James Tillman, Jr. v. Director, Employment Security Department and Central Arkansas Library System

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE

DIVISION IV

JAMES TILLMAN, JR.

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, EMPLOYMENT

SECURITY DEPARTMENT and

CENTRAL ARKANSAS LIBRARY

SYSTEM

APPELLEES

E 01-81

JANUARY 30, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE BOARD

OF REVIEW, [NO. 01-BR-00207]

AFFIRMED

Appellant James Tillman appeals the denial of unemployment benefits to him as found by the Board of Review, arguing that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant was denied benefits, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513(a)(1) (1996), because the Board determined that he had voluntarily left his last work without good cause connected with the work. We affirm.

On appeal, the findings of fact of the Board of Review are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Hunt v. Director, 57 Ark. App. 152, 942 S.W.2d 873 (1997). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Our review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence before it. Id. We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable

to the Board's findings. See Feagin v. Everett, 9 Ark. App. 59, 652 S.W.2d 839 (1983). Even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence before it. See Perdrix-Wang v. Director, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993).

The claimant bears the burden to prove good cause by a preponderance of the evidence. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, supra. Good cause sufficient to support a successful unemployment benefits claim is cause that would reasonably impel an average able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his employment. Garrett v. Director, 58 Ark. App. 7, 944 S.W.2d 865 (1997). Good cause depends not only on the good faith of the employee involved, which includes the presence of a genuine desire to work and to be self-supporting, but also depends on the reaction of an average employee. Id. Good cause for quitting work involves good faith, the desire to work, and whether the employee took appropriate steps to remedy the situation causing the problem with the work; this issue presents a question of fact. Morton v. Director, 22 Ark. App. 281, 742 S.W.2d 118 (1987). The taking of appropriate steps to prevent perceived mistreatment from continuing is an element to be considered in determining whether an employee had good cause to quit work. Brown v. Director, 54 Ark. App. 205, 924 S.W.2d 492 (1996).

On these facts, we agree with the Board and hold that there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Board, the facts were that appellant worked for the library as a bookmobile librarian, which requiredthat he possess a commercial driver's license. He commenced his employment with the library in September 1988 and had been a trusted and valued employee for many years. It is relevant to this appeal that two maintenance workers would occasionally have to drive the bookmobile, and they also had commercial driver's licenses.

On August 30, 2000, appellant's supervisor asked appellant to review and sign a handbook regarding Department of Transportation regulations on drug and alcohol rules and testing, which applied to any holders of commercial driver's licenses. Appellant was the only person at the library required to read and sign the handbook, which appellant perceived as unfair. The next day, on August 31, 2000, appellant tendered a letter of resignation, effective September 15, 2000, thereby providing a two-week notice. A few days later, the supervisor approached appellant to discuss the situation. Appellant told his supervisor that he would not sign the handbook because the other workers with commercial licenses should have to do likewise. After seeking upper management's position on the matter, appellant's supervisor responded to appellant that management agreed with his opinion about the other drivers and that they would also be required to sign the handbook and follow the same procedures. Appellant was asked to withdraw his resignation, but he refused because he had made up his mind on the matter. When appellant testified, he stated that he felt that he was treated unfairly in other situations at work and that his decision to quit was based upon the entirety of these events. Appellant applied for unemployment benefits, but he did not prevail before the Employment Security Department, the Appeals Tribunal, or the Board of Review.

The Board concluded that appellant quit because he felt he was mistreated, but itfound that the evidence did not establish such a situation. The Board found that appellant voluntarily left his last work without good caused connected with the work. There is substantial evidence to support that conclusion. The employer posited a reasonable request, appellant reacted strongly to it, the employer offered to remedy the situation to alleviate appellant's concerns of being singled out, but appellant maintained his desire to voluntarily quit his job. This situation was not one that would impel the average worker to give up employment, and the Board's finding so is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Affirmed.

Neal and Baker, JJ., agree.