Terry Alan Ross v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

LARRY D. VAUGHT, JUDGE

DIVISION IV

TERRY ALAN ROSS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR02-95

August 28, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE POLK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

CR-01-27

HON. GAYLE K. FORD, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

A Polk County jury convicted appellant Terry Alan Ross of one count of first-degree terroristic threatening and one count of second-degree terroristic threatening. He was sentenced to seventy-two months in the Department of Correction and twelve months in the county jail, respectively, with the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant's only point on appeal is that the trial court erred in not granting a directed verdict on both counts. We affirm.

A directed-verdict motion is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Ward v. State, 64 Ark. App. 120, 981 S.W.2d 96 (1998). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we consider only the evidence that supports the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Harris v. State, 72 Ark. App. 227, 35 S.W.3d 819 (2000). The test is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, which is evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or another. Id. Resolution of conflicts in testimony and assessment of witness credibility is for the fact-finder. Id.

On February 20, 2001, the State charged appellant with two counts of first-degree terroristicthreatening arising out of an incident that took place on or about October 21, 2000. The first count alleged that appellant, with the purpose of terrorizing David P. Rowe or Pastor Ross Williams, threatened to cause death or serious physical injury to Pastor Ross Williams. The second count alleged that appellant, with the purpose of terrorizing David P. Rowe or Pastor Ross Williams, threatened to cause substantial property damage to Vandervort First Baptist Church.

At the jury trial held on June 28, 2001, David Rowe, associate pastor of the Vandervort First Baptist Church, testified that appellant's grandmother requested that he visit appellant, who was staying at her house. During the visit, Rowe invited appellant to attend church, and appellant responded that the best thing to happen to the church would be that it burn and all its members be killed. According to Rowe, appellant expressed that it would happen soon and knew for a fact it would happen because when he gives his word he always keeps it. Appellant also told Rowe that Pastor Ross Williams would get what he deserved, elaborating that he would stick his fist through Pastor Williams's face and a "shoe up his ass." Before Rowe left, appellant reiterated his threats regarding the church, its members, and Pastor Williams. Rowe testified that he felt afraid and very threatened by appellant's statements. He explained that at first appellant was calm, but when he began making the threats he became "very agitated," started to pace, and was "very intense" and "vehement" about what he was saying. Rowe believed appellant's threats due to his intensity. After his discussion with appellant, Rowe returned to the church and informed Pastor Williams of appellant's threats. Rowe further testified that although he was not personally threatened by appellant, he was personally terrorized by appellant's statements.

Appellant's guardian, Larry Gibson, testified that appellant will threaten people, but would not carry out his threats. Gibson stated that appellant would only make the threats to scare people. Appellant testified in his defense, stating that he did tell Rowe that the church should be "boardedup, closed down or just destroyed," but he denied threatening Pastor Williams or making any statement about killing anyone.

A person commits terroristic threatening in the first degree if, with the purpose of terrorizing another person, he threatens to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial property damage to another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 1997). A person commits terroristic threatening in the second degree if, with the purpose of terrorizing another person, he threatens to cause physical injury or property damage to another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-301(b)(1)(Repl. 1997). "Purposely" is defined as follows: "A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 1997). In Knight v. State, 25 Ark. App. 353, 758 S.W.2d 12 (1988), we stated that to be found guilty of terroristic threatening, the defendant must intend to fill the victim with intense fright. The defendant must act with the purpose of terrorizing another person, i.e., it must be his conscious object to cause fright. Id.

Appellant's sole argument is that the State failed to establish that the statements were made with the purpose of terrorizing David Rowe or Pastor Williams. In support of his argument, he asserts that the disputed statements "could not have been made to terrorize David Rowe or Pastor Williams" and that the "purpose may have been just to show that he disagreed with the church and wanted to be left alone by the associate minister." A person's state of mind at the time of a crime is seldom apparent. Wesson v. State, 320 Ark. 380, 896 S.W.2d 874 (1995). Since intent cannot be proven by direct evidence, the fact-finder is allowed to draw upon his or her own common knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty in ascertaining a person's intent, a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Id.

Although appellant denied making the threats testified to by Rowe, the resolution of conflicts in the testimony and assessment of witness credibility is for the fact-finder. Harris, supra. As stated previously, Rowe testified that he felt afraid, threatened, and personally terrorized by the threats of injury appellant made against Pastor Williams and threats to cause damage to the church. Rowe stated that he believed appellant's threats because of the way he became agitated, started pacing, and made the threats with intensity. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that appellant made the threats against Pastor Williams and the church and that the statements were made with the purpose of terrorizing Rowe.

In addition to arguing that the threats were not made with the purpose of terrorizing Rowe, appellant also contends that because Rowe did not immediately leave or call the authorities after the threats were made, he was not filled with fright. This argument is without merit because it is not necessary that the recipient of the threat actually be terrorized. Lewis v. State, 73 Ark. App. 417, 44 S.W.3d 759 (2001). Appellant also notes that he was on house arrest and could not carry out the threats. This argument is likewise unavailing because the statute does not require that it be shown that the accused have the immediate ability to carry out the threat. Wesson, supra.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the convictions.

Affirmed.

Hart and Roaf, JJ., agree