Michael E. Hall v. Caroline I. Hall

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE KAREN R. BAKER

DIVISION III

CA02-102

March 19, 2002

MICHAEL E. HALL AN APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY

APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT

[DV-99-6047]

v.

HONORABLE MACKIE M. PIERCE,

CAROLINE I. HALL CIRCUIT JUDGE

APPELLEE

AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL;

AFFIRMED ON CROSS-APPEAL

The major issue in this divorce case is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to divide appellant's military retirement benefits. The case also raises the issue of whether full faith and credit should be accorded to a decree of separate maintenance awarded appellee by a California court. We affirm.

Appellant Michael Hall has been a resident of Pulaski County, Arkansas, since 1998. Appellee Caroline Hall is a resident of California. The facts are undisputed. The parties married in California in 1969, while appellant was in the military. After a military assignment in Texas, the parties returned to California in 1971. According to appellant's complaint, the parties separated in 1986. Appellant retired from the military in 1983 due to physical disability and filed a claim for disability benefits with the Veterans Administration (VA). Appellee filed an action for spousal support in California in 1986 and was awarded

$250 per month. In April 1991, appellee filed a petition to enforce the earlier spousal support order, and an order was entered on June 20, 1991, ordering appellant to comply with the earlier spousal support order and authorizing the clerk to sign documents necessary to receive military benefits. The June 1991 order was approved by an attorney for appellant.

On August 18, 1991, appellee filed a petition in California for legal separation. The petition sought spousal support and a division of community property, including appellant's military retirement.1 A summons was issued and served on appellant on September 8, 1991, at an address in Winston, North Carolina. On November 5, 1991, the California court entered an order incorporating the earlier orders from the spousal support case, setting an arrearage for unpaid support, awarding each party the personal property in his or her possession, and awarding appellee one-half of appellant's military retirement benefits. The order also indicates that appellant consented to the jurisdiction of the California court for purposes of the division of his military retirement. On March 12, 1999, appellee filed a petition for an order to show cause, seeking modification of the support provision and enforcement of the division of appellant's military retirement provision of the November 5, 1991 order. A summons was served on appellant on May 26, 1999, at an address in North Little Rock, Arkansas. On July 30, 1999, the California court entered an order finding a change in appellee's financial circumstances and modifying the spousal support to $1,109per month. The court also provided that the spousal support could be modified if appellee were to begin receiving her share of appellant's military pension.

On November 17, 1999, appellant filed a complaint for divorce in Pulaski County, Arkansas. The complaint alleged that appellee was a resident of California and sought a divorce based on eighteen months' separation. Appellant also requested that each party be awarded the property in his or her possession. Appellee answered, admitting the residence of the parties and setting forth the California proceedings. Appellee prayed that the complaint be dismissed or, in the alternative, full faith and credit be given to the California court's orders. Appellee also requested attorney's fees in the event that the trial court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the property issues. Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the California orders were not entitled to full faith and credit because the California court did not, under federal law, have authority to divide his military retirement benefits because he waived them in order to obtain VA disability benefits and because he lacked sufficient "minimum contacts" with California to give that court personal jurisdiction over him. Appellee responded by objecting to the jurisdiction of the court to consider the property question because, according to appellee, the property rights had been settled in the California litigation.

The trial court issued a letter opinion on November 2, 2001, that in addition to granting the divorce, it found that appellant had sufficient minimum contacts with California to give that court personal jurisdiction over appellant. The trial court also found that the California orders were valid on their face and entitled to full faith and credit. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the property issues and suggested that the parties seekrelief as to those issues in California. A decree incorporating these findings was entered on November 8, 2001. This appeal followed.

Appellant raises three issues on appeal: the trial court erred by failing to find that appellant's military/VA disability pension was not marital property and, therefore, not capable of division by any court; the trial court erred in finding that it has no jurisdiction over the property issues; and the trial court erred in giving full faith and credit to a decision by another court when there was clear evidence that [the California] court never had in personam jurisdiction over appellant or subject-matter jurisdiction over the division of military/VA disability benefits. Appellee cross-appeals, challenging the trial court's failure to award her attorney's fees in this action.

This court reviews equity cases de novo and will not reverse the trial judge's findings unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Oliver v. Oliver, 70 Ark. App. 403, 19 S.W.3d 630 (2000). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Hedger Bros. Cement & Materials, Inc. v. Stump, 69 Ark. App. 219, 10 S.W.3d 926 (2000); Summers v. Dietsch, 41 Ark. App. 52, 849 S.W.2d 3 (1993).

We find that the trial court was correct in declining jurisdiction over the property issues. The trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over appellee because she lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Arkansas for the trial court to divide the property rights. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the state courts to enter judgments or decreesaffecting the rights or interests of nonresident defendants. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The existence of personal jurisdiction, in turn, depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant and a sufficient connection between the forum and the defendant to make it fair to require defense of the action in the forum state. Kulko, supra. The principal factors to be considered are the nature and quality of the acts, the extent of the relationship of the defendant to this state, and the degree of inconvenience that would result to the defendant by being forced to stand suit in this state in that particular cause of action. Bunker v. Bunker, 261 Ark. 851, 552 S.W.2d 641 (1977); Jessie v. Jessie, 53 Ark. App. 188, 920 S.W.2d 874 (1996). There are no facts in the record showing that appellee has any contacts with the state of Arkansas to support personal jurisdiction.

In Janni v. Janni, 271 Ark. 953, 611 S.W.2d 785 (Ark. App. 1981), this court held that where the acts constituting the grounds for divorce occurred outside the state of Arkansas, and where the last marital domicile was outside the state of Arkansas, Arkansas's courts did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The court also stated that our long-arm statute purports to give jurisdiction only over nonresident defendants who commit acts in this state that give rise to a cause of action. See also Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981) (holding that where Bolivia was the last marital domicile, and no acts of marital misconduct took place in Arkansas, Arkansas did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant).

This court may affirm the trial court where the trial court reached the correct result but gave an incorrect reason. Summers Chevrolet, Inc. v. Yell County, 310 Ark. 1, 832 S.W.2d 486 (1992).

On cross-appeal, appellee asserts that the trial court erred in declining to award her attorney's fees in this matter. As noted above, appellee included a request for fees in the event the trial court found that it had jurisdiction over the property issues. After the trial court issued its letter opinion, appellee's counsel sent the trial court a letter seeking guidance on the issue by asking whether a motion for fees needed to be filed. No motion was filed, and no ruling was obtained.

It may well be that the trial court did not consider the issue to be before it. Appellee's request for attorney's fees was conditioned upon the trial court finding that it had jurisdiction over the property issues. After the trial court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the property issues, no other motion was filed. Because appellee did not properly raise the issue or obtain a ruling in the trial court, the issue is not properly before this court. See Dodson v. Madison County, 311 Ark. 395, 844 S.W.2d 371 (1993).

Affirmed on direct appeal; affirmed on cross-appeal.

Gladwin and Neal, JJ., agree.

1 California law allows a court to divide community property when entering a decree of legal separation. See Cal. Civ. Code § 4800 (Deering 1984) (repealed 1994, currently codified as Cal. Fam. Code § 2550 (Deering 1994)).