Jamie Long v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

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Jamie LONG v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN  SERVICES  CA05­306  __ S. W.3d ___  Court of Appeals of Arkansas  Opinion delivered June 28, 2006  PARENT & CHILD – TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS – TERMINATION REVERSED.– Given  the extraordinary progress appellant had made in fulfilling the requirements of the court, the  overwhelming  evidence  of  the  very  strong  bond  between  mother  and  children,  and  the  testimony from the therapist of appellant's daughter that the child would “regress,” the trial  court was clearly erroneous in finding that appellant’s continued contact with her children  would be detrimental; accordingly, the best interest of the children dictates that the appellate  court reverse the termination of appellant’s parental rights and reinstate reunification services  with a goal of returning the children to appellant’s custody.  Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Joyce Williams Warren, Judge; reversed and remanded.  DeeNita D. Moak, for appellant.  Gray Allen Turner, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.  JOSEPHINE  LINKER  HART,  Judge.  Jamie  Long appeals  from an  order  of  the  Pulaski  County Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to her daughter K.L. and son M.S.  On  appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence to terminate her  parental rights.  We reverse and remand.  On February 27, 2003, Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) took Long’s  children  into  custody  after  she  was  arrested  on  drug  charges  relating  to  her  use  of ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 2  methamphetamine.  At the time, K.L., and M.S., were five and two years old, respectively.  On April 25, 2003, the children were adjudicated dependent­neglected.  Initially, Long was not compliant with the requirements of the case plan.  At the first  review hearing, the trial court found that Long had not complied with its orders and the case  plan services in that she had not submitted to the court­ordered psychological evaluation,  failed  to  complete  parenting  classes,  no  longer  attended  NA/AA  meetings  at  Celebrate  Recovery, arrived late for visitation with her children and, contrary to the direction of DHS,  brought people to the visits.  The trial court did note, however, that Long did have a drug­  and­alcohol assessment, “some visitation,” and “some random drug screens.”  At an October  30, 2003, review hearing, the trial court  found that Long still had not completed parenting  classes and had not visited the children since September 8, 2003. The trial court ordered  Long  to  continue  to  submit  to  random  drug  screens,  visit  the  children  “regularly,”  and  “continue intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment.”  It also imposed a requirement  that  Long  “have  a  stable  home  and  employment  and  demonstrate  that  she  can  properly  provide for her kids.”  In its February 26, 2004, permanency­planning order, the trial court found that Long  had complied with the court orders and case plan, and it continued to order reunification  services.  Additionally, the court awarded Long weekend visitation.  On March 19, 2004, the trial court entered an emergency ex parte order modifying  the visitation to twice weekly at the DHS offices.  The visitation was changed on March 16,  2004, after the foster mother, Mrs. Cherry, informed DHS that the children had not been  returned on time from the weekend visit.  This order remained in place even though Long  informed DHS that the late return was caused by her hospitalization due to complications  with her pregnancy.  At  the  next  permanency­planning  hearing,  held  on  May  20,  2004,  the  trial  court  rejected DHS’s recommendation that reunification remain the goal and sua sponte ordered  a termination hearing.  In that order, the trial judge stated: “I understand she’s pregnant.  I  am  concerned  about  the  fact  that  she’s  pregnant  and  having  some  problems.    I’m  not  unsympathetic to that, but mom does not seem to have understood the priorities that she  should have on this case.”  She further noted that Long had not provided the drug treatment  sign­in sheets that she had been directed to submit.  Nonetheless, the trial judge ordered  reunification services to continue.  At the September 15, 2004, termination hearing, Dr. Paul Deyoub, a psychologist,  testified  that  he  administered  a  psychological  evaluation  to  Long.  He  stated  that  Long  admitted  to using methamphetamine “four or five times,” marijuana, “some alcohol,” and ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 3  pain medication.  Long told him that she was currently living with a man from Mexico named  Mario, whom she planned to marry when her DHS case was over.  He noted that she had  Mario’s name tattooed on both sides of her neck, but he opined that it was consistent with her  personality in that it reflected impulsiveness and poor decision making.  Dr. Deyoub further  opined that Long’s involvement with Mario also reflected poor judgment in that he was a “big  priority  for  her.”    According  to  Dr.  Deyoub,  Long’s  testing  revealed  some  degree  of  personality disorders, with traits of Borderline, Histrionic, and Dependent disorders indicated.  