James C. Morgan v. Logan Oil Company

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION II

JAMES C. MORGAN

APPELLANT

V.

LOGAN OIL COMPANY

APPELLEE

CA02-186

December 18, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. F002354]

AFFIRMED

The appellant in this workers' compensation case filed a claim for benefits alleging that he sustained a compensable heart attack in the course of his employment with appellee. After a hearing, the Commission found that appellant had failed to establish that he sustained an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. This appeal followed.

For reversal, appellant contends that the Commission's finding is not supported by substantial evidence because it is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We find no error, and we affirm.

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and we will affirm if

those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The determination of the credibility and weight to be given a witness's testimony is within the sole province of the Commission. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Farmers Cooperative v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.3d 899 (2002).

Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-114 (Repl. 2002) provides, in pertinent part, that:

(a) A cardiovascular, coronary, pulmonary, respiratory, or cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction causing injury, illness, or death is a compensable injury only if, in relation to other factors contributing to the physical harm, an accident is the major cause of the physical harm.

(b)(1) An injury or disease included in subsection (a) of this section shall not be deemed to be a compensable injury unless it is shown that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability or death was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the employee's usual work in the course of the employee's regular employment or, alternately, that some unusual and unpredicted incident occurred which is found to have been the major cause of the physical harm.

Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-114(b), in order to prove that he had sustained a compensable injury, appellant was required to show that his heart attack was precipitated by exertion that was extraordinary or unusual compared with his usual work. In the present case, appellant testified that he suffered a sudden onset of chest and back pain, accompanied by weakness, while he was engaged in rapidly moving stock at work. In addition, heintroduced medical opinion to the effect that his heart attack was caused by the unusual exertion of moving this stock so rapidly. However, the Commission was also presented with testimony that appellant had not, in fact, been moving stock at work at the time of the incident, and that appellant informed the emergency room physician that he had been doing nothing particularly strenuous when he developed the sudden onset of pain. The Commission was therefore presented with two conflicting versions of the events surrounding appellant's heart attack, and its finding consequently turns on a determination of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Given that questions of weight and credibility are matters within the exclusive province of the Commission, we cannot say that the Commission erred in finding that appellant failed to establish that he sustained an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. See, e.g., Patterson v. Insurance Department, 343 Ark. 255, 33 S.W.3d 151 (2000); White v. Gregg Agricultural Enterprises, 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001); Ellison v. Therma Tru, 71 Ark. App. 410, 30 S.W.3d 769 (2000).

Affirmed.

Hart and Bird, JJ., agree.