Randy Edward Williams v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JUDGE JOSEPHINE LINKER HART

DIVISION II

RANDY EDWARD WILLIAMS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR02-00982

April 23, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR01-3628]

HONORABLE JOHN LANGSTON,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Randy Edward Williams, appeals from his conviction for second-degree murder. For reversal, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. However, because the issue was not preserved for appellate review, we do not address his argument, and accordingly, we affirm.

On September 15, 2001, appellant and several other people, both residents and guests, gathered at the home of David Purifoy. Appellant, who had planned to leave Little Rock and return to Louisiana, stopped at the Purifoy home hoping to obtain additional cash for his bus trip by selling his .40 caliber pistol to someone at the gathering. Appellant spent his time in the back bedroom talking with Perry Brown and David Johnson. Around 7:00 p.m., Purifoy heard gunshots coming from the bedroom and was told by Brown that appellant had shot Johnson.

When the police arrived, Johnson was dead from multiple gunshots wounds to the left

side of his body, and he was slumped on a couch with a .40 caliber pistol and spent shells strewn on the floor. Appellant had left the residence, but he was arrested the following day and charged with murder in the first degree.

A jury trial was held on May 14 and 15, 2002. At the close of the State's case, appellant's counsel made a motion for directed verdict as follows:

Motion for directed verdict on the charge of first-degree murder. I believe the State has failed to prove any premeditation, deliberation. Of course motive is not an element, but there's really no explanation for the shooting in the State's case, other than the fact that the young man was shot.

The trial court denied appellant's motion as well as his renewal of the motion at the close of all the evidence. The court then instructed the jury on the elements of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter. After deliberation, the jury found appellant guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment in the Department of Correction. From that conviction and sentence comes this appeal.

On appeal, appellant admits, as he testified at trial, that he shot Johnson seven times with a .40 caliber automatic handgun and that Johnson died as a result. However, appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for second-degree murder, contending that he was justified in shooting Johnson, and he suggests that the jury so found because he was acquitted of first-degree murder. Alternatively, he argues that he was guilty only of manslaughter.

Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for second-degree murder was not preserved for appellate review. In Ramaker v. State, 345 Ark.225, 46 S.W.3d (2001), our supreme court held that in order to preserve challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for a lesser-included offense, a defendant is required to address the lesser-included offense, either by name or by apprising the trial court of the elements of the lesser-included offense in the motion for directed verdict.

Here, the jury was instructed on the charge of first-degree murder in that with the purpose of causing the death of Johnson, appellant caused Johnson's death. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(2)(Supp. 1997). Further, the jury was instructed on the crime of second-degree murder, in that he knowingly caused Johnson's death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-103(a)(1)(Supp. 1997). In moving for a directed verdict, appellant only challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for first-degree murder. He did not, however, move for a directed verdict on the charge of second-degree murder, which is a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder here. See McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002) (holding that second-degree murder under section 5-10-103(a)(1) is a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder under section 5-10-102(a)(2), as it differs from the greater offense only to the extent that it requires a lesser kind of culpable mental state). While he also mentioned premeditation, deliberation, and motive, these are not elements of second-degree murder. Commensurate with the holding in Ramaker, because appellant did not move for a directed verdict on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, the issue is not preserved for appellate review. Therefore, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Griffen and Baker, JJ., agree.