Long’s I.Q. was 88.  He noted that Long had an unstable life, having been abandoned by her  parents to a group home for six years “for no apparent reason” after her parents divorced.  Later, Long tried to live with her mother when she was fifteen, received in­patient treatment  at Rivendell and Turning Point, and had, since age seventeen, tried to make “it as best she can  with relationships” that failed but had produced two children.  He opined that her prognosis  for reunification was “very guarded and poor . . . although not impossible.” Dr. Deyoub noted  a trend of past dependence on males in relationships and stated that “Mario is an unknown.  I have no idea what this individual is all about.  So that’s just one more factor that I don’t  know about, but that the Court has to see who is this person.”  Jan Kucala, a licensed counselor, certified play therapist, and program manager for the  Centers for Youth and Families in Jacksonville testified that she counseled K.L., beginning  on January 13, 2004.  She stated that the child had “a lot of anxiety and worry about family  matters  and  concern  about  what  was  going to  happen  to  her,  what  was  happening to  her  mother.”  Ms. Kucala stated that Long had made progress, that she was much more aware of  K.L.’s feelings, that she was “very open” about mistakes that she had made, and that she  showed  “a  lot  of  insight”  into  how  her  separation  from  her  children  has  damaged  her  relationship with them and what she would need to do to repair that relationship.  Ms. Kucala  noted as well that, at times, there was confusion as to who K.L.’s case worker was and noted  that  there  were  several  appointments  for  which  DHS  had  failed  to  bring  the  child.    She  reported that being out of the home was “very stressful” on K.L., that K.L. felt “punished”  because she was in foster care, and that there was a “very strong bond” between K.L. and her  mother.  Further, Ms. Kucala opined that if Long’s rights were terminated, “regression will  probably  occur  on  [K.L.’s]  part,”  and  while  she  declined  to  offer  an  opinion  regarding  termination because her agency did not encourage them to make this type of judgment, she  did state that she thought that “the family had been making progress,” and K.L. had not been  prepared “in any way” for termination of her mother’s parental rights.  Regarding Mario, Ms.  Kucala stated that his involvement had been limited, but she was aware that Long and Mario ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 4  had  an  agreement  that  Long  would  be  able  to  stay  home  with  the  children  while  Mario  supported the family, and Mario affirmed that commitment.  Nonetheless, she stated that she  did not think that it would be prudent to put the children “totally in their mom’s home today,”  but noted that the “kids are very bonded to her” and she did not believe that the reunification  process  “would  be  a  long­term  thing.”  She  recommended  that  the  trial  court  order  unsupervised visitation.  Long testified that she currently lived in a one­bedroom apartment, but she had signed  a transfer with the management company and paid fees to allow her to move into a larger  apartment that would accommodate the return of her children.  She stated that Mario’s take­  home pay was four to five hundred dollars per week.  She admitted to testing positive for  opiates the previous August, but attributed it to the Tylenol 3 that she had been prescribed.  She admitted that she moved to Georgia for three or four months in 2003, but when she found  that transferring her case there would be a “long process,” she returned to Arkansas.  She  stated that she moved there because Mario was able to make more money. Nonetheless, while  she was away, she claimed that she called her children regularly.  Regarding her substance­abuse problems, Long claimed that she was not “addicted in  any way to any controlled substance” when she had her assessment because she had just been  in jail for two­and­a­half months.  Since getting out, she went to Celebrate Recovery for drug  meetings, AA meetings every day for a month “to keep busy doing things on the positive  level,” and UAMS Adult Psychiatry for individual counseling.  She also claimed  to have  attended Narcotics Anonymous at Saline Memorial Hospital.  Long admitted that she was  slow to provide the documentation of her attendance at the various therapy  sessions, but  claimed that no one told her that her documentation was inadequate.  Long noted that she had  been assigned to take five drug screens since May of that year, and while she missed one, all  except  the August 9, 2004, screening when she was taking Tylenol 3 as prescribed, had been  negative.  Long noted that the caseworkers had changed quite a bit during the pendency of her  case. She recalled that Angela Haynes, Carolyn Williams, Bonnie Twillie, and Tamika Floyd  had all been assigned her case at various times, and she stated that confusion as to who was  handling the case had affected her visitation.  She recounted having difficulty finding out who  her caseworker was at several key times.  Long stated  that  she  had  a  long­term relationship  with  Mario  Cirilo  and  that  they  planned to marry once she got her kids back home.  She claimed that she was working very  hard to get her children back.  