John Michael VanCuren v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION III

JOHN MICHAEL VANCUREN

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR04-347

January 19, 2005

APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-03-272-2]

HONORABLE KIM MARTIN SMITH, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Josephine Linker Hart, Judge

A jury found appellant, John Michael VanCuren, guilty of the crimes of second-degree forgery and theft of property, and he was sentenced to a total of thirty-six months' imprisonment and a total fine of $20,000. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his two convictions, as the State failed to show that he had the requisite intent to commit the crimes. We affirm.

A person commits the crime of second-degree forgery if, with purpose to defraud, he alters any written instrument that was purported to be or calculated to represent if completed the act of a person who did not authorize that act and that instrument is a "contract, assignment, ... commercial instrument, ... or other written instrument that does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-37-201(a),(c)(1) (Repl. 1997). Further, "[a] person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 1997). Our theft-of-property statute provides in part that a person commits the crime of theft of property if he "[k]nowingly obtains the property of another person, by deception..., with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(2) (Supp. 2003). And "[a] person acts knowingly with respect to his conduct ... when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature...." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(2) (Repl. 1997).

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, considering only the evidence that supports the verdict, and we affirm if substantial evidence exists to support it. Watson v. State, ____ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (June 24, 2004). Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Further, a criminal defendant's intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime, and because intent cannot be proven by direct evidence, the jurors are allowed to draw upon their common knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty in ascertaining a defendant's intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Id.

The evidence adduced at trial supporting the convictions is as follows: On April 2, 2002, John Griffin, as an employee of Reeves Bail Bond Service, wrote a $132,500 bail bond for Michael Roy Thompson. According to the security agreement signed by Joy Reed, the bond was secured by a Pace Arrow Motor Home and personal property. Appellant, who was the manager of Reeves Bail Bond Service, later wrote on the security agreement that the bond was also secured by a 2000 Gulf Stream Motor Home. That motor home was owned by Lindell Duncan. Duncan, however, did not know Michael Roy Thompson and never pledged the motor home as collateral for Thompson's bail bond.

In the fall of 2002, Duncan attempted to sell the motor home, and appellant contacted Duncan about purchasing it. On October 16, 2002, Duncan agreed to allow appellant to take possession of the motor home in exchange for a check in the amount of $1,006 for the first and last payment on the motor home; five $1,000 money orders dated October 16, 2002, that appellant said he mailed to the finance company carrying the note; and a $5,000 check to be held as security. Duncan also received an additional check on November 7 or 8, 2002, in the amount of $553.91 for an additional month's payment when appellant signed a document prepared by Duncan's attorney evidencing their purported agreement. Appellant, however, never mailed the money orders to the finance company but instead deposited them in a Reeves Bail Bond Service bank account on October 16, 2002. He stopped payment on the $5,000 check on October 17, 2002.

On October 14, 2002, appellant applied for title to the motor home in the name of Reeves Bail Bond Service. In support of his application, he presented a copy of the altered security agreement and an affidavit of repossession stating that the motor home was repossessed from Duncan on October 14, 2002. He was issued an application for title. Appellant sold the motor home to Mike Phipps for $21,100. The check for the purchase was dated October 16, 2002, and was deposited on October 19, 2002.

Thus, appellant altered the security agreement that secured Thompson's bail bond and listed, without Duncan's consent, the motor home owned by Duncan as collateral for the bond. He obtained possession of the motor home under the guise of purchasing it, sought to obtain title to the motor home by presenting an affidavit of repossession and the altered security agreement, and sold the motor home. This evidence established that appellant altered the security agreement with the purpose to defraud and that he knowingly obtained Duncan's motor home by deception with the purpose of depriving Duncan of the motor home. Contrary to appellant's position on appeal that he lacked the requisite intent to commit the crimes, this evidence constituted substantial evidence to support appellant's convictions for second-degree forgery and theft of property. While appellant asserts that his alternative explanation of the events established that he lacked the requisite intent, we, as previously explained, consider only that evidence supporting the verdict.

Affirmed.

Bird and Roaf, JJ., agree.