Jeffrey Hyland v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION III

JEFFREY HYLAND

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 03-335

October 8, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR2001-678 IV]

HONORABLE EDWARD T.

SMITHERMAN, JR., CIRCUIT

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

John F. Stroud, Jr., Chief Judge

Appellant, Jeffrey Hyland, was tried by a jury and found guilty of the offense of murder in the second degree. He was sentenced to thirty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction and fined $15,000.1 His sole point of appeal contends that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for him on the second-degree murder charge. We affirm.

Ray Shoptaw, a criminal investigator with the Garland County Sheriff's Office, testified that on September 11, 2001, his office received a report of a dead body in the ditch near the Slaughter Bridge on Spring Street in Hot Springs. He said that he responded to the call and found the body of a white male, Travis "Devon" Trantham. He also testified that a search warrant was subsequently obtained for a residence on Cones Road, where the person reporting the location of the body had told him that the incident occurred. He stated that at that location they found places in the carpet that had been replaced because of blood, and blood spatters on the ceiling, door, and a mini-blind. He said that they also found a torque wrench that they were told was used as the weapon against Mr. Trantham. He stated that appellant was present during the search, that he assisted them, and that he gave a statement.

Chris Chapmond, a detective with the Hot Springs Police Department, testified that he was involved in the murder investigation concerning Travis Trantham, particularly in obtaining the search warrant and interviewing several suspects. He said that he spoke with appellant and that appellant gave him a statement, which was introduced as one of the State's exhibits. In it, appellant stated in pertinent part that he knew a man named Josh West was going to give Devon [the victim] a "good ol ass wumping"; that he helped get Devon to the house on Cones Road; that he entered the house through a rear window, unlocked the door, and went to the bedroom; that he knew Josh was hiding in the house; and that he heard a "hit," looked around the corner, and saw Devon lying on the floor and bleeding from the mouth. He stated further that he was

told Devon was only hit once; that he checked Devon's pulse and he had a light pulse and was breathing at that time; that he, Josh, and a man named David Wright loaded Devon into the back of a truck; that he was scared of Josh and did exactly what he said; that they took Devon to Slaughter Bridge; that Josh and David put Devon in the ditch; and that they all left after that was done. Appellant's statement also asserted that he, Josh, and David returned to the house and that Josh tried to clean up the blood.

Shannon Adcock testified that she overheard conversations among appellant and others in which they talked about planning how to get Travis Trantham to the Cones Road house; that appellant was to be the one who entered through the window and opened the door; and that he appeared willing to assist in the plan. She said that on September 11, David Wright called her to come get him, appellant, and Josh West; that David told her what had happened; and that Josh told her that he had hit Travis. She said that David Wright told her that if she wanted Travis to live she needed to make an anonymous call that he was dropped off near Slaughter Bridge. She said that she contacted the police and went to Slaughter Bridge.

Dr. Paul Kokes, the pathologist for the autopsy that was performed on Travis Trantham, testified that Trantham's body showed blunt-force injuries; that underneath the large area of bruising on the left side of Trantham's face, around the eye and extending back to the left side of the scalp, a deeper injury was found; that there was a complete tear of the temporalis muscle, located just above the ear; and that underneath that, there was a depressed and comminuted fracture of the skull. He explained that depressed meant that the bone of the skull had been pushed inward into the cranial vault, and that comminuted meant that the bone within the area of fracturing had been broken into multiple pieces. He explained that it was this injury that was responsible for Trantham's death.

Appellant contends that even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it did not establish that he had the requisite intent, i.e., to cause serious physical injury, to support his conviction for murder in the second degree. He argues that at worst, his conduct was reckless, and that the case should have been submitted on the offense of manslaughter, rather than second-degree murder. We disagree.

A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Peterson v. State, ____ Ark. App. ____, 100 S.W.3d 66 (2003). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. When the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Id.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-103 (Repl. 1997), defines, in pertinent part, the offense of murder in the second degree:

(a) A person commits murder in the second degree if:

. . .

(2) With the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of any person.

"A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result[.]" Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 1997). Moreover, as our supreme court explained in Smith v. State, 337 Ark. 239, 988 S.W.2d 492 (1999), because of the difficulty in ascertaining a person's intent, a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. A jury may draw upon its own common knowledge and experience to infer intent from the circumstances. Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002). "`Serious physical injury' means physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ[.]" Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(19) (Repl. 1997).

Here, appellant's own statement acknowledges that he assisted in luring the victim to the scene of the crime and in disposing of the body after a co-defendant struck the victim on the head with a torque wrench. It also acknowledges that he expected the victim to get a "good ol ass wumping." It was reasonable for the jury to infer that a natural and probable consequence of an "ass wumping," would be serious physical injury. Clearly, the injuries actually received by the victim amounted to serious physical injury. We find that there was substantial evidence to support the verdict, and that the trial court did not err in its refusal to direct a verdict.

King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732 (1996), cited by appellant in support of his argument, is of no help to him. He asserts that in King, "the Court indicated that bringing a victim to the crime scene without knowledge that a crime will occur is not sufficient to sustain a conviction." (Emphasis added.) Appellant further argues that he "had no knowledge or intent for the victim to receive the extent of injuries he did." First, as noted previously, appellant's own statement acknowledges that he knew the victim would receive an "ass wumping," which would involve a crime of some degree even if Trantham had not died. Moreover, appellant's citation to King, supra, is further misplaced because the discussion in King concerning a lack of knowledge that a crime was to occur was directed at whether a witness should have been declared an accomplice as a matter of law. The appellate court concluded that the trial court had not erred in refusing to do so because the facts did not establish conclusively that the witness was an accomplice. The witness had testified that he did not know why he had been asked to lure the victim to the house. Here, we are not dealing with the accomplice status of a witness who did not know why he was asked to lure a victim to the scene of a crime, but rather whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict against appellant.

Affirmed.

Neal and Roaf, JJ., agree.

1 Appellant's sentence was enhanced to thirty years and a $15,000 fine because he was tried and sentenced as an habitual offender.