Nonetheless, she admitted that Mario was “a priority,” and she  disputed that it was bad judgment to try to have a baby while her children were  in  DHS ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 5  custody.  Long stated that the reason she had failed to get her children back to the foster­  parent’s home on time after her last weekend visit was that she was hospitalized.  She claimed  that she provided DHS caseworker Carolyn Williams with “some proof” she had been in the  hospital, but admitted it was “the wrong one.”  Long also conceded that she had not provided  documentation to DHS proving that she had been employed at McDonald’s.  Tamika Floyd, one of the four caseworkers that had worked with Long’s children,  testified that Long was aware of the requirement that she receive drug treatment and that she  provide proof that she was getting drug treatment; that she submit to random drug testing  showing that she was “clean;” that she maintain steady employment and stable housing; and  that she attend NA meetings and provide DHS with the proof of attendance.  Floyd stated that  Long tested positive in August for opiates and positive for propoxyphene on May 18.  Floyd  stated that Long also missed one drug screen, claiming “she forgot.”  Floyd claimed that she  “never saw any proof [Long] completed drug treatment.”  Floyd admitted that Long gave her  sign­in sheets for NA meetings in August, July, and May, and told her that the sign­in sheets  for  June  were  at  her  sister’s  house.    However,  Floyd  claimed  that  she  was  only  able  to  “confirm” attendance at two meetings in July and that she had no proof that Long attended  individual counseling.  Floyd further admitted that she received a letter from Long’s father  verifying that he paid Long to take care of her grandmother, but never received “pay stubs.”  Floyd stated that Long “began to comply” with the case plan requirements, but noted  that some elements still needed work, including the requirement that she maintain a stable  home environment­­­Floyd stated Long’s one­bedroom apartment was not large enough to  accommodate her children.  She further  stated that the NA sign­in sheets are “somewhat  questionable.”  Regarding the services that DHS provided to Long, Floyd listed “a drug and  alcohol assessment, counseling services with [K.L.], psychological assessment, and random  drug  screens.”  She  also  claimed  that  transportation  services  were  “offered”  along  with  visitation with the children, “services” for M.S. at Pediatric Specialty Care, foster care, and  medical and dental services.  Floyd stated that she believed that Long knew her case worker,  but admitted that there was considerable shuffling of the case among several workers in the  office.  Regarding individual counseling, Floyd stated that Long had told a previous case  worker, Williams, that Long was receiving counseling at UAMS and “there’s no notation that  the counseling was deficient and more counseling was needed.”  Floyd also stated that she  visited  Long’s  current  one­bedroom  apartment,  and  she  saw  that  there  was  “food  in  the  refrigerator, the lights were on, and it was clean,” and “fully furnished.”  In  its  termination  order,  the  trial  judge  found  that  “there  is  a  potential  that  these  juveniles would be harmed by continuing contact with the mother.”  It further noted that there ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 6  was “great potential for emotional harm to these juveniles if they had continued contact with  a mother who has not placed them first and foremost in her priorities so that she can be there  for them all day, every day, and provide for all their needs.”  Additionally, the trial judge  found that Long “has not demonstrated that she can remain drug free, have stability in housing  and employment, and make appropriate decisions that do not negatively affect [the children’s]  well being.”  She noted deficiencies in the documentation that Long was ordered to provide.  On appeal, Long argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was sufficient  evidence to terminate her parental rights. She contends that she “substantially complied” with  the  orders  of  the  trial  court  and  corrected  the  problems  that  caused  the  removal  of  her  children.  Long notes that she was ordered to submit to ten drug screens, and she never tested  positive for methamphetamine, the use of which caused her children to be taken into custody.  She further notes that she completed parenting classes, attended visitation, participated in a  psychological evaluation, completed a drug and alcohol assessment, attended outpatient drug  counseling at Celebrate Recovery, attended individual counseling at UAMS, and obtained a  place to live and an adequate means of support.  Long asserts that she met the three objectives  required of her at the permanency­planning hearing: visit her children, continue in therapy  with her daughter, and attend AA or NA meetings once a week and provide documentation  of those meetings to the caseworker.  The grounds for termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing  evidence.  M.T. v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 58 Ark. App. 302, 305, 952 S.W.2d 177,  179 (1997).  When the burden of proving a disputed fact is by clear and convincing evidence,  the question on appeal is whether the trial court's finding that the disputed fact was proved  by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the opportunity  of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.  