Waterloo Industries, Inc. v. Peggy Palmer

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION II

WATERLOO INDUSTRIES, INC.

APPELLANT

V.

PEGGY PALMER

APPELLEE

CA03-108

October 8, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. F001482]

AFFIRMED

John Mauzy Pittman, Judge

The appellee in this workers' compensation case, Peggy Palmer, injured her right hip and lower back when she fell off a moving conveyor belt in the course of her employment with appellant, Waterloo Industries, Inc., on July 19, 1999. Initially, appellee was treated conservatively, and appellant accepted the claim as compensable. However, appellant controverted appellee's claim on August 26, 1999. Appellee continued to receive treatment for her injury and symptoms, including piriformis release surgery. Subsequently, appellee filed a claim for additional workers' compensation benefits for reasonably necessary medical treatment and temporary total disability. The Commission found that appellee proved that she sustained a compensable injury for which she was entitled to reasonably necessary medical treatment and temporary total disability. From that decision, comes this appeal.

For reversal, appellant contends that the Commission erred in finding that a compensable injury existed after August 26, 1999. We find no error, and we affirm.

Our standard of review is well-settled. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and we will affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The determination of the credibility and weight to be given a witness's testimony is within the sole province of the Commission. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Farmers Cooperative v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.3d 899 (2002).

Appellant asserts that the evidence suggests that appellee was malingering, and argues that there were no objective findings to support appellee's diagnosis of piriformis syndrome or to show that appellee remained in her healing period after August 26, 1999. We do not agree. The Commission found that, upon initial examination following appellee's fall, Dr. Baltz observed ecchymosis over the right sciatic notch and sacroiliac area where she landed. Ecchymosis, defined as "[a] purplish patch caused by extravasation of blood into the skin," Stedman's Medical Dictionary at 539 (26th ed. 1995), could reasonably be found to be a finding that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient, therefore satisfying the statutory definition of an objective finding. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) (Repl. 2002). Furthermore, the Commission noted that Dr. Baltz also observed muscle spasms, and a medical notation of muscle spasms has also been held sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, 346 Ark. 487, 58 S.W.3d 369 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sands, 80 Ark. App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002); see Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2002).

Appellant appears to be arguing that the Commission erred in finding appellee's injury to be compensable because there are no objective findings to show that the effects of appellee's injuries continued after appellant controverted her claim on August 26, 1999. However, this is but another way of arguing that appellee was required to offer objective medical evidence to prove not only the existence of an injury, but also to show that she remains in her healing period, an argument we specifically considered and rejected in Chamber Door Industries, Inc. v. Graham, 59 Ark. App. 224, 956 S.W.2d 196 (1997). Objective findings are not required to establish each and every element of compensability, Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997), and we hold that the Commission did not err in finding that a compensable injury existed after August 26, 1999.

Affirmed.

Gladwin and Baker, JJ., agree.