Eric Crowder-Jones v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DIVISION II

ERIC CROWDER-JONES

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR03-13

December 10, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR 02-156]

HON. MARION HUMPHREY,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Robert J. Gladwin, Judge

A Pulaski County jury found Eric Crowder-Jones guilty of two counts of residential burglary, attempted first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and terroristic threatening. His convictions stem from two incidents that occurred in November 2001. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-eight years' imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his directed-verdict motions as there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We affirm.

Following her divorce from appellant, Wendy Fair and their two children stayed at her grandparents' house along with several other relatives. Fair testified that appellant had been welcome at her grandparents' house until he turned violent, which resulted in her getting an order of protection. On the night of November 3, 2001, Fair received a "blocked" call on her cell phone. Appellant's number was the only number Fair had blocked. She did not answer her phone, and the lights suddenly went out at her grandparents' house. Fair and other relatives who were present heard someone beating on the front door, and Fair's aunt, Felesia Booker, jumped up to lock the deadbolt. Felesia testified that as soon as she turned away from the door after

locking it, the door came crashing down and hit her. Felesia stated that although she could not see who was at the door, she knew appellant's voice. She said that appellant yelled to Fair that she was "fixing to get it." Felesia testified that appellant came into the house. Fair and the rest of the family hid in a bedroom, and appellant eventually left.

Luther Booker, Fair's grandfather, was not present when appellant knocked down the front door to his residence. Luther testified that when he got to his residence following the incident, he noticed a concrete block, which was beside his front door that was hanging from the hinge. In addition, Luther testified that appellant called him later that day and threatened to kill him and his family while they were sleeping.

Officer Marvin Powell testified that he had come to know the Booker family due to previous incidents involving appellant. He confirmed that the phone lines had been cut and that the breakers had been turned off. Officer Powell stated that the victims told him that appellant had made it as far as right inside the threshold of the door. He testified that it looked as though the door had blocked appellant from getting any further into the house. Later that day, appellant called another one of Fair's aunts, Lesia Marie Booker-Hill, who knew nothing about the incident at the Booker residence. Lesia stated that appellant told her that she needed to contact her father, Luther, because something had just happened and that appellant then said, "Oh, you can't call them because I just cut the phone lines and electricity." He also admitted to Lesia that he had knocked down the front door. Lesia stated that appellant told her he was going to kill Fair, her grandmother, her aunt Felesia, and her two minor siblings. Lesia said that appellant told her he was going to kill Fair's siblings because he wanted the Booker family to know how it felt to not be able to see their children.

On November 23, 2001, the Booker family came home early from Thanksgiving in Missouri because appellant had called, which made them worry about their house. When the family arrived home, they discovered that the phone lines had been cut again. In addition, Luther noticed that his two hunting rifles were missing. While looking around the house, Luther and two of his sons, Martin and Dexter, noticed that a pane had been taken out of a bathroom window. Luther and his sons were standing in the hallway discussing the matter when it was decided that they would search the closets and under the beds. In Fair's bedroom, Martin discovered appellant hiding under Fair's bed. Luther said that his son had a "crazy" look on his face and was backing away while pointing at the bed. Luther testified that he knew something was wrong so he got his handgun. At that moment, appellant emerged from under the bed, and Luther heard shots being fired. He stated that the bullets were coming toward him and that, in fact, a fragment from something flew up and hit his face. Luther returned fire, and appellant fired his weapon again in Luther's direction. As Luther and the rest of the family ran from the house, Luther handed Dexter a shotgun. They then stood guard around the house so that appellant could not escape before the police arrived. Appellant came out of the house with a shotgun, and Dexter shot and wounded him. A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Jenkins v. State, 348 Ark. 686, 75 S.W.3d 180 (2002). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. Medlock v. State, 79 Ark. App. 447, 89 S.W.3d 357 (2002). The evidence to support a conviction, whether direct or circumstantial, must be of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable and material certainty and precision, compel a conclusion one way or the other and pass beyond mere speculation and conjecture. See id.

Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of residential burglary in the on November 3 incident because there was no evidence that he actually entered the Booker residence or remained there unlawfully. He contends, that even if he knocked the door down, Officer Powell stated that he never passed the threshold because the door blocked his way.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-39-201(a)(1) (Repl. 1997) provides that a person commits residential burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a residential occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing therein any offense punishable by imprisonment. Officer Powell testified that, although the fallen door was a hindrance in entering the house, appellant could have made it to the threshold of the door. Officer Powell also stated that the victims told him that appellant was just inside the door. Moreover, Felesia testified that appellant came into the house. It is the sole province of the jury to determine not merely the credibility of the witnesses, but the weight and value of their testimony. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001). The jury was entitled to believe the testimony of these witnesses.

Alternatively, appellant argues that the State failed to prove the element of intent in that a specific criminal intent cannot be presumed from a mere showing of an illegal entry. "A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 1997). A purposeful intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime. Thompson v. State, 338 Ark. 564, 999 S.W.2d 192 (1999). Here, appellant knocked the front door down with a concrete block and shouted to Fair that she was "fixing to get it." Members of the jury are allowed to draw upon their common knowledge and experience to infer a defendant's intent from the circumstances. See Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002). Here, the jury could have inferred from appellant's words and his violent manner of entry that he intended to cause bodily harm to Fair. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports appellant's conviction for residential burglary.

Regarding his attempted first-degree murder conviction, appellant argues that the State failed to prove he had a purposeful intent. He contends that he did not make a conscious decision to cause the death of anyone but, rather, was at the Booker residence to see his children. He points out that no one but him was injured and that he merely fired warning shots.

A person commits murder in the first degree if he commits or attempts to commit a felony, and in the course of and in the furtherance of the felony, he causes the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). A person attempts to commit an offense if he purposely engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of an offense. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-3-201(a)(2) (Repl. 1997). In order to be considered a substantial step, the conduct must be strongly corroborative of the person's criminal purpose. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-3-201(c) (Repl. 1997). Here, appellant hid under a bed armed with a weapon and, once discovered, emerged from under that bed firing his weapon in Luther's direction. The jury could infer from these circumstances that appellant purposely intended to engage in conduct that he hoped would result in Luther's death. A presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions because of the difficulty in ascertaining a person's intent. Alexander v. State, 78 Ark. App. 56, 77 S.W.3d 544 (2002). Moreover, appellant had communicated his threat to kill Luther and his family to several members of the Booker family, including Luther. In addition, the jury could infer appellant's guilt from his improbable explanation that he was simply there to see his children. See Howard v. State, 348 Ark. 471, 79 S.W.3d 273 (2002).

Next, appellant argues that the State did not prove that he purposely engaged in the conduct that resulted in the aggravated-assault convictions. He maintains that he was not creating a substantial danger of death or serious injury to another person by simply hiding under the bed waiting for his children to come home.

Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-204(a) (Repl. 1997), a person commits aggravated assault if, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he purposely engages in conduct that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person. Contrary to appellant's assertion, he did not simply hide under a bed but, rather, he fired his weapon in the direction of Dexter and Martin Booker. The fact that appellant pointed his gun toward the two men is enough to sustain his convictions for aggravated assault. See Harris v. State, 72 Ark. App. 227, 35 S.W.3d 819 (2000). Finally, appellant contends that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for terroristic threatening because the State failed to show that Fair actually feared him. A person commits the offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree if, with the purpose of terrorizing another person, he threatens to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial property damage to another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 1997). It was not necessary that Fair actually be frightened by appellant's threat; instead, the proscribed conduct was appellant's intent to cause her fright. See Smith v. State, 296 Ark. 451, 757 S.W.2d 554 (1988). The jury could infer from the circumstances already put forth that appellant's intent was to terrorize Fair. In any event, Fair was sufficiently afraid of appellant that she moved from the Booker home into a women's shelter following the November 3 incident.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Baker, J., agree.