Matthew A. Meadows v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION I

MATTHEW A. MEADOWS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR04-221

January 5, 2005

APPEAL FROM THE JOHNSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-03-16]

HON. JOHN S. PATTERSON,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

John Mauzy Pittman, Chief Judge

The appellant was charged with possession of ephedrine, possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture, aggravated assault, and fleeing. At appellant's jury trial, the trial court granted appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of possession of ephedrine. Appellant then moved that the charges of aggravated assault and fleeing be severed from the possession of drug paraphernalia charge for trial. The trial court denied the motion; appellant was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture, aggravated assault, and fleeing; and this appeal followed. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for severance of offense. We find no error, and we affirm.

Severance of criminal offenses is governed by Ark. R. Crim. P. 22.2. The rule provides that:

(a) Whenever two (2) or more offenses have been joined for trial solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar

character and they are not part of a single scheme or plan, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses.

(b) The court, on application of the prosecuting attorney, or on application of the defendant other than under subsection (a), shall grant a severance of offenses:

(i) if before trial, it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense; or

(ii) if during trial, upon consent of the defendant, it is deemed necessary to achieve a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense.

The decision to sever offenses is discretionary with the trial court. Garner v. State, 355 Ark. 82, 131 S.W.3d 734 (2003). Moreover, we will affirm a trial court's denial of a motion to sever if the offenses at issue were part of a single scheme or plan or if the same body of evidence would be offered to prove each offense. Id.

In the present case, there was evidence that appellant attempted to buy case lots of ephedrine pills from a merchant. The merchant informed the police and was directed by them to accept the order. Undercover police officers were on the scene when appellant picked up the order of ephedrine pills from the merchant. They followed appellant's vehicle, hoping to discover his laboratory, but appellant realized that he was being followed and fled. A high-speed car chase ensued. Appellant drove with great recklessness, intentionally hitting the police car with his own vehicle while reaching speeds in excess of eighty miles per hour on unpaved roads, and appellant ultimately escaped. Police went directly to his residence, where they obtained permission to search from his sister and discovered the drug paraphernalia.

Severance is not mandatory where the offenses are part of the same conduct or a single scheme or plan. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 21.1. Appellant argues that, because the possession of ephedrine charge was dismissed, there is nothing to show that the remaining offenses were based on a series of connected acts, and severance is therefore mandatory under Rule 22.2. We disagree. Although the possession of ephedrine charge was dismissed at trial because the ephedrine was destroyed and no one had verified that the substance obtained by appellant actually contained ephedrine, there was abundant evidence to show that appellant placed an order for a large quantity of pills and received a package that he believed to contain ephedrine. Appellant's flight can reasonably be attributed to this belief, and we think that it likewise can reasonably be concluded that appellant intended to use the ephedrine he believed he had obtained to manufacture methamphetamine with the paraphernalia found in his residence. Under these facts, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the charges.

Affirmed.

Crabtree and Roaf, JJ., agree.