Delta Consolidated Industries, Inc. and GAB Robins North America, Inc. v. Michael Nelson

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION IV  CA05­889  D E L T A   C O N S O L I D A T E D  INDUSTRIES,  INC  and  GAB  ROBINS  NORTH AMERICA, INC.  APPELLANTS  MARCH  15, 2006  APPEAL  FROM  THE  WORKERS’  COMPENSATION COMMISSION  [NO.F400912 ]  V. MICHAEL NELSON  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge  This  appeal  follows  the  decision  of  the  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  (Commission) affirming and adopting the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).  Appellants  Delta  Consolidated  Industries,  Inc.  and  GAB  Robins  North  America,  Inc.,  challenge  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  supporting  the  finding  that  appellee,  Michael  Nelson sustained a compensable injury to his right upper extremity caused by job activities  that  involved  rapid  repetitive  motion.    Appellants  also  allege  that  the  ALJ  and  the  Commission  abandoned  their  roles  as  impartial  finders  of  fact  by  interjecting  their  own  theory of compensability and ignoring appellee’s inability to meet his burden of proof.  We  affirm.  Appellee was in his mid­twenties when he began working for appellant in October  2000.  As a welder, his job duties consisted primarily of welding metal toolboxes of various  sizes using a wire welder.  He worked on a production line lifting and pushing boxes and  parts of boxes, of various weights and dimensions, as well as performing actual spot welds  on each toolbox.  Appellee assisted in producing between 350 to 450 toolboxes per day, depending on the sizes of the boxes.  In late September or early October 2003, appellee  reported  problems  with  his  right  elbow  to  representatives  of  his  employer.  Rather  than  providing immediate medical treatment, appellee was advised to soak his elbow in hot water  and Epsom salts.  His condition grew progressively worse, and after a couple of weeks, he  was provided with an elbow brace.  The brace did not provide him relief, and on October 27,  2003, he specifically requested medical treatment.  Appellee was taken to the company doctor, Dr. Michael Lack, who diagnosed his  injury  as  lateral  epicondylitis.  Dr.  Lack  treated  appellee  with  a  Medrol  Dosepak  and  permitted him to return to work using only his left hand.  After the course of conservative  treatment failed to provide any significant relief to appellee, Dr. Lack referred him to Dr.  Jeffery  Cole,  an  orthopedic  surgeon  in  Memphis,  Tennessee.    Dr.  Cole  initially  treated  appellee with additional conservative methods through approximately January 6, 2004, at  which  time  he  scheduled  appellee  for  surgery.  The  surgery  was  not  performed  due  to  appellants’ denial of appellee’s workers’ compensation claim.  Appellee continued working  for  appellants  until  March  17,  2004,  at  which  time  he  was  informed  that  there  were  no  further light­duty jobs available and that he would either have to return to his regular job or  take short­term disability.  Between that date and the date of the hearing before the ALJ,  appellee did not return to gainful employment.  Appellants initially accepted appellee’s claim as compensable and paid for medical  treatment through January 6, 2004.  They subsequently controverted the claim in its entirety,  maintaining that appellee’s job duties did not involve rapid repetitive activities that could  have caused a gradual onset injury to his right upper extremity.  Appellee sought a hearing  before an ALJ, who found that the injury was compensable.  Appellants appealed the ALJ’s  August  18,  2004  decision  to  the  full  Commission  on  September  13,  2004,  and  the ­2­  Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the ALJ in its opinion filed on June 21,  2005.  Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on July 6, 2005.  Typically, on appeal to this court, we review only the decision of the Commission,  not that of the ALJ.  Daniels v. Affiliated Foods S. W., 70 Ark. App. 319, 17 S.W.3d 817  (2000).  In this case, the Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s opinion as its own,  which it is permitted to do under Arkansas law.  See Death & Perm. Total Disab. Trust Fund  v.  Branum,  82  Ark.  App.  338,  107  S.W.3d  876  (2003).    Moreover,  in  so  doing,  the  Commission makes the ALJ’s findings and conclusions the findings and conclusions of the  Commission.  Id.  Therefore, for purposes of our review, we consider both the ALJ’s order  and the Commission’s majority order.  In reviewing a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, this court views  the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the findings of the  Commission. Magnet Cove Sch. Dist. v. Barnett, 81 Ark. App. 11, 97 S.W.3d 909 (2003).  These  findings  will  be  affirmed  if  supported  by  substantial  evidence.  Id.  Substantial  evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support  a conclusion.  Id.; see also Wheeler Constr. Co. v. Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d  822 (2001).  The issue on appeal is not whether the appellate court might have reached a  different  result  or  whether  the  evidence  would  have  supported  a  contrary  finding;  if  reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, the appellate court must affirm  its decision.  Linton v. Ark. Dep’t of Correction, 87 Ark. App. 263, __ S.W.3d __ (2004).  In  making our  review,  we  recognize  that  it  is  the  function  of  the  Commission  to  determine  the  credibility  of  witnesses  and  the  weight  to  be  given  their  testimony.  