Ronnie E. Moore v. Conagra Poultry Company

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION I

RONNIE E. MOORE

APPELLANT

V.

CONAGRA POULTRY COMPANY

APPELLEE

CA 02-380

NOVEMBER 13, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. FOO4737]

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Ronnie E. Moore, appeals the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission denying him benefits for a lower-back injury because he failed to satisfy his burden of proving that there was a causal relationship between his accident at work and his injury. The Commission affirmed and adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Appellant asserts on appeal that the Commission clearly erred in its interpretation and application of the law, which resulted in a decision not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Appellant was employed by Conagra on June 2, 1999, in the electrical maintenance department. He had worked for Conagra approximately twelve to fourteen months at the time of his injury. On June 2, appellant climbed a ladder to the roof of the Conagra facility to inspect an electrical problem that was affecting an elevator. Upon descending the ladder,

he fell backward and landed on a piece of four-inch-by-four-inch angle iron, which struck him in the middle of his back. He was taken by ambulance to the emergency room. Appellant complained of lower back pain, a "stabbing pain" in the middle of his back, and stiffness of his neck. X-rays taken on the day of the injury were negative for any spinal injury, but a cracked cervical vertebrae and degenerative disk disease were detected in the C-spine area.

Appellant continued to complain of neck and back pain, and an MRI was done on July 15, 1999, which showed a herniated disc at C5-6. Another MRI was performed on August 25, 1999, which showed degenerative disk disease at L2-3 and L4-5 and osteoarthritic apophyseal joint hypertrophy at L3-4 and L4-5. The second MRI was performed because appellant continued to complain of back pain. Appellant received treatment for neck and back pain over the course of the next several months. He saw several different doctors in El Dorado, Pine Bluff, and Little Rock. He was treated with pain medication and physical therapy. When the conservative treatments were not successful in alleviating appellant's pain, Dr. Wilbur Giles in Little Rock performed an anterior cervical diskectomy and arthrodesis for cervical radicular syndrome on April 26, 2000.

After his surgery in April 2000, though his neck pain had been resolved, appellant continued to complain about back pain and insisted on another MRI for the lumbar region. Conagra contested any further treatment, alleging that the cervical spine injury was his only work-related injury. After much persistence on the part of appellant, another MRI was performed on August 21, 2000. The results revealed evidence of a lateral disk herniationwith foraminal narrowing at L4-5 with an annular bulge at L2-3. Appellant was diagnosed with lumbar disk syndrome, although no surgical treatment was recommended. Appellant was eventually referred to the Chronic Pain Clinic for a series of epidural or facet injections. Appellant requested that his workers' compensation carrier pay for his medical expenses in regard to his medical treatment for his lower back problems. This request was denied by Conagra, even though they had found his cervical spine injury to be a compensable, work-related injury. Conagra contended that there was no objective medical evidence to establish a causal connection between appellant's lumbar problem with his work-related accident on June 2, 1999. At the hearing before the ALJ, appellant testified that he had complained of lower back pain since his injury on June 2, 1999, and he produced medical documentation of such complaints. Appellant also testified that he had not injured his back in any other way since the accident at work. Conagra argued that the appellant's lumbar injury did not appear on the MRI results until August 2000, over a year after the original injury. The ALJ agreed with Conagra that appellant had not met his burden of proof that there was a causal relationship between his injury at work and his herniated disc in the lumbar region of his back. 1

Appellant appealed the ALJ's decision to the Commission. The Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the ALJ, stating that her decision was supported by a preponderance of the credible evidence and that it correctly applied the law. This appealfollowed.

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence. Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 277, 950 S.W.2d 472, 474 (1997). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts, 74 Ark. App. 428, 431, 58 S.W.3d 853, 855 (2001). The question is not whether the evidence would have supported findings contrary to the ones made by the Commission; there may be substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we had sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Disheroon, 26 Ark. App. 145, 761 S.W.2d 617 (1988). If reasonable minds could have reached the result found by the Commission, we must affirm the decision. Stotts, supra.