Id.  A finding is clearly erroneous  when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is  left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.  Dinkins v. Arkansas  Dep't of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001).  This court reviews termination  of parental rights cases de novo.  Id.  It is clear that Long substantially complied with the requirements imposed upon her  by the court.  As the trial judge recites in her order, Long was required to do “three main  things:  attend  AA  or  NA  meetings  once  per  week  and  provide  documentation  to  the  caseworker every month; make her priority to visit the juveniles without fail; and continue in  therapy with [K.L.] so that she could learn how to help [K.L.] alleviate her anxiety and better  parent [K.L.] with her issues.” With the exception of providing documentation, Long fulfilled  all of these requirements.  Given the extraordinary progress Long has made in fulfilling the ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 7  requirements of the court, the overwhelming evidence of the very strong bond between mother  and children, and the testimony from K.L.’s therapist that the child would “regress,” we hold  that the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that Long’s continued contact with her  children would be detrimental.  Accordingly, the best interest of the children dictates that we  reverse the termination of Long’s parental rights and reinstate reunification services with a  goal of returning the children to Long’s custody.  Reversed and remanded.  ROAF, VAUGHT, and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.  CRABTREE  and GLOVER, JJ., dissent.  TERRY CRABTREE, Judge, dissenting. The trial court in this case terminated appellant’s parental  rights  nineteen  months  after  the  children  had  been  removed  from  her  care.  There  was  evidence  presented at the termination hearing that appellant had yet to comply with the most basic requirement  of the case plan, which was to satisfy the court that she had come to terms with and had overcome her  recognized drug problem.  There was also evidence that she had yet to achieve the level of stability  necessary for the children’s return to her care, in that she had not maintained stable employment nor  had  she  obtained  suitable  housing.    The  stability  of  her  home  was  also  complicated  because  of  uncertainties arising from her relationship with her current boyfriend.  Because I am not left with the  definite  and firm conviction  that the  trial court was mistaken in its judgment, I would affirm the  termination decision.  On February 28, 2003, the children were taken into emergency custody after appellant was  arrested on charges of possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two  counts of endangering the welfare of a child.  Appellant failed to appear at the review hearing held the  following  July.  In  its  ruling  from  that  hearing,  the  trial  court  found  that  appellant  was  not  in  compliance  with  the  case  plan  in  that  she  had  missed  three  appointments  for  a  psychological  evaluation; she had not completed parenting classes; and she was not attending AA/NA meetings as  required.  At the subsequent review hearing in October, it was disclosed that appellant had moved to  Georgia.  Again, it was found that appellant was not in compliance with the case plan, and the trial  court warned appellant that the permanency­planning hearing was upcoming and urged appellant to  bring herself into compliance.  At this juncture, eight precious months had passed since the children  had been taken from her home, but appellant had not yet begun to engage in the process of facilitating  their return home.  The permanency­planning hearing was held in February 2004.  At this hearing it was shown  that appellant was beginning to make progress toward the goal of reunification.   In late December  2003, she had returned to Arkansas from her three­month sojourn in Georgia; she had completed  parenting classes; she had regularly visited with the children; and a drug screen taken in January came  back negative, as did a drug screen conducted the day of the hearing.  Appellant was living with her  sister and had a job interview at McDonald’s.  Appellant, however, had not completed outpatient drug ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 8  treatment, nor had she been attending AA/NA meetings. Though the children had been out of the home  for one year and could not be returned home, the trial court continued the goal of reunification because  of the measurable progress appellant had made, giving her three more months to bring herself into  compliance.  Appellant was also granted unsupervised weekend visitation.  However, this visitation  was suspended after a month when appellant failed to return the children on time.  Appellant offered  the explanation that she had been hospitalized and was thus not able to return the children on time, but  appellant  never  provided  the  court  with  documentation  of  her  stay  in  the  hospital,  despite  her  representation that she possessed such documentation.  At the permanency­planning review hearing held in May 2004, after the three­month grace  period, it was disclosed that appellant was still not attending AA/NA meetings.  