Betty Faye Bowman v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION I

BETTY FAYE BOWMAN

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 02-571

MARCH 19, 2003

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR 2001-1430]

HONORABLE JOHN W. LANGSTON, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied the request of the appellant, Betty Faye Bowman, to transfer the felony charge pending against her in circuit court to the juvenile division. Appellant brings this interlocutory appeal arguing that the trial court erred in declining to transfer her case. We affirm.

On April 26, 2001, the State filed an information in the Pulaski County Circuit Court charging appellant with first-degree murder, alleging that on November 16, 2000, she purposely caused the death of Samuel Hendricks. Because she was sixteen years old at the time of the alleged crime, appellant filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(c)(1) (Repl. 2002). After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion.

When considering a motion to transfer a case to the juvenile division, a trial courtmust consider all of the following factors: (1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society requires prosecution as an extended juvenile jurisdiction offender or in the criminal division of circuit court;

(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;

(3) Whether the offense was against a person or property, with greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;

(4) The culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning and participation in the alleged offense;

(5) The previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been adjudicated a juvenile offender and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence;

(6) The sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of the juvenile's home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living, or desire to be treated as an adult;

(7) Whether there are facilities or programs available to the judge of the juvenile division of circuit court which are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile prior to the expiration of the juvenile division of circuit court's jurisdiction;

(8) Whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the commission of the alleged offense;

(9) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile's mental, physical, educational, and social history; and

(10) Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g) (Repl. 2002).

The circuit court's order shall include written findings, see Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g), but the court is not required to make findings on all ten of the statutory factors. SeeBeulah v. State, 344 Ark. 528, 42 S.W.3d 466 (2001). The serious and violent nature of the offense may be entitled to great weight in the court's analysis. See Ray v. State, 65 Ark. App. 209, 987 S.W.2d 738 (1999).

Upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a juvenile should be tried as an adult, the court shall enter an order to that effect. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(h) (Repl. 2002). Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. McClure v. State, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997). The circuit court's decision on whether to transfer the case to juvenile court will not be reversed unless the decision is clearly erroneous. Beulah, supra. The State charged appellant with purposeful first-degree murder. Officer Calvin Martin testified at the hearing that he found Hendricks's body lying in a pool of blood in the kitchen of his house. He also stated that there were blood stains on the bed and floor of the bedroom and on the sink and floor of the bathroom. He found three bloody knives inside the house, one by the front door, one next to Hendricks's body, and one underneath his body. The autopsy report from the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory showed that Hendricks died as a result of multiple sharp-force injuries, including wounds to his right chest, the upper left side of his neck, his forehead, a small wound on the palm of his left hand, and a small cut on his left thumb. There was no dispute that appellant acted alone in the incident. The evidence supports the circuit court's findings regarding the seriousness and violence of the charged offense, that appellant acted willfully and alone, and that she used a deadly weapon.

Appellant's date of birth is September 24, 1984, making her sixteen years old at the time the crime was committed. The Division of Youth Services provides services to a juvenile until she reaches age twenty-one. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-28-208(d) (Repl. 2002). Based upon appellant's current age, she would be eligible for juvenile treatment services for less than three years.

Appellant argues that her motion should have been granted because she may suffer from mild mental retardation. The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in Carroll v. State, 326 Ark. 882, 934 S.W.2d 523 (1996). In that case, the court held that a circuit court did not err by denying a transfer motion where the juvenile's IQ was 74, and the crime was manifestly violent. In the case at bar, appellant's intelligence was measured in 1996 and 2001, and her scores were 79 and 70, respectively. Also, her alleged crime - purposefully stabbing Hendricks multiple times - was manifestly violent.

The circuit court ruled that appellant's motion should be denied because the charged offense, first-degree murder, was very serious; the offense was violent and willful and resulted in Hendricks's death; no extended program of rehabilitation would be available; and because she acted alone and with a deadly weapon. We hold that the trial court did not err by retaining jurisdiction of this case and refusing to transfer it to the juvenile division.

Affirmed.

Hart and Bird, JJ., agree.