John Garver v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION II  CA CR 05­766  March 15, 2006  JOHN GARVER  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF  GARLAND COUNTY  [NO. CR­02­708]  V. HONORABLE JOHN HOMER WRIGHT,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED TERRY CRABTREE, Judge  In this revocation case, appellant pled guilty to the offense of failure to appear and was placed  on probation for five years.  The State subsequently filed a petition to revoke alleging that appellant  had  violated  the  conditions  of his  probation  by  possessing  drug  paraphernalia  and  a  controlled  substance.  After a hearing, the trial court found that appellant had inexcusably violated the terms of  his probation by committing those two offenses, and appellant was sentenced to two years in prison  to be followed by a five­year suspended imposition of sentence.  For reversal, appellant advances  several arguments contesting the sufficiency of the evidence to support the revocation decision.  We  affirm.  At  the hearing, it  was disclosed that  the conditions of appellant’s probation included not  committing a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment, and not using, selling, distributing or  possessing any controlled substance.  Eric Clendening, appellant’s probation officer, testified that he  reported these probation violations after appellant’s arrest in another county on charges of possessing  drug paraphernalia and marijuana.  He spoke with appellant at the jail and later at his office after  appellant’s release.  On both occasions, appellant admitted that he smoked marijuana, calling himself  an “old pothead.”  During the office visit, appellant confided that he would not pass a drug test because he had been smoking marijuana.  Mike Thomas, a deputy with the Grant County Sheriff’s Office, testified that he was on duty  on October 14, 2004, when at around 10:30 p.m. he saw a vehicle parked at a church.  Because he  felt it unusual for a vehicle to be parked there at that time of night, Thomas conducted a welfare  check  and  found  appellant  asleep  behind  the  wheel.  He  asked  for  and  received  appellant’s  identification,  and  he  ran  a  check  which  revealed  an  outstanding  warrant  for  appellant’s  arrest.  Thomas then placed appellant under arrest.  Thomas did an inventory of the vehicle, a Camaro, that belonged to appellant’s father.  He  found a silver and black pipe in the driver’s seat that contained a substance which Thomas identified  as marijuana residue.  In the console, Thomas found a bag of a green leafy substance, which he  identified as marijuana.  A back pack was found behind the driver’s seat.  It contained a glass pipe  and a blue lighter.  In the hatchback area, he found a ceramic pipe and a green bank­style bag, which  contained a silver spoon.  A flashlight was also found in the hatchback.  Inside the light were two  hypodermic syringes and a straw.  The standards which guide our review are as follows:  In order to revoke probation or a suspension, the trial court must find  by a preponderance of the evidence that  the defendant  inexcusably  violated a condition of that probation or suspension.  The State bears  the burden of proof, but need only prove that the defendant committed  one violation of the conditions.  When appealing a revocation,  the  appellant has the burden of showing that the trial court’s findings are  clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Evidence that is  insufficient  for  a  criminal  conviction  may  be  sufficient  for  the  revocation  of  probation  or  suspended  sentence.    Since  the  determination of a preponderance of the evidence turns on questions  of credibility and the weight to be given testimony, we defer to the  trial judge’s superior position.  Richardson v. State, 85 Ark. App. 347, 350, 157 S.W.3d 536, 538 (2004) (citations omitted).  Appellant  first  argues that  the evidence  is  not  sufficient because Officer Thomas did not  specifically identify appellant as the person he took into custody and whose vehicle he searched the  evening of October 14, 2004.  There is no merit in this argument.  To be sure,  it is essential to every  case that the defendant be shown as the one who stands accused of the criminal wrongdoing.  See ­2­  CA 05­766  Williams  v.  State, 308 Ark. 620, 825 S.W.2d 826 (1992); Womack v. State, 301 Ark. 193, 783  S.W.2d 33 (1990).  However, that connection can be inferred from all the facts and circumstances  of the case.  Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d (2004); Holloway v. State, 312 Ark. 306,  849 S.W.2d 473 (1993).  Here, the appellant was tried alone for the revocation of his probation, and  Officer Thomas referred to appellant as “Mr. Garver” throughout his testimony and was not heard  to say that the wrong man was standing before the court.  Such evidence has been deemed sufficient  proof of identity to support a criminal charge. Becker v. State, 298 Ark. 438, 768 S.W.2d 527 (1989);  see also Standridge v. State, supra; Holloway v. State, supra; Williams v. State, supra; Womack v.  State, supra.  We find it sufficient in this revocation case.  Appellant next argues that the evidence is insufficient because there was no evidence that  appellant possessed marijuana.  Appellant contends that the substance was not tested by a chemist  and that the officer’s testimony that the substance was marijuana is not sufficient.  He also contends  that there was no testimony establishing that there was a useable amount of marijuana.  Along the  same vein, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed drug paraphernalia  with regard to the pipe that was found in the driver’s seat of the vehicle.  He again asserts that the  officer was not competent to testify that the pipe contained marijuana residue.  Appellant’s arguments ignore that there were other items found in the vehicle, namely the pipe  found  in the  back  pack  sitting  behind  the  driver’s  seat,  and  the  ceramic  pipe,  silver  spoon,  and  flashlight  that  contained  two  syringes  and  a  straw,  all  of  which  were  found  in  the  hatchback.  Appellant makes no argument on appeal that he was not in possession of these items, nor does he  contend that these items were not drug paraphernalia.  Inasmuch as appellant’s possession of any one  item of paraphernalia violated the terms of his probation, appellant’s failure to contest the evidence  with regard to all of the items found in the vehicle renders the arguments he makes on appeal moot.  See Pugh v. State, 351 Ark. 5, 89 S.W.3d 909 (2002).  Nevertheless,  we  will  say  that  the  trial  court’s  finding  that  appellant  possessed  drug  paraphernalia is not clearly erroneous.  Officer Thomas testified as to the training he received to ­3­  CA 05­766  identify marijuana and its burned residue.  Although the officer was fairly new at his job, his ability  to identify marijuana residue was subject to a credibility determination by the trial court.  The trial  court  was  permitted  to  believe  the  officer’s  testimony  that  the  pipe  found  in  the  driver’s  seat  contained  marijuana  residue.    There  was  also  testimony  that  appellant  admitted  that  he  smoked  marijuana.  Thus,  we  cannot  say  that  the  trial  court’s  finding  that  appellant  possessed  drug  paraphernalia is clearly against  the preponderance of the evidence.  Again,  a  finding of this one  violation is sufficient to support the revocation decision.  We need not express any opinion with  respect to appellant’s argument concerning the marijuana.  Affirmed.  BIRD  and GLOVER, JJ., agree. ­4­  CA 05­766 

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