See  Williams v. L & W Janitorial, Inc., 85 Ark. App. 1, 145 S.W.3d 383 (2004).  Questions of  weight  and  credibility  are  within  the  sole  province  of  the  Workers’  Compensation  Commission, which is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or of any other ­3­  witness,  but  may  accept  and  translate  into  findings  of  fact  only  those  portions  of  the  testimony it deems worthy of belief.  Cottage Café, Inc. v. Collette, __ Ark. App. __, __  S.W.3d  __  (Feb.  1,  2006).  Once  the  Commission  has  made  its  decision  on  issues  of  credibility, the appellate court is bound by that decision.  Id.  A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective  findings.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(D).  A claimant seeking workers’ compensation  benefits for a gradual­onset injury must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:  (1)  the injury arose out of and in the course of his or her employment; (2) the injury caused  internal or external physical harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in  disability or death; (3) the injury was a major cause of the disability or need for treatment.  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­102(4)(A)(ii)  and  (E)(ii).    An  injury  caused  by  rapid  repetitive  motion, causing internal or external physical harm to the body, and arising out of and in the  course of employment may be a compensable injury if it is also proven to be the major cause  of the disability or need for treatment.  See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11­9­102(4)(A)(ii)(a) and  (4)(E); see also High Capacity Prods. v. Moore, 61 Ark. App. 1, 962 S.W.2d 831 (1998).  The determination of whether there is a causal connection between an injury and a disability  is a question of fact for the Commission to determine.  Oak Grove Lumber Co. v. Highfill,  62 Ark. App. 42, 968 S.W.2d 637 (1998).  The  definition  of  “rapid  repetitive  motion”  has  been  expanded  beyond  an  earlier  definition that required the motions to be “exact, or almost exactly, the same movement again  and again.”  See Hapney v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 342 Ark. 11, 26 S.W.3d 777 (2000); see also  Baysinger v. Air Systems, Inc., 55 Ark. App. 174, 934 S.W.2d 230 (1996) (cited in Malone  v. Texarkana Pub. Schs., 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (1998)).  Malone discusses that  portion of Baysinger that refined the earlier definition “to include multiple tasks involving  different movements which could be considered together to satisfy the repetitive element of ­4­  ‘rapid repetitive motion.’”  Malone, 333 Ark. at 349, 969 S.W.2d at 647.  Our supreme court  devised a two­part standard to determine whether an injury is caused by rapid and repetitive  motion:  (1)  the  tasks  must  be  repetitive,  and  (2)  the  repetitive  motion  must  be  rapid.  Malone, 333 Ark. at 350, 969 S.W.2d at 647.  They further stated that “[a]s a threshold issue,  the tasks must be repetitive, or the rapidity element is not reached.  Arguably, even repetitive  tasks and rapid work, standing alone, do not satisfy the definition.  The repetitive tasks must  be completed rapidly.”  Id., 969 S.W.2d at 647­48.  In Malone, the supreme court held that  a woman who worked as a custodian did not perform rapid repetitive motions, even though  her job required numerous movements repeated many times in a day, because the movements  were different and separated in time.  Id., 969 S.W.2d at 648.  During the hearing before the ALJ, appellee specifically alleged that he sustained a  gradual  onset  injury  to  his  right  elbow  that  was  caused  by  lifting  and  maneuvering  the  toolboxes that he helped produce.  There was testimony given as to the weight of the various  boxes, the mechanism used to lift the boxes, the number of boxes produced per day, and the  amount of time spent lifting the boxes.  Appellants contend that this case closely resembles  Jobe  v.  Wal­Mart  Stores,  Inc.,  66  Ark.  App.  114,  987  S.W.2d  764  (1999),  where  the  Commission found that the duties were repetitive but not rapid and that the gradual onset  1  injury was not compensable under Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(A)(ii)(a).  In the instant  case, appellee worked with a partner to slide the toolboxs up rollers onto a platform, where  the two men would spot weld between fourteen and sixty separate welds on each toolbox  before sliding it on down the production line.  There were incidents where appellee would  finish his welds before his partner, thereby causing him to wait before proceeding.  “Breaks”  in the cycle also occurred when the next toolbox was delayed in reaching their station and 1  Jobe is distinguishable from the standpoint that there the parties stipulated that the  job duties in question were not “rapid;” accordingly, compensability was denied.  There  was no such stipulation in the instant case.  ­5­  when  holes  were  blown  in  the  metal  with  the  welder.  The  latter  circumstance  required  appellee to let the metal cool for at least thirty seconds before he could begin welding again.  Appellants claim that the duties did not meet the criteria for rapid and repetitive.  They also  contend that a videotape submitted by them, which undisputedly reflected the exact type of  2  work performed by appellee,  shows that there was time and opportunity for employees to  consume beverages, wander around the job site, and move freely around both sides of the  work station.  