McKee Foods Corporation and Risk Management Resources v. Claudine Christie

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE KAREN R. BAKER

DIVISION I

McKEE FOODS COPORATION

RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES

APPELLANTS

v.

CLAUDINE CHRISTIE

APPELLEE

CA02-986

MARCH 12, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[F105116]

AFFIRMED

Appellants, McKee Foods Corporation and Risk Management Resources, appeal the Workers' Compensation Commission's award of benefits to appellee, Claudine Christie, arguing that the Commission's grant of benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.

On appeal, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision and affirms when that decision is supported by substantial evidence. Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 341 Ark. 527, 20 S.W.3d 280 (2000). Substantial evidence exists if reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion. Id. Moreover, we will not reverse the Commission's decision unless fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusion when considering the same facts. Id. We defer to the Commission in determining the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760 (2001).

At the time of the claim, appellee was a thirty-four year old woman with a high school degree and some college credit. She went to work for appellant McKee in March 1994 and worked there full-time until 1998. She worked as a "feeder." Those duties included bending, lifting, carrying, twisting, and reaching. She also worked as a "cripple hauler," carrying large barrels of cake with a two-wheel dolly. In 1998, she voluntarily began working part-time at twenty hours a week.

On January 14, 2001, appellee began a new full-time job for McKee, that of a "packaging tech." She testified that this job required more lifting and leaning than her previous work duties for appellant, and that she began hurting after about two days. She sought emergency treatment on January 25, 2001, at which time she complained of low back pain radiating to the left hip and leg for one to two days. The physician diagnosed "low back pain" and treated appellee conservatively. Appellee testified, "They gave me a shot and the pain went away." She then returned to packaging tech duties, but her condition worsened.

Appellee sought treatment on January 29, 2001, at Siloam Springs Memorial Hospital. She complained of pain in the left side of her spine, low back, "progressive over almost two weeks." She denied specific trauma, but reported an increase in job duties with more bending and upper body work. The physician's diagnosis was "lumbar pain - muscle spasm." The physician's report stated, "I think she has a work related condition. She should be on limited activity - no bending from the waist or lifting this week."

On February 1, Dr. Benjamin reported to appellant McKee that appellee reported low back pain for several days and identified January 22, 2001, as the day of waking up with severe back pain that eventually led to two emergency room treatments. He noted that x-rays showed no major problems and recommended that she go back to full duty with the suggestion that she be given a jobthat did not involve leaning far over a table and reaching out.

On May 4, 2001, Dr. Runnels, a neurological surgeon, wrote regarding appellee, "I have advised her to quit her job due to the fact that it aggravated her back problem." Appellee testified that she did not return to work after May 2001.

Appellee claimed entitlement to workers' compensation stating that she had sustained a compensable injury on January 22, 2001, and that she was entitled to temporary total disability compensation, reasonably necessary medical treatment, and an attorney's fee. Appellants contended that she did not sustain a compensable injury.

Dr. Runnels wrote to appellee's attorney on August 16, 2001, and stated that he was:

certain her years of working as a pack technician, etc., have contributed somewhat to her back problems, but, as to exactly how much they contributed and is it compensable, I cannot say. . . . In answer to your question, I cannot rate her as having permanent disability related to her work unless there is some specific event, something to operate on, and something more definite than just gradual backaches . . ..

The Commission found that appellee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a back injury which caused physical harm to her body and arose out of and in the course of her employment with appellant McKee. The Commission characterized her injury as one of gradual onset and awarded reasonably necessary medical expenses and an attorney's fee. However, the Commission also found that she had failed to prove that she was ever incapacitated from earning wages and denied her claim for temporary total disability.

When an individual requests benefits for an injury characterized by gradual onset, Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii) (Repl. 2002) controls, defining "compensable injury" as follows:

(4)(A)(ii) An injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body and arising out of and in the course of employment if it is not caused by a specific incident or is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence, if the injury is:

....

(b) A back injury which is not caused by a specific incident or which is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence[.]

A claimant seeking benefits for a gradual-onset injury must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the injury arose out of and in the course of his or her employment; (2) the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; and (3) the injury was a major cause of the disability or need for treatment. Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760 (2001). Furthermore, objective medical evidence is necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury, but it is not essential to establish the causal relationship between the injury and the job. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). Matters of credibility are for the Commission to determine. Id.

Appellee sought emergency treatment and was diagnosed with low back pain on January 25, 2001. This medical report corroborates appellee's testimony of when her symptoms began. Although she benefitted from the initial conservative medical treatment, her low back pain increased after returning to work. Medical records show that she again sought treatment for progressive back pain that also corroborated her testimony and that she reported to the attending physician that her increased job duties required more bending and upper body work. The physician examined appellee and diagnosed "lumbar pain - muscle spasm." A physician's report of muscle spasm is an objective medical finding. University of Ark. Med. Sciences v. Hart, 60 Ark. App. 13, 958 S.W.2d 546 (1997).

Appellee's treating physician reported on January 29, 2001, his belief that "she has a work related condition." On February 1, 2001, while Dr. Benjamin recommended she return to full duty, he did so suggesting that her employer provide work which did not involve reaching and leaning. Dr. Runnels expressly opined in May 2001 that appellee's job "aggravates her back problem." Dr. Runnels' August 16, 2001, letter stated, "I am certain her years of working as a pack technician, etc., have contributed somewhat to her back problems, but, as to exactly how much they contributed and is it compensable, I cannot say." The Commission interpreted this letter as Dr. Runnels' assertion that he could not say that the claimant's work was the major cause of her back condition. The Commission correctly stated that appellee was not required to prove that her work was the major cause of her back condition, only that her compensable injury is the major cause of her disability or need for treatment. See Medlin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 64 Ark. App. 17, 977 S.W.2d 239 (1998). No medical reports contained an opinion that her condition was not work related.

Therefore, substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision. Accordingly, we affirm.

Crabtree and Roaf, JJ., agree.