Karess Dartell Jones v. State of Arkansas
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DIVISION IV
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE
CACR 05-887
June 14, 2006
KARESS DARTELL JONES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
CRAIGHEAD COUNTY
[NO. CR-04-719]
V.
HONORABLE
FOGELMAN
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
JOHN
NELSON
AFFIRMED
APPELLEE
Appellant Karess Dartell Jones was found guilty by a jury of raping D.S., a minor less than
fourteen years of age, for which he was sentenced to ten years in prison. Appellant contends on
appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to the
police and that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the finding of guilt. We find no error and
affirm.
Although appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is his second point on
appeal, double jeopardy considerations require us to address that issue first. Jones v. State, 349 Ark.
331, 78 S.W.3d 104 (2002). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm
if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence to
support the conviction. Gilbert v. State, 341 Ark. 601, 19 S.W.3d 595 (2000). Substantial evidence
is evidence of sufficient force and character as to compel, with reasonable certainty, a conclusion
beyond mere speculation or conjecture. Engram v. State, 341 Ark. 196, 15 S.W.3d 678 (2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1081 (2001).
A person commits rape if he or she engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity
with another person who is less than fourteen years of age. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A)
(Repl. 2006). The term “sexual intercourse” means penetration, however slight, of the labia majora
by a penis. The phrase “deviate sexual activity” means any act of sexual gratification involving the
penetration, however slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another; or the penetration,
however slight, of the labia major or anus of one person by any body member of another person.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(1)(A) & (B) (Repl. 2006).
The victim in this case, D.S., testified that she lived with her grandmother and that appellant
raped her one night when she was spending the weekend with her mother. Specifically, she said that
appellant “stuck his dick in my hole,” meaning “the hole the blood comes out of once a month.”
According to her, three of her siblings were in bed with her when this occurred, and she had been
wearing jeans, not pajamas, when she had gone to bed. D.S. testified that she was lying on her
stomach with her pants down and that appellant’s pants were pulled down below his knees. She said
that appellant went into the front room when it was over and that she went into the bathroom and
used a tissue to wipe off his sperm.
S.C., the victim’s younger sister, testified that she was visiting her mother that night and that
she saw appellant on top of D.S. with his pants halfway off. She said that D.S. was lying on her side
and that his hands were on her bottom. S.C. testified that D.S. had on pajamas.
The victim’s mother testified that D.S. was crying the next day and told her what had
happened. She said that a month before the incident she had a conversation with appellant about
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D.S. She said that appellant had thought that D.S. was sixteen or seventeen years old, but that she
had told him that she was thirteen. She recalled that D.S. was wearing jeans the night in question.
Angela Meredith, a Jonesboro police officer, took a statement from D.S. Officer Meredith
testified that D.S. told her that she had been alone in the bed at the time of the assault and that she
had been wearing pajamas.
Detective Dewayne Pierce of the Jonesboro Police Department interviewed appellant about
five days after the incident and then briefly again the following day. Video-tape recordings of the
interviews were shown to the jury. To summarize their content, appellant admitted that he had
sexual intercourse with D.S. and that it was not against her will.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient in light of the inconsistencies in the
testimony with regard to what clothing D.S. was wearing and whether the act occurred while the
child was lying on her stomach or her side. Appellant also points out that, other than the inconsistent
testimony, there was no forensic evidence establishing that a rape occurred. It is for the jury,
however, to resolve inconsistencies in the testimony, and we will not disturb their credibility
assessment. Medlock v. State, 79 Ark. App. 447, 89 S.W.3d 357 (2002). Furthermore, it has been
frequently held that the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim alone is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004). The child testified that
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, and appellant confessed to having intercourse with the
victim. We cannot say that there is no substantial evidence to support the guilty verdict.
Turning to appellant’s initial argument, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective Pierce. Appellant argues that the evidence
shows that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive his rights under Miranda.
