James Michael Reeves v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
 

DIVISION I

JAMES MICHAEL REEVES

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR03-05

January 14, 2004

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 2002-1465]

HON. JOHN PLEGGE,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Robert J. Gladwin, Judge

Appellant James Michael Reeves was charged with forgery in the second degree. On September 3, 2002, the Pulaski County Circuit Court found appellant guilty and sentenced him as an habitual offender to six years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction.

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Rule 4-3(j) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, appellant's counsel has filed a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is without merit. The clerk of this court furnished appellant with a copy of his counsel's brief and notified him of his right to file pro se points for reversal within thirty days, which appellant did not do.

Appellant's counsel's motion was accompanied by an abstract and brief referring to everything in the record that might arguably support an appeal. Defense counsel listed five rulings by the trial court that were adverse to appellant. Four of these adverse rulings were on evidentiary issues, and the other was the finding of the court that appellant was guilty of forgery

in the second degree. We find that all rulings adverse to appellant were addressed by his counsel, and that there was no reversible error with respect to any of them.

We first address the possibility of a sufficiency of the evidence argument. In order to challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction at a bench trial, an appellant must move for dismissal at the close of all the evidence and state the specific grounds therefor. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(b) and (c); Sharkey v. State, 71 Ark. App. 50, 25 S.W.3d 458 (2000). Defense counsel herein did not move for dismissal at the close of all of the evidence and, therefore, appellant cannot challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence on appeal.

Defense counsel made two objections to the State's leading its witnesses during direct examination. One of these objections was made two times during the State's questioning of Investigator Tonya Huhn, after the investigator had been asked if she had read appellant his Miranda rights before she took a custodial statement. Investigator Huhn answered "yes" both times. Defense counsel made another objection on the basis of leading when the State asked Dennis Bradley if the information that appeared on the face of the forged check at issue was information pertaining to his bank account. Bradley replied "yes" to this question. The trial court denied all the objections.

We agree there was no error in the denial of these objections. Even though a question can be answered yes or no, it is not a leading question if it does not suggest a particular answer. Parker v. State, 266 Ark. 13, 582 S.W.2d 34 (1979). Also, as noted in Anderson v. City of Paragould, 16 Ark. App. 10, 695 S.W.2d 851 (1985), even if a question is leading, it is not prejudicial when there is no dispute as to the facts being elicited during this particular line of questioning. In order to prevail on his claims of error, an appellant must show prejudice resulting from the alleged violations. See Cook v. State, 76 Ark. App. 447, 68 S.W.3d 308 (2002). There is no showing of prejudice herein.

At the conclusion of the direct examination of Investigator Huhn, the State moved for the admission of the forged check at issue and two other exhibits. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the forged check on the basis that there was not "a proper foundation for this witness to say whose check it was," and that counsel thought those people needed to be present. The trial court denied this objection by ruling that the check was being admitted for the purpose for which it was intended, which was to show the writing on it.

Subsequent to this ruling by the trial court, Dennis Bradley identified the exhibit as being his personal bank check, and defense counsel did not object. Pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 901(b)(1), a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be can provide the necessary identification of the matter. Moreover, throughout the trial, there was never any contention by the defense that the State's exhibit was not Mr. Bradley's personal bank check. In order to obtain a reversal based upon this ruling, an appellant would have to show how the trial court's ruling prejudiced him. Cook, supra. Given Mr. Bradley's identification of the check as his personal check and the failure of defense counsel to contend that the State's exhibit was not Mr. Bradley's personal check, appellant made no showing of prejudice, and the trial court did not err in denying the objection.

On cross-examination of appellant, the State questioned him about the fact that both he and a companion, Christina Verble, had told detectives that appellant had written Ms. Verble's name in the "Pay to the Order Of" line of the forged check. The State was cross-examining appellant on this point in order to undermine his testimony on direct examination that his in-custodial statement was coerced. The State was trying to establish its position that if both appellant and his companion, who were questioned separately, said that appellant had signed Ms. Verble's name on the check, and the statement were true, then appellant's testimony that his confession was coerced must be false.

Defense counsel objected on the basis that the question was argumentative, and the court denied this objection, stating, "It's cross examination. I'll allow wide latitude." We agree there was no error in the court's denial of this objection. A cross-examiner is given wide latitude because cross-examination is the means by which to test the truth of the witness's testimony and the witness's credibility. Fowler v. State, 339 Ark. 207, 5 S.W.3d 10 (1999). The trial court is given wide discretion in evidentiary rulings, and we will not reverse unless the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. In any event, there was no showing of prejudice occasioned by the trial court's decision because Ms. Verble also testified for the defense and admitted on cross-examination that appellant had written her name on the check in question. See Cook, supra.

From our review of the record and the brief presented to us, we find that there was compliance with Rule 4-3(j) and that the appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of conviction.

Affirmed.

Griffen and Roaf, JJ., agree.