Tommy G. Corbit v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

LARRY D. VAUGHT, JUDGE

DIVISION III

TOMMY G. CORBIT

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR02-750

February 26, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE WHITE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

CR-2001-607

HON. ROBERT EDWARDS, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant Tommy Corbit was convicted by a jury of first-degree terroristic threatening, and he was sentenced to pay a $1000 fine and court costs. He argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict. We disagree and affirm.

On October 28, 2001, State Trooper Royce Denney stopped the truck of Patricia Berry for speeding on Highway 167 in White County in front of appellant's home. Because there were too many people in the cab of the truck, Trooper Denney asked two male juveniles to get in the back of the truck. After obtaining Ms. Berry's license, he returned to his patrol car to conduct a computer check of her license. He noticed appellant, who was standing in his front yard, hollering and waving his fingers. Trooper Denney responded to appellant by telling him that he would deal with him when he was finished with the traffic stop. While the check was running, Trooper Denney saw the faces

of the male juveniles in the back of the truck turn "dead white" and their chins drop, indicating something was wrong. The juveniles and Ms. Berry told the trooper what they had heard.

At trial, one of the juveniles testified that appellant started talking to them while they were in the back of the truck and told them that the officer knew better than to come in his yard because "he'd kill him with his bare hands." The other juvenile testified that appellant shook his hands, expressed that he was tired of the officer pulling people over in his front yard, and said "I'll kill him with my bare hands." Ms. Berry testified that the trooper was in his car when appellant was yelling that he was tired of the officers pulling people over in front of his house. She recalled appellant shaking his hands and saying "come on up here and I'll kill you with my bare hands."

Upon hearing what the juveniles and Ms. Berry said, Trooper Denney asked Ms. Berry to move her car up for her safety. He gave her a warning and asked her to go to the Bald Knob Police Department to give a written statement regarding the incident with appellant.

Appellant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case, arguing that there was no threat conveyed to any intended victim; that there was no testimony that anybody who heard the statement was terrorized; and that the threat was conditional. The trial court denied the motion, and appellant and his wife and daughter denied that he ever threatened to kill the trooper. Rather, they explained that they were upset by the police repeatedly stopping people in front of their house, and that on that day they were trying to get to the hospital because appellant's wife was having chest pains. They testified that they were scared to leave for the hospital because the officer said he would deal with appellant later. Appellant renewed his motion for directed verdict at the close of the case, which was again denied. A jury convicted him of terroristic threatening in the first degree, and he was sentenced to pay a $1000 fine and court costs.

Appellant's sole point of appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion fordirected verdict. When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Beavers v. State, 345 Ark. 291, 46 S.W.3d 532 (2001). Evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, is sufficient to support a conviction if it is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one way or the other. Id. On appeal, this court does not weigh the evidence presented at trial, as that is a matter for the fact-finder; nor do we assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

A person commits terroristic threatening in the first degree if, with the purpose of terrorizing another person, he threatens to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial property damage to another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 1997). "Purposely" is defined as follows: "A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 1997). In Knight v. State, 25 Ark. App. 353, 758 S.W.2d 12 (1988), we stated that to be found guilty of terroristic threatening, the defendant must intend to fill the victim with intense fright. The defendant must act with the purpose of terrorizing another person, i.e., it must be his conscious object to cause fright. Id.

Appellant first argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the alleged threat was conditional, i.e., if the trooper comes up here, I will kill him with my bare hands. Appellant fails to note that one of the juveniles testified simply that appellant said, "I'll kill him with my bare hands." Even if the threat were conditional, appellant recognizes that the court has rejected the argument that the statute only criminalizes present, and not future death threats. See Walker v. State, 13 Ark App. 124, 680 S.W.2d 915 (1984) (citing Richards v. State, 266 Ark. 733, 585 S.W.2d 375 (Ark. App. 1979)). He contends he only makes the point to show that there was never any type of threat which would terrorize an armed state trooper. This argument is withoutmerit because it is not necessary that the recipient of the threat actually be terrorized. Lewis v. State, 73 Ark. App. 417, 44 S.W.3d 759 (2001).

Next, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient because the threat was never communicated to the trooper. This argument also lacks merit. There was evidence that the juveniles and Ms. Berry heard appellant threaten to kill the trooper and that the threat was communicated by them to the trooper immediately after the threats were made. The statute does not require that the threat be communicated by the accused directly to the person threatened. Knight v. State, 25 Ark. App. 353, 758 S.W.2d 12 (1988).

Appellant further argues that the record shows no evidence of his intent to terrorize. A person's state of mind at the time of a crime is seldom apparent. Wesson v. State, 320 Ark. 380, 896 S.W.2d 874 (1995). Since intent cannot be proven by direct evidence, the fact-finder is allowed to draw upon his or her own common knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Here, the testimony revealed that during the traffic stop appellant was yelling that he was tired of the officers pulling people over in front of his house and that he was shaking his hands and saying that he would kill the trooper with his bare hands. The threats were immediately communicated to the trooper. There was substantial evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the threats were made with the purpose of terrorizing the trooper.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Neal, J., agree.