As before, appellant  had provided no documentation that she was receiving outpatient drug treatment. She had inexcusably  missed one drug screening.  Since the last hearing, she had only attended three visitation sessions with  the  children.    It  was  said  that  appellant  had  not  maintained  regular  contact  with  the  department.  Further, it was disclosed that her criminal charges remained outstanding.  Based on this evidence, the  trial court decided to change the goal from reunification to termination, noting in particular that the  children had been taken into protective custody over drug usage and that appellant had not complied  with the case plan in that area.  Even though appellant excused her lack of visitation on the basis that  her caseworker had changed and that it had not been made clear to her when her visits were to occur,  the trial court was not required to accept that any such confusion extended over an entire three­month  period.  Although the majority is critical of the trial court’s “sua sponte” decision  not to accept the  department’s recommendation to continue the goal of reunification, it was the trial court’s prerogative  to change the goal to termination, despite that recommendation.  Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­338(c) (Supp.  2005).  The decision rests with the trial court, not the department.  At  the  conclusion  of  this  review  hearing,  the  trial  court  offered  appellant  words  of  encouragement, advising her that changing the goal to termination was not the “death knell” and that  there was still time to bring herself into compliance.  Unfortunately, the testimony presented at the  termination hearing, held some three months later, revealed that appellant did not take advantage of the  additional time.  There was testimony that she tested positive on May 19 for propoxyphen, also known  as Darvon, that she had missed a drug screening in July, and that she had tested positive for opiates in  August.  She did not present satisfactory proof verifying her attendance at NA meetings.  She provided  one unsigned sign­in sheet for May, none for June, four unsigned sheets in July, and four unsigned  sheets in August.  Her attendance at only two meetings in July could be confirmed.  Other than her own  word,  she  provided  no  documentation  that  she  had  participated  in  or  completed  outpatient  drug  counseling.  It should be noted that appellant represented throughout the proceedings, and to Ms.  Kucala, K.L.’s counselor, that she had been receiving treatment on her own at UAMS. ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 9  1  Jim Pfeiffer, a licensed professional counselor and certified drug­abuse therapist, testified  that  he  performed  a  drug  and  alcohol  assessment  on  appellant  in  May  of  2003,  while  appellant  was  incarcerated on the drug charges.  In the interview, appellant told him that she used drugs and that she  drank alcohol sparingly, even though she admitted to having a DWI a year and a half ago.  She said that  she had smoked marijuana one time and that she had used methamphetamine four or five times, but that  her drug of choice was hydrocodone.  Appellant reported that she had been using this drug for five  years on an average of four to five pills a day, twenty to thirty pills per month.   Pfeiffer said that  appellant did not believe that she needed treatment because she had experienced no cravings since her  incarceration.  Appellant stated that she traded methamphetamine for hydrocodone, but Pfeiffer said  that she did not consider trading as dealing in drugs.  Dr. Paul Deyoub, a forensic psychologist, conducted an evaluation of appellant in September  of 2003.  He diagnosed appellant with a mixed personality disorder with Borderline, Histrionic, and  Dependent traits.  He said that this disorder was characterized by substance abuse, instability, and  unstable and abusive relationships.  Noting that appellant had been in and out of court on hot­check  and contempt charges, as well as her more recent drug arrest, he said that trouble with the law also  typified her personality disorder.  Dr. Deyoub stated that appellant had no insight into her substance­  abuse problem and that she tended to minimize it.  He felt that she was at risk for continued drug use  and regarded her prognosis for reunification as being guarded and poor, although not impossible.  Dr.  Deyoub said that one could not believe appellant’s promises of improvement and that one would have  to see evidence of improvement before the children could be returned. He testified that appellant must  demonstrate to her caseworker that:  she is drug free, living in a home, working, supporting herself, not using  drugs and doing her therapy.  All of that would have to happen before.  At the time I did this, and in cases like this which I do a lot of these,  you’re looking at six months to a year and she would be able to verify  those steps.  Because individuals like her and specifically [appellant]  would have a high likelihood of recurrence or positive drug screens and  so forth and all of that would be a set back.  You would have to see it  before  you  could  place  the  kids  back  with  her  and  put  two  young  children with her if she’s still  using drugs or if she’s still living an  unstable life.  People like [appellant] with a diagnosis and with her IQ  are capable of doing this.  That’s not the problem.  