Basler Electric Company, Inc. and The Hartford Insurance Company v. Wanda S. Lamb

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN E. JENNINGS, JUDGE

DIVISION II

CA 01-896

March 6, 2002

BASLER ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. and

THE HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS

APPELLANTS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

E911912

VS.

WANDA S. LAMB

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

Wanda Lamb sustained an admittedly compensable back injury while lifting coils at work on November 17, 1998. On or about March 27, 2000, appellee was working on an assembly line which required her to stand and lean over the line while twisting her body. As a result of her work activities on that day, appellee began having significant physical problems for which she sought medical treatment. Appellants had ceased paying appellee's medical bills prior to March 27 after Dr. R. Edward Cooper, Jr., found that she had sustained no permanent impairment. The law judge foundthat appellee had failed to prove that she sustained a new injury on March 27, but that she had proven that she had suffered several recurrences of the original compensable injury. The Commission affirmed and adopted the law judge's findings. Appellants argue that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission's opinion. We disagree and affirm.

Appellee sustained a low back injury in 1991, which required follow-up medical treatment including medication, but she was able to return to work without any restrictions. She then sustained an injury to her back on November 17, 1998, that appellants accepted as compensable and paid benefits until medical treatment was terminated following Dr. Cooper's October 12, 1999, report finding that appellee had sustained no permanent impairment. In August 1999, Dr. Cooper had stated:

I think it is unlikely that her symptoms are coming from her LS spine. It appears that the worker's compensation people have not changed her job task as we worked out before. This seemed to work and keep her situation under control, but she is still doing the same job which is irritating her. I think that as long as she is doing that job probably she is going to continue to have flare-ups and from the spine standpoint I think there is nothing that we can do for it.

The Commission found that appellee had failed to prove that she sustained a new injury on March 27, 2000, but that she had proven that she had experienced a number of recurrences followingthe November 17, 1998, injury. The Commission relied on Dr. Cooper's August 1999 report in finding that appellee's work duties had exceeded the physical restrictions placed upon her by her primary treating physician and had caused her to suffer several flare-ups from the original injury.

On appeal we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and give the testimony its strongest probative force in favor of the Commission's decision. Patterson v. Arkansas Dep't of Health, 70 Ark. App. 182, 15 S.W.3d 701 (2000). Our standard of review on appeal is whether the Commis sion's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Ellison v. Therma Tru, 71 Ark. App. 410, 30 S.W.3d 769 (2000). We do not reverse a decision of the Commission unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have arrived at the conclusion reached. Buford v. Standard Gravel Co., 68 Ark. App. 162, 5 S.W.3d 478 (1999). The Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinion and the authority to determine its medical soundness and probative force. Green Bay Packaging v. Bartlett, 67 Ark. App. 332, 999 S.W.2d 695 (1999). The Commission has the duty to use its expertise in translating evidence given by medical experts into findings of fact. Hill v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 74 Ark. App. 250, 48 S.W.3d 544 (2001).

Appellants argue that there is no medical evidence to establish that the treatment appellee began receiving after March 27, 2000, was related to anything other than the degenerative disc disease that has plagued her since 1991. They contend that although Dr. Cooper mentioned an exacerbation of her back condition in his August 1999 report, this was approximately seven months prior to the alleged recurrence of March 27, 2000, and that appellee thus failed to establish the requisite causal connection.

A recurrence is not a new injury but merely another period of incapacitation resulting from a previous injury. Atkins Nursing Home v. Gray, 54 Ark. App. 125, 923 S.W.2d 897 (1996). A recur rence exists when the second complication is a natural and probable consequence of a prior injury. Weldon v. Pierce Bros. Constr., 54 Ark. App. 344, 925 S.W.2d 179 (1996).

The determination of the existence of a causal connection is a question of fact for the Commission. Goodwin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 72 Ark. App. 302, 37 S.W.3d 644 (2001). Dr. Cooper's report establishes that appellee's "flare-ups" were caused by the fact that appellants had failed to change appellee's job duties as discussed and that performance of her job duties was irritating her back problem. Because the Commission found that appellee had suffered several recurrences of the original compensa ble injury, the focus was not only on the March 27 incident. Thefact that the report of Dr. Cooper, relied upon by the Commission, was written seven months prior to March 2000 is not determinative. Dr. Cooper predicted that the appellee would continue to have flare-ups "as long as she is doing that job." The Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Crabtree, J., agree.