Pearl V. Pritchett v. Lewis Lumber & Manufacturing Company and Compensation Managers, Inc.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JUDGE KAREN R. BAKER

DIVISION IV

PEARL V. PRITCHETT

APPELLANT

V.

LEWIS LUMBER & MANUFACTURING CO. and COMPENSATION MANAGERS, INC.

APPELLEES

CA01-00743

MARCH 13, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS'COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E801539]

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Pearl Pritchett, appeals the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) denying continued benefits after May 11, 1998, to appellant for her compensable back injury. Appellant's sole argument for reversal is that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's finding that she is not entitled to additional medical treatment or additional temporary total disability benefits (TTD) after May 1, 1998, as a result of her compensable injury. We affirm.

On January 27, 1998, appellant sustained an injury to her back while working for appellee Lewis Lumber. She was taking boards off of a belt and putting them in bundles when her leg caught on a bundle behind her and she fell. Initially, appellees accepted appellant's claim as a compensable injury and paid medical and temporary total disability benefits through May 11, 1998. Thereafter, appellees, without controverting the initial injury, denied any further obligation to provide appellant

with temporary disability payments or medical benefits.

Appellant's initial complaint was for an injury to her lower back on the right side. On the day of the injury, she advised her supervisor, who was also her husband, of the injury; however, he waited until the following day to take her to the emergency room in Mena where she was treated by Dr. Wilson. An x-ray was taken, and she was referred to Dr. Ulmer in Mena who prescribed medication after the examination and referred appellant to Dr. Cappelo. Appellant saw Dr. Cappelo on February 27, 1998, when he diagnosed her with low back strain and recommended physical therapy. When appellant returned for follow-up to Dr. Cappelo on May 8, 1998, he stated that "she's bending over, is able to dress herself in the morning, walks on her heels and toes. No back spasm. Neurological examination: The reflexes are intact. Impression: Patient may return to active duty."

However, appellant did not return to work. Instead, she sought treatment from other doctors for treatment of her condition. Only two of these doctors' medical records are included in the record before us, Dr. Martimbeau and Dr. Alkire.

A hearing was held on October 31, 2000, to determine whether appellant was entitled to additional TTD benefits and medical benefits beyond the date of May 11, 1998. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to additional medical treatment or additional TTD benefits as a result of her compensable injury. In finding that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proof, he noted that Dr. Martimbeau concluded that appellant's "current symptoms do not correlate with any specific findings revealed by the MRI." In addressing Dr. Alkire's treatment of appellant, the ALJ emphasized the doctor's statement to appellant and her husband that the doctor "didn't see anything pathological in the lumbar spine that would cause her pain and symptoms." On April 30, 2001, the Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's opinion.

In reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, this court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock, 63 Ark.App. 118, 975 S.W.2d 857 (1998). These findings will be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Carter, 62 Ark.App. 162, 969 S.W.2d 677 (1998). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Wackenhut Corp. and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jones, 73 Ark.App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001). On an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission, the question is not whether the evidence would have supported findings contrary to those of the Commission; rather, the decision of the Commission must be affirmed if reasonable minds might have reached the same conclusion. See Dallas County Hosp. v. Daniels, 74 Ark.App. 177, 47 S.W.3d 283 (2001); Barnett v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Ark.App. 265, 970 S.W.2d 319 (1998).

When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision, we cannot say that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

Bird and Griffen, JJ., agree.