Rodney Brown v. State of Arkansas

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE KAREN R. BAKER

DIVISION I

RODNEY BROWN

APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR02-773

MARCH 12, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR2001-3394]

HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER CHARLES PIAZZA, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

A jury convicted appellant, Rodney DeShawn Brown, of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Charged as an habitual offender having been previously convicted of four or more felonies, he received a sentence of fifteen years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues two points: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of marijuana with intent to deliver; (2) the trial court erred in admitting Officer's Blount's testimony that the appellant stated "he was going to beat this in court." We affirm.

The events leading up to Mr. Brown's arrest arose from his involvement in a traffic incident. Officer Harrelson and Officer Blount responded to the traffic accident. At the scene of the accident, Mr. Brown admitted to Officer Harrelson that he had run the red light. Officer Harrelson testified to those facts at trial. Also at trial, Kim Carter testified that she witnessed events following this automobile accident. After the accident, she saw Mr. Brown, who was wearing a black shirt, get out

of his car from the driver's side, go to the trunk of the car and pull out a trash bag, and toss the bagto the passenger of the car who was wearing a yellow shirt. The passenger took the bag, placed it behind a tree in a nearby parking lot, watched the bag for a period of time, then left when the police arrived. Ms. Carter called the police, who then notified the officers who responded to the traffic accident to contact Ms. Carter to determine what she had observed. Officer Blount subsequently recovered the bag that contained approximately ten pounds of marijuana. Officer Blount placed Mr. Brown in custody, charging him at that time with only a traffic offense, not with possession of marijuana. While en route to the police station for questioning, Mr. Brown stated that he "would beat this in court."

Mr. Brown failed to preserve his first argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. To preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial, a defendant must make a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case and renew at the close of all the evidence. Smith v. State, 347 Ark. 277, 280, 61 S.W.3d 168,171 (2001). Failure to comply with this rule waives any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c) (2002). At the close of the evidence, counsel for Mr. Brown stated that he was "going to risk error as counsel and not make these motions. I don't think I'm required." In response to the judge's comment that were a directed verdict motion made, he would find there was substantial evidence to submit the case to the jury, Mr. Brown's attorney said "I would too." Accordingly, Mr. Brown's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not preserved for our review, and we do not address it.

Mr. Brown's second argument is also without merit. Defense counsel objected to Officer Blount's testimony that while transporting Mr. Brown to police headquarters, Mr. Brown stated, "I'm going to beat this in court." Pointing out that at the time Mr. Brown was being transported, he had been charged only with a traffic offense, he objected to introduction of the statement on thebasis it was "vague and ambiguous and misleading to the jury and could be prejudicial." The objection was overruled. Mr. Brown insists that the ambiguity of the remark, as to what charge or possible charge he was referring, renders the statement inadmissible. His argument is unavailing.

Statements and admissions by an accused from which an inference of guilt may be drawn are admissible. Brown v. State, 239 Ark. 909, 395 S.W.2d 344 (1965). Although Mr. Brown argues that the jury would be unfairly confused by his statement that he "would beat this in court," the jury was entitled to hear his assertion and make a common-sense evaluation that he was referring to the illegal possession of marijuana rather than the traffic offense, particularly in light of the fact that he had already confessed to the police that he had run the red light. A jury is not required to set aside its common knowledge, but has the right to consider all the evidence in the light of its own observations and experiences in the affairs of life. See Wallace v. State, 55 Ark. App. 114, 117, 932 S.W.2d 345, 347 (1996) (allowing evidence of accused's attempt to induce the victim to drop the charges as evidence of his knowledge of his own guilt).

Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.

Crabtree and Roaf, JJ., agree.