Nyle Da-Von Daniels v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION I

NYLE DA-VON DANIELS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CA CR 04-5

January 5, 2005

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY

[NO. CR2002-4077]

HONORABLE WILLARD PROCTOR, JR., JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Terry Crabtree, Judge

In a bench trial, the appellant, Nyle Da-Von Daniels, was found guilty of attempted first-degree murder for which he was sentenced as an habitual offender to a term of thirty-three years in prison. Appellant's only issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict due to insufficient evidence of the culpable mental state. We disagree and affirm.

We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Coggin v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (March 25, 2004). The test for such motions is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Barrett v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W.3d 485 (2003). Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without having to resort to speculation or conjecture. Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003). It has been held repeatedly that, in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Edmond v. State, 351 Ark. 495, 95 S.W.3d 789 (2003).

A person commits the offense of first-degree murder if, with a purpose of causing the death of another person, he causes the death of another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(2) (Repl.1997). One is said to act purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 1997). A person attempts to commit an offense if he purposely engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of an offense whether or not the attendant circumstances are as he believes them to be. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-3-201(a)(2) (Repl. 1997). A criminal defendant's intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime. Winbush v. State, 82 Ark. App. 365, 107 S.W.3d 882 (2003). Thus, it is recognized that intent may be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner of its use, and the nature, extent, and location of the wounds. Edmond v. State, 351 Ark. 495, 95 S.W.3d 789 (2003).

A review of the record discloses that appellant and Shaketha Young, a working college student, met one night outside her friend's apartment. After talking for a while, they exchanged phone numbers. They spoke on the telephone to each other for about a month, and ultimately a date was arranged. A second date was planned for the next evening after Ms. Young got out of her evening classes. They met at her studio apartment at around 11:30 p.m., had a few drinks, and then had consensual sexual relations. Afterwards, Ms. Young heard appellant stirring in the kitchen area, presumably getting something to drink, and she dozed off. She testified that, the next thing she remembered, she was lying on her back and that appellant reached over and cut her throat with one of her kitchen knives. Appellant then stabbed her in the chest, saying "You going to die tonight bitch. Die bitch. Die bitch." Ms. Young grabbed the knife, which broke in two, and they struggled, ending up on the couch. She had him pinned down, and he bit her eye three times. On the third bite, he clamped down and pulled back, but let go when she hit him with a lamp. She ran to the door but tripped, and appellant hit her in the eye he had bitten. Ms. Young made it to the door, but appellant slammed it shut. At this point, they were at a standoff, as Ms. Young was trying to gather the nerve to kick him between the legs. Appellant told her that he would let her go if she got his clothes for him. She responded that she was dying and needed to go to the hospital, to which appellant replied, "You about to piss me off. Go over there and get my clothes before I shoot you with my gun." When appellant reached for his clothes, Ms. Young ran out of the door, naked, bleeding profusely, and screaming. A downstairs neighbor let Ms. Young in her apartment, and the police and an ambulance were called. The gash in Ms. Young's throat required seven to nine stitches. Her eye and the puncture wound to her chest were treated but required no stitching. She was released from the hospital early that same morning.

The next day Ms. Young met Detective Laura Pritchett at the apartment. Appellant phoned several times while they were there. Appellant told Ms. Young that he was sorry. Appellant spoke with the detective and told her that he had "fucked up" and that he had left town and was staying with relatives. The detective arranged for appellant to turn himself in later that day, but appellant did not do so. Instead, he was arrested about a month later. At the time of his arrest, appellant had a two-page letter in his possession which could be read as expressing an obsessive attraction for Ms. Young.

Appellant's argument on appeal is that the evidence does not sufficiently show that he acted with the purpose of killing Ms. Young. We disagree. The record reflects that appellant sliced Ms. Young's throat and stabbed her in the chest with a knife, all the while declaring that she was going to die. We cannot say there is no substantial evidence to support this conviction.

Affirmed.

Pittman, C.J., and Roaf, J., agree.