Angela C. Mays v. Hamilton House Restaurant

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION IV

ANGELA C. MAYS

APPELLANT

V.

HAMILTON HOUSE RESTAURANT

APPELLEE

CA04-576

January 19, 2005

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. F205608]

AFFIRMED

Larry D. Vaught, Judge

Angela Mays was employed by the Hamilton House restaurant as a waitress when she slipped on a wet floor and incurred a compensable knee injury on April 29, 2002. Hamilton House accepted the knee injury and paid medical benefits for it. Afterwards, Mays filed another claim with the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission seeking additional benefits for an injury to her left wrist. Hamilton House denied the claim. On February 21, 2003, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who concluded that Mays suffered a compensable injury to her left wrist as a compensable consequence of her knee injury. The Commission, overruling the ALJ, found no causal connection between Mays's wrist injury and her compensable knee injury. Mays argues on appeal that the Commission's finding was not based on substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.

On review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and will affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Winslow v. D. & B. Mech. Contrs., 69 Ark. App. 285, 13 S.W.3d 180 (2000). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Coll. Club Dairy v. Carr, 25 Ark. App. 215, 756 S.W.2d 128 (1988). To reverse a decision of the Commission, we must be convinced that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. Franklin Collier Farms v. Chapple, 18 Ark. App. 200, 712 S.W.2d 334 (1986).

Further, where a claim is denied because the claimant has failed to show entitlement to compensation by a preponderance of the evidence, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires us to affirm the Commission if its opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of the relief sought. Stephenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 265, 19 S.W.3d 36 (2000). There may be substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we had sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. Winslow, 69 Ark. App. at 287, 13 S.W.3d at 181.

On appeal Mays argues that the Commission erred in finding that she failed to establish a connection between her wrist injury and her compensable knee injury, via her own testimony and that of orthopedic surgeon Dr. Robert J. Olive. Mays's relationship with Dr. Olive began after she fell and injured her knee in April. Mays visited the emergency room for treatment and was referred to Dr. Olive. She began treating with Dr. Olive on May 2, 2002. During the months of May, June, and July, she saw Dr. Olive on five occasions for treatment of problems associated with her left knee. Her last visit in July was after her knee "gave out," and she fell on her deck. She presented to Dr. Olive with a contusion and swelling in her knee. She stated that during the fall, which was allegedly caused by her weak knee, a nail penetrated her shin and wrist. She feared that she had "jammed" her wrist.

Mays returned to Dr. Olive on September 16, 2002, complaining of pain in her wrist after her knee again gave out, and she fell on the concrete. She stated that her knee and wrist were both hurting, and the pain had not subsided with pain medication. At the hearing, Mays recounted approximately eight falls due to her knee injury. She stated that each time, she placed pressure on her wrists to break the fall, which caused her wrist pain. However, on each of the prior occasions, the wrist pain resolved as a result of the pain medication she was taking for her knee injury. As a result, Dr. Olive's September notation was the first time that Mays's wrist trouble was documented in her medical records.

On October 21, 2002, Dr. Olive ordered an x-ray of Mays's wrist. She was ultimately diagnosed with De Quervain's tenosynovitis, and the condition was surgically corrected in December of 2002. According to Dr. Olive's testimony, De Quervain's tenosynovitis is typically an overuse syndrome, but Dr. Olive acknowledged that it can manifest as a result of trauma, such as a fall. Mays testified that her painful wrist condition was a result of the trauma associated with her September fall, which was a natural consequence of her compensable knee injury. The Commission discounted Mays's testimony, finding it to be "suspect at best."

It was Mays's burden to prove a causal connection between the work-related accident and the later disabling injury. Lybrand v. Ark. Oak Flooring Co., 266 Ark. 946, 588 S.W.2d 449 (Ark. App. 1979). The determination of whether the causal connection exists is a question of fact for the Commission to determine. Jeter v. B.R. McGinty Mech., 62 Ark. App. 53, 968 S.W.2d 645 (1998). Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are within the exclusive province of the Commission. Ellison v. Therma-Tru, 71 Ark. App. 410, 30 S .W.3d 769 (2000). We defer to the Commission's findings on what testimony it deems to be credible, and it is within the Commission's province to reconcile conflicting evidence and to determine the true facts. Id. Finally, the Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence, and the resolution of conflicting evidence is a question of fact for the Commission. Smith-Blair v. Jones, 77 Ark. App. 273, 72 S.W.3d 560 (2002).

Here, after weighing two conflicting medical explanations-overuse or trauma-for Mays's injury, the Commission concluded that her wrist injury was caused by overuse and thus was not a compensable consequence of her knee injury. Although the evidence would have supported a contrary finding, because the Commission's conclusion was reasonable, we must therefore affirm its refusal to grant Mays benefits for her wrist injury.

Affirmed.

Griffen and Crabtree, JJ., agree.