Christopher Jackson v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION IV

CHRISTOPHER JACKSON

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR03-35

August 27, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-02-1567]

HONORABLE JOHN W. LANGSTON, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Josephine Linker Hart, Judge

Appellant, Christopher Jackson, was found guilty at a bench trial of the crimes of aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft of property and was sentenced to a total of ten years' imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of aggravated robbery because he was not the principal actor in the commission of the crime. Further, he argues that because he was not charged in the information as an accomplice, the State could not seek a conviction based on an accomplice theory. We affirm.

On March 21, 2002, the victim, Patrick Jennings, was sitting in his girlfriend's Geo Prizm, which was parked in the driveway of her home, when he was approached by two men, one of whom was appellant. One of the men asked if he could borrow Jennings's cellular telephone, and Jennings obliged. The man using the telephone turned away from Jennings but then turned back and pointed a gun at him. Both assailants were standing next to each other on the driver's side of the car. Jennings gave conflicting testimony, testifying that appellant did not have the gun but also testifying that he was not sure who had the gun. He described the gun as large and black with a wood-grain handle. After one of the men said that this was a robbery, Jennings dropped his wallet out the car window and handed over his watch. Appellant then went around the car, opened the passenger door, removed the keys from the ignition, and exited the car. Jennings was told to get out of the car and to hand over the rest of his money; one of the men threatened to kill him. He was then told to remove his clothing and get out of the yard or else he would be shot. Jennings admitted that he did not know who made these remarks to him. Jennings ran, and the men entered the car and drove away.

Later that evening, police officers apprehended appellant in a parking lot, where he was sitting in the driver's seat of the stolen car. Police found underneath the driver's seat of the car a handgun that Jennings testified was the gun used to commit the robbery, though he misidentified the caliber of the weapon.

At trial, appellant testified that he was unaware of his friend's intent to rob Jennings and that his friend was the person who borrowed the telephone, wielded the pistol, and told Jennings to remove his clothes. He denied having spoken to Jennings or removing the keys from the car. According to appellant, the keys were still in the ignition when they entered the car, and he left in the car because he was with his friend. Double-jeopardy considerations require this court to first address the sufficiency of the evidence to support appellant's conviction for aggravated robbery before considering other issues on appeal. Polk v. State, ___ Ark. ___, 105 S.W.3d 797 (2003). "A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately thereafter, he employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102(a) (Repl. 1997). A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-103(a)(1) (Repl. 1997).

"A person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person when ... [h]e is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense[.]" Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-402(2) (Repl. 1997). An accomplice is one who, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, solicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other person to commit it, or aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403(a)(1),(2) (Repl. 1997). When two persons assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable for the conduct of both. Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991). There is no distinction between the criminal responsibility of an accomplice and a principal. Polk, supra. In cases where the theory of accomplice liability is implicated, we affirm a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence if there is substantial evidence that the defendant acted as an accomplice.  Purifoy, supra.

Because there is no distinction between the criminal responsibility of an accomplice and a principal, there was substantial evidence that appellant committed the crime of aggravated robbery. The victim's testimony detailing appellant's conduct of entering the car, removing the key from the ignition, and leaving in the car established appellant's liability as an accomplice. His liability was also established by his possession of both the car and the handgun.

As previously noted, appellant further argues that because he was not charged in the information as an accomplice, the State could not seek a conviction based on an accomplice theory. In pertinent part, the information charged appellant with aggravated robbery and theft of property. An information is not defective if it sufficiently apprises the defendant of the specific crime with which he is charged to the extent necessary to enable him to prepare a defense. Purifoy, supra. Because there is no distinction between principals and accomplices for purposes of establishing criminal liability, the information was sufficient to apprise him of the crimes with which he was charged. See id. (holding that an information charging a defendant as a principal was sufficient to apprise the defendant of the crimes with which he was charged).1 The information named the offenses and the party to be charged and was therefore sufficient, as it contained the elements of the charged offense and apprised appellant of what he had to be prepared to meet. See Polk, supra (holding that an information naming the offense and party to be charged was sufficient even though the information failed to allege that the defendant was an accomplice).

Affirmed.

Pittman and Robbins, JJ., agree.

1 While appellant asks this court to overrule Purifoy, this court lacks authority to overrule Arkansas Supreme Court precedent. Box v. State, 348 Ark. 116, 71 S.W.3d 552 (2002).