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A statement made while in custody is presumptively involuntary, and the burden is on the
State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a custodial statement was given voluntarily
and was knowingly and intelligently made. Jones v. State, 344 Ark. 682, 42 S.W.3d 536 (2001).
A suspect’s waiver of rights is valid only if it is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Burin v. State, 298 Ark. 611, 770 S.W.2d 125 (1989). There are two dimensions to the inquiry of
waiver. Howell v. State, 350 Ark. 552, 89 S.W.3d 343 (2002), overruled on other grounds, Grillot
v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). First, the relinquishment of the right must have been
voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception. Id. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Id.
When reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we make an independent determination based upon
the totality of the circumstances. Dickerson v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Oct. 6, 2005).
The totality of the circumstances includes the age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence of the defendant. Id. We defer to the superior position of the trial judge to evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses who testify at the suppression hearing. Flowers v. State, ___ Ark. ___,
___ S.W.3d ___ (May 5, 2005). Conflicts in the testimony are for the trial judge to resolve, and the
judge is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, especially that of the accused, as he is
the person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings. Id.
At the suppression hearing, Detective Pierce testified that appellant was twenty-seven years
old at the time of the interviews, that he was employed by Labor Ready Temporary Services, and that
he operated a car. He did not consider appellant to be low functioning, although he did not know
whether appellant could read or write. He read the rights form out loud to appellant, who signed the
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form by printing his name. Pierce testified that he employs the “Reed Method” of interrogation, in
which the interrogator tries to convince the individual that the investigation is complete and that the
interrogator knows what occurred, in an effort to get the individual to be truthful. When asked if this
method involves trickery, Pierce replied that it depended on how one defines trickery.
Detective Ray Buhrmester, another Jonesboro police officer, testified that he worked another
case involving appellant in 2002. Buhrmester said that, when he interviewed appellant, he read the
rights form to appellant because appellant said that he could not read or write. He said that appellant
signed the rights form and that he understood it.
Appellant’s mother, Christine Kelly, testified that appellant lived with her and that she had
to take care of him because he could not hold a job. She said that as a child appellant had a learning
disability and that he could not read, write, or comprehend what he reads. She said that it was
necessary for her to fill out job applications for him.
Appellant testified that he could neither read nor write because he had a learning disability.
He said that he finished the tenth grade in high school and that he took special education classes
when he was in school. He had no GED. He said that he owned a vehicle and that he had acquired
a driver’s license. Appellant testified that Detective Pierce had gone over the rights form with him
but that he did not understand it. He said, however, that he did not inform Pierce that he did not
understand his rights. He said that he first learned about the rape accusation when he read about it
in the newspaper. Appellant testified that he had been arrested two or three times and that he had
been to prison.
Appellant’s argument is that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive his
rights. He contends that the evidence showed that he had a learning disability and could not read or
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write, and that Detective Pierce, a seasoned police officer, took advantage of him with his
interrogation methods. Appellant also focuses on Pierce’s use of the word “consensual” during the
first interview, and appellant’s statement in the second interview that he had not understood the
meaning of that word. We cannot agree.
Although appellant’s skill in reading comprehension may have been limited by a learning
disability, even appellant agreed, and the recordings of the statements show, that Detective Pierce
verbally advised appellant of his rights. Appellant also signed the rights form, indicating that he
understood them. Although a low I.Q. and mental capacity are factors to consider in determining
the validity of a waiver, standing alone they are not sufficient to suppress a statement. Dickerson
v. State, supra; Rankin v. State, 338 Ark. 723, 1 S.W.3d 14 (1999).
appellant was no stranger to the legal system.
It is also significant that
Rankin v. State, supra.
As for his initial
misunderstanding about the meaning of the word “consensual,” appellant throughout both statements
consistently admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the victim, and he said in different, but
unmistakable terms that the victim had agreed to have sex with him and that he did not force her to
have intercourse. Appellant also expressed concern about being charged with “statutory rape,”
reflecting a clear understanding of the accusation that was being made. Considering the totality of
the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
VAUGHT and BAKER, JJ., agree.
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