Appellant argues on appeal that the Commission erred in failing to consider the evidence presented by him concerning his complaints and treatment for lower-back pain from the time of his work-related injury up until the lumbar disk herniation was discovered in August 2000. Appellant alleges that he did prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his lumbar disk herniation was causally-related to his compensable, work-related injury in June 1999. Appellant further contends that the ALJ and the Commission based their respective decisions on an incorrect interpretation of the law in regard to "objective findings."

It is well-understood that "a compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by `objective findings.'" Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp. 1999). "Objective findings are those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i) (Supp.1999). A "compensable injury" is one "arising out of and in the course of employment...." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). A causal relationship between the injury and the employment must be proved to satisfy the requirements of a compensable injury. Stotts, supra at 432, 58 S.W.3d at 856. In Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, supra, this court addressed this same issue under similar facts. In that case, the employer was asserting that there was no objective medical evidence to show that the injury complained of by the employee took place when he fell from his truck while covering the load with a tarp. The employer argued that the alleged incident occurred in July 1994, but an MRI showing an injury was not performed until September 1994. The employer asked this court to apply the statutorily-mandated standard of strict construction to hold that a claimant must offer objective medical evidence to prove not only the existence of an injury, but also to show the circumstances under which the injury was sustained and the precise time of the injury's occurrence. Id. at 279, 950 S.W.2d at 474. We instead stated that medical evidence was not required to establish each and every element of compensability, and that the statutory definition of "compensability" as set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5) (Repl. 1996) contains many elements that are not "susceptible of proof by medical evidence supported by objective findings." Id. We concluded that to interpret the Act so strictly as to require objective medical findings to prove non-medical elements ofcompensability would defeat the overriding legislative intent, which is to pay timely benefits to all legitimately injured workers. Id. Therefore, we held that a compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings only in regard to the existence and extent of the injury. Id.

The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted Millican's holding in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). The supreme court stated that "objective medical evidence is necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury but not essential to establish the causal relationship between the injury and a work-related accident." Id. at 447, 990 S.W.2d at 524. In VanWagner, the employee's injury was not mentioned to her doctor until approximately seven months after the injury allegedly occurred. The Commission found that the employee had suffered a compensable injury and the supreme court affirmed the Commission's finding of compensability. Id.

Here, appellee does not contest that appellant suffered a compensable injury on June 2, 1999. The argument is whether or not the designation of "compensable injury" extends to the herniated disk in the appellant's lumbar spinal area. The basic test is whether there is a causal link between the original injury and the subsequent complications. Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond, 7 Ark. App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983). Causal connection is generally a matter of inference, and possibilities may play a proper and important role in establishing that relationship. Osmose Wood Preserving v. Jones, 40 Ark. App. 190, 194, 843 S.W.2d 875, 877 (1991). However, the determination of whether a causal connection exists is a question of fact for the Commission. Carter v. Flintrol, Inc., 19 Ark. App. 317, 720 S.W.2d 337 (1986).

The August 1999 MRI of appellant's lumbar spine was negative for any herniated disks, and only showed degeneratvie disk disease at L2-3 and L4-5 and osteoarthritic apopphyseal joint hypertrophy at L3-4 and L4-5. A year later, another MRI was performed revealing a herniated disk with foraminal narrowing at L4-5 with annual bulge at L2-3. Viewing the evidence presented, the Commission was free to believe that appellant's latest onset of back problems were not caused by his work-related injury.

We conclude the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence and that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the Commission. Although we may have reached a different conclusion had we been sitting as the trier of fact, we are bound by our standard of review, and therefore we must affirm the Commission's decision. VanWagner, supra.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Bird, JJ., agree.

1 The ALJ's opinion contains numerous citations to Workers' Compensation Commission opinions. These opinions are not considered by this court as an authority and should not be cited as such.