 292 Ark. 82, 728 S.W.2d 172 (1987). The trial court indicated that it did  not believe that the divorce decree gave Charles exclusive possession of the residence.  The trial court could have also considered Charles’s failure to seek clarification in the  divorce court as evidence of the lack of probable cause in a fashion similar to a shopkeeper’s  policy  of  automatically  prosecuting  suspected  shoplifters  without  regard  to  their  explanations.  See  Wal­Mart  Stores,  Inc.  v.  Yarbrough,  284  Ark.  345,  681  S.W.2d  359  (1984); Wal­Mart Stores, Inc. v. Williams, 71 Ark. App. 211, 29 S.W.3d 754 (2000). Further,  the trial  court  could find that Charles failed to make a full and fair disclosure of all the  information concerning the divorce case and that this failure also showed a lack of probable  cause. South Ark. Petrol.  Co. v. Schiesser, supra. Here, Charles admitted that there was  information  he  did  not  disclose  to  the  prosecutor  because  he,  Charles,  did  not  think  it  relevant. That information, had it been disclosed, may have caused the prosecutor not to  authorize the issuance of the arrest warrant. Because there was evidence from which the trial  court could have concluded that probable cause for Martha’s arrest was lacking, we affirm  on this point.  Affirmed.  GLADWIN and BIRD, JJ., agree. ___________________________  ROBBINS, J. ­ 4 

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