The problem is 1  When the record was being prepared, the court reporter discovered that her equipment  had  malfunctioned and that Pfeiffer’s testimony had not been recorded.  The trial judge’s clerk  prepared a summary of his testimony from the judge’s notes.  By entry of an agreed order, the  summary was accepted by the parties and the court as a fair representation of his testimony.  ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 10  doing it.  Jan Kucala did testify that appellant had made progress since the last hearing, that the children  were very bonded to her, and that K.L. would probably regress if appellant’s rights were terminated.  However,  Ms.  Kucala  also  stressed  K.L.’s  overriding  need  for  stability,  which  was  a  need  that  appellant could not presently fulfill.  She testified that achieving stability was going to be a “great  difficulty” because there were still a lot of unknowns in the relationship between appellant and her  boyfriend.  She  could  not  recommend  that  the  children  return  home,  only  that  a  trial  period  of  unsupervised but closely monitored visits in the home begin.  She was not able to predict how long it  would take before appellant became stable enough  for the children to return home, saying only that  she did not think it would be a “long­term thing.”  There was further testimony at the hearing that, although appellant had been asked, she had  never provided pay stubs to verify her four­month employment at McDonald’s. Appellant claimed that  she was presently working for her father caring for her aged grandmother.  There was testimony that  her caseworker could not verify appellant’s claim that she was moving into a larger apartment.  An overview of this case reveals that appellant waited ten months to begin working toward the  goal of reunification, that she maintained partial compliance for five months, and that she made no  meaningful progress and in fact regressed in the final months of the proceedings.  At the termination  hearing,  the  trial  court  was  entitled  to  accept  Dr.  Deyoub’s  testimony  outlining  the  necessity  for  documented proof, not appellant’s word, that she was meeting the goals of the case plan of living a ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 11  stable and drug­free life, and of maintaining employment and suitable housing.  The trial court could  find  based  on the  evidence at the  hearing that appellant had not successfully dealt with her drug  problem, which was the reason that the children were removed from the home.  Appellant could not  verify that she had attended drug counseling or NA meetings on a regular basis.  Just prior to the  termination  hearing,  she  had  failed  two  drug  tests  and  had  failed  to  attend  one  drug  screening.  Although appellant testified that she had tested positive for opiates because of prescribed medication,  appellant did not offer any verification of this prescription, and the trial court was not obliged to believe  her  testimony.  There  was  also  testimony  at  the  hearing  that  called  into  question  whether  or  not  appellant was or even had been gainfully employed.  Appellant failed to provide proof of employment,  and the trial court was not required to believe her testimony that she was currently employed by her  father. There was testimony giving the trial court reason to doubt that appellant had made arrangements  for an apartment that could accommodate the children. Moreover, after nineteen months, appellant had  not achieved the level of personal stability necessary for the children to return home. According to Ms.  Kucala, there was much work yet to be done, and she could not say when appellant would be ready for  the children to return home on a permanent basis.  Although Ms. Kucala expressed the opinion that  K.L. would regress if appellant’s rights were terminated, the trial court was entitled to accord whatever  weight to that testimony as it saw fit, and could properly focus on the overall best interest of the child  in the context of all the evidence under consideration.  It is always a sad day anytime a trial judge makes the tough and unenviable decision that the ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2  LONG v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 12  best interest of children demands the termination of parental rights. On appellate review, we are to give  a high degree of deference to the trial court, as it is in a far superior position to observe the parties  before it.  Trout v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, 359 Ark. 283, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2004).   With that  degree of deference in mind, I am not willing to say that the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous.  In this case, the seasoned trial judge had the best opportunity to observe appellant, as well as the other  witnesses, and to make an informed assessment of the situation gathered over the course of nineteen  months.  The trial judge took the case under advisement in order to render a careful and thoughtful  decision.  It is my opinion that we should not second­guess the judgment of the trial court when there  is an abundance of evidence to support its decision.  I would affirm, and I am authorized to state that  Judge Glover joins in this dissent. ___________________________  HART, J. ­ 2 

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