Dwight D. Seagraves v. Delta Consolidated Industries and GAB Robins North America, Inc.

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION IV

DWIGHT D. SEAGRAVES

APPELLANT

V.

DELTA CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES and GAB Robins North America, Inc.

APPELLEES

CA05-622

January 4, 2006

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. F214745]

REMANDED

Josephine Linker Hart, Judge

Appellant, Dwight D. Seagraves, appeals from the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying his claim for benefits. Among the issues raised on appeal, appellant argues that the Commission failed to make findings of fact regarding whether he suffered an aggravation of a pre-existing condition. We remand for the purpose of allowing the Commission to make findings of fact on this issue.

In the Commission's opinion reversing the administrative law judge's award of benefits, the Commission reviewed medical records and noted that appellant fell at work in November of 2000, injuring his right wrist, but that x-rays were interpreted as

"unremarkable."1 Medical records further indicated that on August 24, 2001, appellant reported being thrown from a horse, and appellant was diagnosed as having a right wrist sprain, with medical imaging showing a normal wrist.

According to the Commission, appellant testified that on June 17, 2002, while at work, he was prying on a toolbox when his wrist "popped." An incident investigation report filled out the same day indicated that appellant's "wrist popped causing him pain to a pre-existing injury to the right wrist." The report further described the "root cause" as a "pre-existing injury due to fall from horse." Medical records from June 18, 2002, indicated "C/O R wrist pain x 10 mos." The Commission noted, however, that appellant testified that he did not tell the doctor that he had been suffering wrist pain for ten months. Medical records from June 21, 2002, reported that appellant was thrown from a horse in August of 2001 and was having problems with his right wrist. X-rays showed a "fracture of the proximal pole of the navicular bone." Further, the Commission noted a letter from Dr. G. Thomas Frazier, who, based on appellant's history of falling off of a horse and injuring his wrist in 2001, his re-injury in 2002, and his lack of continuing symptoms between the two injuries, opined that appellant "most likely sustained a nondisplaced fracture of the proximal pole of the scaphoid on his initial injury of August of 2001" and that there "was most likely a fibrous union of the fracture that subsequently was disrupted" by the 2002 injury. He concluded that this constituted "an aggravation of a pre-existing, though asymptomatic, condition...."

In its adjudication, the Commission cited to the relevant statutory definition of a "compensable injury," which is an "accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body ... arising out of and in the course of employment...." See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005). The Commission stated that appellant suffered from wrist problems since at least November of 20002 and suffered a right wrist sprain in 2001 when he was thrown from a horse. Though acknowledging that appellant testified that he sustainedan injury on June 17, 2002, the Commission observed that while the incident report from that day indicated that his wrist "popped" at work, the "root cause" was the pre-existing injury from appellant's fall from a horse. The Commission further noted the medical report indicating a ten-month history of complaints of right wrist pain, which corresponded with appellant's fall from a horse. The Commission stated that the report "belie[d] the claimant's testimony that he did not experience recurring problems after the August 2001" incident. Also, the Commission noted that appellant filed for benefits through his group health insurance, and noted medical records from June 21, 2002, indicating that appellant attributed his injury to his 2001 injury and not a workplace incident. The Commission discounted Dr. Frazier's opinion that the incident had "disrupted" and "aggravated" a prior orthopedic condition because his opinion "was based on an inaccurate history" provided by appellant. The Commission concluded that appellant was not a "credible witness" and found that he failed to prove he sustained a compensable accidental injury in 2002.

Among the arguments raised on appeal, appellant argues that the Commission "failed to ... analyze the claim ... in the context of an aggravation." We agree. The Commission found that appellant did not sustain a compensable injury in 2002. In its opinion, the Commission acknowledged that appellant suffered an injury in 2001 when he fell from a horse, acknowledged that his x-rays from 2001 and 2002 differed in that the latter showed appellant had a fracture; discounted Dr. Frazier's report because it was based on an inaccurate history, that is, the assertion that appellant was asymptomatic from 2001 to 2002; and acknowledged appellant's reporting of an injury on June 17, 2002. Given the Commission's reliance on these facts, the Commission apparently found that any fracture appellant suffered from in 2002 was attributable to his 2001 injury.

Nevertheless, even if, as the Commission apparently concludes, that appellant'sfractured wrist was attributable to the 2001 injury, this does not foreclose, and the Commission does not address, the possibility that appellant aggravated a pre-existing condition. An employer takes the employee as he finds him, and employment circumstances that aggravate pre-existing conditions are compensable. Heritage Baptist Temple v. Robison, 82 Ark. App. 460, 120 S.W.3d 150 (2003). An aggravation of a pre-existing noncompensable condition by a compensable injury is, itself, compensable. Id. An aggravation is a new injury resulting from an independent incident. Id. An aggravation, being a new injury with an independent cause, must meet the definition of a compensable injury in order to establish compensability for the aggravation. Id.

Thus, we remand to the Commission for it to make specific findings of fact on whether appellant aggravated a pre-existing condition. While there may be evidence in the record to support such findings, the Commission failed to resolve the issue by making specific findings of fact. And we do not review decisions of the Commission de novo on the record or make findings of fact that the Commission should have made but did not; rather, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings that the Commission does make. Sonic Drive-In v. Wade, 36 Ark. App. 4, 816 S.W.2d 889 (1991). When the Commission fails to make specific findings on an issue, we remand the case for the Commission to make such findings. Id. Consequently, we remand to the Commission so that it may make specific findings of fact on the issue of whether appellant aggravated a pre-existing condition.

Remanded.

Glover and Baker, JJ., agree.

1 We note that in its opinion, the Commission repeatedly misreads this medical record from November 7, 2000. The record provides, "2 hrs ago, when welding, Pt fell into toolbox injuring right wrist." The Commission erroneously reads this as "2 yrs ago."

2 Here again, the Commission erroneously stated that appellant also reported in November of 2000 that he fell two years earlier.