Michael Jerome Banks v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE
DIVISION I
CACR 06-350
December 6, 2006
MICHAEL JEROME BANKS
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF CRITTENDEN COUNTY,
ARKANSAS
[NO. CR02-622]
HONORABLE GRAHAM PARTLOW,
JR., CIRCUIT JUDGE
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
On November 4, 2002, appellant pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Crittenden County,
to aggravated assault, and he was sentenced to forty-eight months of probation. The State
filed an amended petition for revocation on October 28, 2005, alleging that appellant violated
his probation by his failure to pay fines, costs and fees, failure to report, failure to pay
probation fees, failure to notify the sheriff and his probation officer of his current address and
employment, being a felon in possession of a firearm, associating with other felons,
committing terroristic threatening, resisting arrest, and by being in possession of and using
marijuana. A revocation hearing was held on December 6, 2005, and the trial court found that
all of the grounds for revocation alleged in the amended petition for revocation had been
proven by the State. The court sentenced appellant to six years in the Arkansas Department
of Correction. Counsel for appellant has filed a no-merit brief and a motion to be permitted
to withdraw as counsel. Appellant was notified of his counsel’s brief and motion, and he has
elected to file pro se points for reversal.
In the brief and motion filed by appellant’s counsel, we are urged to hold that an appeal
of the revocation would be wholly frivolous. The procedure for the filing of a no-merit brief
is governed by Anders v. California, 386 U.S.738 (1967), and Rule 4-3(j) of the Rules of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. A no-merit brief must contain an argument section that
consists of a list of all rulings adverse to the defendant made by the trial court on all
objections, motions, and requests made by either party with an explanation concerning why
each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. Adaway v. State, 62 Ark. App.
272, 972 S.W.2d 257 (1998). The test is not whether counsel thinks the trial court committed
no reversible error, but rather whether the points to be raised on appeal would be “wholly
frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Pursuant to Anders, the appellate court is also required
to make a determination “after a full examination of all the proceedings,” whether the case
is wholly frivolous.
There were only two rulings adverse to appellant at the hearing. The first was an
overruled hearsay objection, and the second was the court’s decision to revoke appellant’s
probation. During the prosecution’s direct examination of appellant’s probation officer,
Michael Walker, Mr. Walker testified that when he attempted to visit appellant’s home, he
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was advised by appellant’s niece that appellant did not reside at that address. Counsel for
appellant made a hearsay objection that was overruled by the court. In his brief, counsel for
appellant correctly explains that the Arkansas Rules of Evidence do not apply in revocation
proceedings. Ark. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3)(2006); Jones v. State, 31 Ark. App. 23, 786 S.W.2d
851 (1990); Ark. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3)(2006).
To revoke probation or a suspension, the trial court must find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant inexcusably violated a condition of that probation or
suspension. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(d)(Supp. 2003). The State need only prove that the
defendant committed one violation of the conditions. Richardson v. State, 85 Ark. App. 347,
157 S.W.3d 536 (2004). When appealing a revocation, the appellant has the burden of
showing that the trial court’s findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
Id. Evidence that is insufficient for a criminal conviction may be sufficient for the revocation
of probation or suspended sentence. Id. Because the determination of a preponderance of the
evidence turns on questions of credibility and the weight to be given testimony, we defer to
the trial judge’s superior position. Id.
In addition to his testimony regarding his attempt to visit appellant’s home, appellant’s
probation officer testified that appellant was not current on his probation fees, that appellant
failed to report on three occasions, and that appellant tested positive for cocaine and marijuana
on February 24, 2005. Clearly, there was evidence that appellant committed more than one
violation of the terms of his probation, so the trial court did not err when it revoked
appellant’s probation.
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Appellant’s pro se points are as follows:
1. Mr. Butler Bernard didn’t raise any issue to object. The claim of
insufficient evidence was barr [sic] by the defendant failure to state specific
ground in his direct verdict motion where defense counsel stated only that his
motion was based on a lack of evidence. Bowen v. State, 342 Ark. 581, 30
S.W.3d 86 (2000).
2. Failure to pay fine and costs and fees, me and my probation officer we had
talk about my fee, and fine and he told me to have them pay by the time I see
him again in which I suppose to have seen him Oct 31 of 2005.
When an offender on probation defaults in the payment of supervision fees or
any installment thereof, the court may require the offender to show cause why
he would not be imprisoned for nonpayment. A.C.A. 16-93-104(2006).
3. My court appointed lawyer didn’t raise any issue, or object or speak in my
behalf. He didn’t never raise and issue that I was never tested positive for the
use of marijuana. It doesn’t show on record that I tested positive for the drug.
My probation officer Mr. Michael Walker signed me up for the 12 step
program, and which I was enrolled to a Mrs. Sheila Trotter.
4. The charges of firearm as a felon, Terroristic Threatening, or resisting
arrest. I don’t have any of those charges, all of them are just hear say charges
of the police officer. In which my court appointed lawyer didn’t point out, if
you read the testimony of officer Futch, officer Wilson, and McCall, in my
transcript. Don’t nobody state the truth but officer McCall. I feel that I’ve
challenge all nine of the original allegation contained in the petition for
revocation of probation.
5. And the fifty point for reversal or modify my sentence. Criminal procedure
- sentencing- second sentence cannot be imposed at revocation of probation
hearing –Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2331 (Repl.1977), adopted by the General
Assembly in 1973 and effective at the date of the commission of the crime in
issue provided that the court could accept the plea of guilty, suspend
imposition of sentence and place the defendant on probation, futher, the court
had the authority to revoke probation, and require a probationer to serve the
remainder of a sentence imposed, Ark. Stat. Ann 43-2332 (Rep. 1977);
however, a second sentence could not be imposed at a revocation hearing.
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Appellant’s first and third points amount to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Appellant did not raise this issue below. It has long been held that the appellate
court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Porter v. State, 356
Ark. 17, 145 S.W.3d 376 (2004).
In his second and fourth points, appellant challenges witness testimony. In point two
he asserts that his probation officer advised him to have his fees paid by the end of the
month. When questioned about this alleged agreement at the revocation hearing, Mr. Walker
stated that he did not remember telling that to appellant. In appellant’s fourth point he argues
that, except for the testimony of Officer McCall, the police officers’ testimony was
untruthful. Obviously, the Court chose to believe the testimony of Mr. Walker and the police
officers. We defer to the trial judge’s determinations of witness credibility and weight to be
given the testimony. Richardson, supra.
Appellant’s final point is that it was error for the court to sentence him to a term of
six years rather than to the remainder of his four years of probation. The Arkansas Supreme
Court held in Cox v. State, 365 Ark. 358, ___ S.W.3d___ (2006), that probation and a fine
did not constitute a “sentenced imposed,” and therefore it was appropriate for the trial court
to impose a sentence that might have been imposed originally when the defendant’s
probation was revoked. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-204(b)(Repl. 2006), aggravated
assault is a Class D felony. The sentence for a Class D felony shall not exceed six (6) years.
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Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(5)(Repl.2006). Because appellant was originally placed on
probation without a period of confinement or suspended imposition of sentence, the trial
court did not err by sentencing appellant to six years in the Arkansas Department of
Correction upon the revocation of his probation.
After reviewing the record, we agree that there is no merit to an appeal of appellant’s
revocation of probation and thereby affirm the decision of the trial court and grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw.
Affirmed.
G LOVER and V AUGHT, JJ., agree.
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