YWCA v. Director et al.

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION II

YWCA

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT AND JANICE MUNZNER

APPELLEES

E 01-99

JANUARY 23, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW

[NO. 200-AT-00403]

AFFIRMED

The appellee, Janice Munzner, filed a claim for unemployment benefits on December 13, 1999, showing her last employer as the appellate, YWCA. The Employment Security Department disqualified appellee from receiving benefits pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513(a)(1) (Repl. 1996), finding that she had voluntarily quit her job without good cause connected with the work. Appellant appealed this decision to the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal, which reversed the Department and held that appellee quit her job with good cause connected with the work. Ultimately, the Board of Review agreed with the Appeal Tribunal that appellee had good cause to quit her employment. We affirm.

Appellee worked for appellant for several years as an operations manager or assistant administrator. She worked under the direct supervision of Ruth Byrn, the administrator of

the YWCA Encore Program. Byrn had mentored appellee and had promoted her to the position that she had at the time appellee left her job. Earlier that year, Patricia Hogan, a subordinate to Byrn, quit her position. Appellee was present during the meeting between Hogan and Byrn when Hogan quit. Hogan disliked Byrn and was extremely critical of her and her management style during the meeting. Appellee did not say much during that meeting, and Byrn later concluded that appellee condoned Hogan's criticism.

Appellee testified that her relationship with Byrn began to deteriorate after Hogan quit. Byrn began to find fault with appellee's work and made degrading comments about appellee's ineptness and inability to function as a supervisor. Appellee also stated that Byrn threatened to cut appellee's pay, referred to her as the degradation of the program, told her that she would never be her friend, told her she was a failure as a manager, and told her that she had "blown" any chance of ever making it in the organization.

Byrn generally worked out of her home and communicated with appellee by e-mail concerning work. The e-mail communication from Byrn to appellee reduced significantly after Hogan quit. Byrn began to avoid communicating directly with appellee by contacting other workers in the office and obtaining information from them. This situation continued until appellee concluded that she could no longer work with Byrn. Appellee met with Nancy Newcomb, Byrn's supervisor, and explained the problem. Newcomb offered several alternatives to appellee. For instance, she offered appellee time off work to allow things to "cool off." She offered to move appellee to another office for a while so that she would not have as much direct contact with Byrn. However, each of the posed alternatives requiredappellee to remain under Byrn's supervision. Appellee would have been required to communicate with Byrn in order to perform her job duties. Therefore, appellee refused the alternatives offered by Newcomb and quit.

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits if she voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work, the left her last work. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513(a)(1). The term "good cause" means a justifiable reason for not accepting the particular job offered. Rowlett v. Director, 45 Ark. App. 99, 872 S.W.2d 83 (1994). To constitute good cause, the reason for refusal must not be arbitrary or capricious, and the reason must be connected with the work itself. Id. The question of what is good cause must be determined in the light of the facts in each case. Wacaster v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 190, 603 S.W.2d 907 (Ark. App. 1980). Although benefits will be denied an employee who leaves employment for general economic reasons not connected with some specific unfairness perpetrated by her employer, where the employer does an act that causes economic injury to the employee, that act may be good cause connected with the work within the meaning of the statute. Barber v. Director, 67 Ark. App. 20, 992 S.W.2d 159 (1999).

We have held that good cause sufficient to have a successful unemployment-benefits claim is cause that would reasonably impel an average able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his employment. Garrett v. Director, 58 Ark. App. 7, 944 S.W.2d 865 (1997). Good cause depends not only on the good faith of the employee involved, which includes the presence of a genuine desire to work and to be self-supporting, but also depends on the reaction of an average employee. Id. Good cause for quitting work involves good faith, thedesire to work, and whether the employee took appropriate steps to remedy the situation causing the problem with the work; this issue presents a question of fact. Morton v. Director, 22 Ark. App. 281, 742 S.W.2d 118 (1987). It is settled that the factual determinations of the Board of Review must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence and this means legal evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Victor Indus. Corp. v. Daniels, 1 Ark. App. 6, 611 S.W.2d 794 (1981).

We hold that substantial evidence supports the Board of Review's decision that appellee quit her job for a reason that would impel an average able-bodied qualified worker to give up her last work. Appellee quit due to the severely strained relationship she had with Byrn. Byrn was appellee's immediate superior, and it was essential that the two communicate well with one another. Byrn had largely ceased communicating with appellee, and appellee could not reasonably function in her job without communication from Byrn. In addition, Byrn made it clear that she considered appellee useless, incompetent, and ineffective in her position.

Appellee properly notified Newcomb, the highest management official with YWCA, of the problematic situation. In response, Newcomb made remedial offers to appellee that would not have improved communications between appellee and Byrn. Appellee quit because she could not perform her job under the supervision of Byrn, and Newcomb offered appellee no reasonable alternative. Therefore, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision that appellee voluntarily left her last work with good cause connected with the work.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Jennings, J., agree.