Rodney D. Green v. Director et al.

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

CHIEF JUDGE JOHN F. STROUD, JR.

DIVISION I

RODNEY D. GREEN

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, ET AL.

APPELLEE

E01-239

September 4, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE BOARD

OF REVIEW

[2001-BR-1224]

AFFIRMED

Rodney Green appeals the Board of Review's decision to deny his application for unemployment benefits on the basis that he voluntarily left his last work without good cause connected to the work. On appeal, he argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the Board's denial of benefits, and he also contends that the Board erred in denying him the opportunity to present additional evidence pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-525(c) (Repl. 2002). We affirm.

The well-settled standard of review in unemployment cases was set forth in Baldor Elec. v. Director, 71 Ark. App. 166, 169-70, 27 S.W.3d 771, 773 (2000) (citations omitted):

On appeal, the findings of fact of the Board of Review are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board's findings. Even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to adetermination of whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence before it.

Green began working for APS, a temporary help service, in January 2000. Through APS, he was placed at Flowers Baking Company ("FBC"). He suffered a work-related injury in April 2000, which he reported to APS, but he was released to return to work by his physician in a letter dated August 29, 2000. Appellant pursued a request for a change of physician from the Workers' Compensation Commission, which was ultimately denied, and the APS representative testified that there was no contact with appellant after the February 2001 workers' compensation hearing. After seeing another physician at his own expense, appellant was again released to work with restrictions on June 11, 2001. Green testified that he returned to FBC at that time but was told that the company did not have any work for him. Without contacting APS, appellant filed for unemployment benefits.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513(a)(2)(A) (Repl. 2002) provides:

An individual working as a temporary employee will be deemed to have voluntarily quit employment and will be disqualified for benefits under this subsection if, upon conclusion of his or her latest assignment, the temporary employee without good cause failed to contact the temporary help firm for reassignment, provided that the employer advised the temporary employee at the time of hire that he or she must report for reassignment upon conclusion of each assignment and that unemployment benefits may be denied for failure to do so.

In the present case, appellant testified that he had contacted FBC to return to work and that he did not know he had to contact APS. However, a document signed by appellant on January 27, 2000, stated that appellant knew that he was an employee of APS, that it was his responsibility to notify APS when his assignment was complete, and that failure to call inas available would be considered resignation and might result in a denial of unemployment benefits. Furthermore, appellant contacted APS, not FBC, at the time of his work-related injury, but he never contacted APS when he was released by his doctor to return to work. There is substantial evidence to support the finding that he voluntarily left his last work without good cause connected to the work.

Appellant also contends that the Board erred in denying his request that additional evidence be taken. Specifically, he wanted to introduce pay records into evidence to show that he received his paychecks from FBC instead of APS and that it was therefore reasonable for him to believe that FBC was his employer rather than APS. The decision to take additional evidence is within the discretion of the Board of Review. Fry v. Director, 16 Ark. App. 204, 698 S.W.2d 816 (1985). In the present case, appellant had the opportunity to present the pay records as evidence in the hearing before the Appeal Tribunal. Even if he believed that FBC was his employer, he became aware that APS was his employer when he received the notice so stating dated July 16, 2001, of the August 2, 2001, telephone hearing before the Appeal Tribunal. Appellant had the opportunity to provide the evidence he now wants to present to the Board of Review at the hearing before the Appeal Tribunal. The Board of Review did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request that additional evidence be taken.

Affirmed.

Hart and Robbins, JJ., agree.