As such, they contend that the duties performed by appellee could not meet  the rapid and repetitive requirements.  Appellants’ major contention is that the ALJ, and the Commission in affirming and  adopting the ALJ’s opinion, interjected their own theory of compensability  that was not  argued  by  appellee.  The  ALJ  questioned  appellee  about  his  job  duties  and  made  a  preliminary finding that the action of pulling the trigger on the welding gun approximately  5000 times per day, rather than lifting and moving the heavy toolboxes, had the potential for  causing upper  extremity  problems.  Appellants  maintain  that  the  ALJ  was  charged  with  finding more than “potential” when determining whether appellee had satisfied his burden  of  proof  and  that  the  ALJ’s  opinion  was  based  upon  speculation  and  conjecture.    The  appellants maintain that the ALJ determined the number of times that appellee squeezed the  trigger of the welding gun solely through the questions he asked directly to appellee, and  then attempted to support his findings by stating that the company doctor also concluded that  the rapid and repetitive motion of pulling that trigger approximately 5000 times per shift  caused the injury.  Appellants claim that the medical records do not support this assertion.  While they concede that medical evidence is not required to prove the cause of an injury was  work­related, they reiterate that a claimant still must prove, among other things, a causal 2  Appellee did state that he tended to work at a faster pace than the employee shown in  the video.  His supervisor conceded the pace on the video was slower than normal  because one work­station was shut down.  ­6­  relationship between his employment and the injury in order to prove its compensability.  Because  neither  appellee  nor  his  attorneys  and  physicians  alleged  that  there  was  a  relationship between pulling the trigger on the welding gun and the elbow injury, coupled  with  a  complete  lack  of  evidence  as  to  the  pressure  needed  to  pull  the  trigger  or  other  evidence as to how such an action could cause a similar injury, appellants contend there is  no support for the Commission’s decision.  In short, the appellants argue that the ALJ and the Commission were obligated to  assess the case based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, not merely  upon their own beliefs.  See Wright v. American Transp., 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107  (1986).  Appellants contend that this case was decided on a theory that appellee and his  attorney chose not to pursue.  While they do not allege that an ALJ is forbidden to question  a  witness  during  a  proceeding,  they  argue  that  he  stepped  beyond  the  appearance  of  neutrality  and  impartiality  in  this  case.  See  Riverside  Marine  Remanufacturers,  Inc.  v.  Booth, __ Ark. App. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Nov. 2, 2005).  More importantly, they contend that  the  limited  questioning  posed  by  the  ALJ  to  the  appellee  regarding  his  duties  with  the  welding gun, in and of itself, does not suffice as substantial evidence.  They argue that it was  mere speculation and conjecture, which cannot substitute for credible evidence.  Smith v.  City of Fort Smith, 84 Ark. App. 430, 143 S.W.3d 593 (2004).  Appellants cite no case law that forbids the ALJ or Commission from using their own  experience, logic, common sense, and independent judgment in deciding cases, and no such  limitation exists.  As appellee points out in his brief, his case relied upon all of his job duties  regarding the production of the toolboxes, which included the actual welding as well as the  lifting and moving of the boxes.  The pre­hearing order filed on May 20, 2004, does not  specify the exact theory of the cause of the injury but merely states that appellee sustained  a gradual onset injury to his right upper extremity that arose out of and during the course of ­7­  his employment.  This court has previously stated that multiple job tasks, when considered  together, can satisfy the statutory requirements for gradual onset injuries. See High Capacity  Prods. v. Moore, supra.  Reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion that  the repetitive welding activities caused the injury and that the subsequent lifting and moving  of  the  heavy  boxes  subsequently  caused  him the  most  pain  due  to  the  physical  exertion  required.  Appellants allege that appellee’s job duties were interrupted by “frequent breaks” that  were demonstrated by the videotape; however, they fail to define “frequent,” relying only  on the videotape footage as an example.  Appellee counters that he had to work steadily to  get the job done and meet the required “tack” times and that often there were welds that had  to be redone.  Normal breaks between periods of job duties do not defeat a finding of rapid  and repetitive movements.  See Patterson v. Frito­Lay, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 159, 992 S.W.2d  130 (1999).  The determination of whether there is a causal connection between an injury  and a disability is a question of fact for the Commission to determine.  Oak Grove Lumber  Co. v. Highfill, supra.  Dr. Lack’s records are sufficient to establish the link or causation  between appellee’s various work duties and the injury, although medical evidence is not  required. Those records in conjunction with the testimony constitute substantial evidence to  support the Commission’s decision.  Affirmed.  GRIFFEN  and NEAL, JJ., agree. ­8­ 

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